* consensus: calculate prevote message delay metric (#7551)
## What does this pull request do?
This pull requests adds two metrics intended for use in calculating an experimental value for `MessageDelay`.
The metrics are as follows:
```
# HELP tendermint_consensus_complete_prevote_message_delay Difference in seconds between the proposal timestamp and the timestamp of the prevote that achieved 100% of the voting power in the prevote step.
# TYPE tendermint_consensus_complete_prevote_message_delay gauge
tendermint_consensus_complete_prevote_message_delay{chain_id="test-chain-aZbwF1"} 0.013025505
# HELP tendermint_consensus_quorum_prevote_message_delay Difference in seconds between the proposal timestamp and the timestamp of the prevote that achieved a quorum in the prevote step.
# TYPE tendermint_consensus_quorum_prevote_message_delay gauge
tendermint_consensus_quorum_prevote_message_delay{chain_id="test-chain-aZbwF1"} 0.013025505
```
## Why this change?
For more information on what these metrics are calculating, see #7202. The aim is to merge to backport these metrics to v0.34 and run nodes on a few popular chains with these metrics to determine the experimental values for `MessageDelay` on these popular chains and use these to select our default `SynchronyParams.MessageDelay` value.
## Why Gauges for the metrics?
Gauges allow us to overwrite the metric on each successive observation. We can then capture these metrics over time to track the highest and lowest observed value.
(cherry picked from commit 0c82ceaa5f)
# Conflicts:
# consensus/metrics.go
# consensus/state.go
* fix merge conflicts
Co-authored-by: William Banfield <4561443+williambanfield@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: William Banfield <wbanfield@gmail.com>
This is an attempt to clean up the logging message as requested in #6269.
(cherry picked from commit 3f9066b290)
Co-authored-by: Sam Kleinman <garen@tychoish.com>
## Description
Since events are not hashed into the header they can be non deterministic. Changing an event is not consensus breaking. Will update docs in the spec
(cherry picked from commit 884d4d5252)
Co-authored-by: Marko <marbar3778@yahoo.com>
* mempool: length prefix txs when getting them from mempool (#5483)
* correctly calculate evidence data size (#5482)
* block: use commit sig size instead of vote size (#5490)
* tx: reduce function to one parameter (#5493)
## Description
Check block protocol version in header validate basic.
I tried searching for where we check the P2P protocol version but was unable to find it. When we check compatibility with a node we check we both have the same block protocol and are on the same network, but we do not check if we are on the same P2P protocol. It makes sense if there is a handshake change because we would not be able to establish a secure connection, but a p2p protocol version bump may be because of a p2p message change, which would go unnoticed until that message is sent over the wire. Is this purposeful?
Closes: #4790
## Description
This PR aims to make the crypto.PubKey interface more intuitive.
Changes:
- `VerfiyBytes` -> `VerifySignature`
Before `Bytes()` was amino encoded, now since it is the byte representation should we get rid of it entirely?
EDIT: decided to keep `Bytes()` as it is useful if you are using the interface instead of the concrete key
Closes: #XXX
Adds a genesis parameter `initial_height` which specifies the initial block height, as well as ABCI `RequestInitChain.InitialHeight` to pass it to the ABCI application, and `State.InitialHeight` to keep track of the initial height throughout the code. Fixes#2543, based on [RFC-002](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/pull/119). Spec changes in https://github.com/tendermint/spec/pull/135.
Fixes#5192.
@liamsi Can you verify that the test vectors match the Rust implementation? I updated `ProofsFromByteSlices()` as well, anything else that should be updated?
Solves #5138 in the way that if a validatorSet is nil or empty it will not try to transform it to protobug
Co-authored-by: Callum Michael Waters <cmwaters19@gmail.com>
ValidateBasic() for PotentialAmnesiaEvidence checks that the rounds of the two votes are different and does not check Vote Type
ValidateBasic() now also ensures that the first block is not a nil block (else the validator hasn't actually locked onto a block)
## Description
This PR wraps the stdlib sync.(RW)Mutex & godeadlock.(RW)Mutex. This enables using go-deadlock via a build flag instead of using sed to replace sync with godeadlock in all files
Closes: #3242
Closes#4926
The dump consensus state had this:
"last_commit": {
"votes": [
"Vote{0:04CBBF43CA3E 385085/00/2(Precommit) 1B73DA9FC4C8 42C97B86D89D @ 2020-05-27T06:46:51.042392895Z}",
"Vote{1:055799E028FA 385085/00/2(Precommit) 652B08AD61EA 0D507D7FA3AB @ 2020-06-28T04:57:29.20793209Z}",
"Vote{2:056024CFA910 385085/00/2(Precommit) 652B08AD61EA C8E95532A4C3 @ 2020-06-28T04:57:29.452696998Z}",
"Vote{3:0741C95814DA 385085/00/2(Precommit) 652B08AD61EA 36D567615F7C @ 2020-06-28T04:57:29.279788593Z}",
Note there's a precommit in there from the first val from May (2020-05-27) while the rest are from today (2020-06-28). It suggests there's a validator from an old instance of the network at this height (they're using the same chain-id!). Obviously a single bad validator shouldn't be an issue. But the Commit refactor work introduced a bug.
When we propose a block, we get the block.LastCommit by calling MakeCommit on the set of precommits we saw for the last height. This set may include precommits for a different block, and hence the block.LastCommit we propose may include precommits that aren't actually for the last block (but of course +2/3 will be). Before v0.33, we just skipped over these precommits during verification. But in v0.33, we expect all signatures for a blockID to be for the same block ID! Thus we end up proposing a block that we can't verify.
Since the light client work introduced in v0.33 it appears full nodes
are no longer fully verifying commit signatures during block execution -
they stop after +2/3. See in VerifyCommit:
0c7fd316eb/types/validator_set.go (L700-L703)
This means proposers can propose blocks that contain valid +2/3
signatures and then the rest of the signatures can be whatever they
want. They can claim that all the other validators signed just by
including a CommitSig with arbitrary signature data. While this doesn't
seem to impact safety of Tendermint per se, it means that Commits may
contain a lot of invalid data. This is already true of blocks, since
they can include invalid txs filled with garbage, but in that case the
application knows they they are invalid and can punish the proposer. But
since applications dont verify commit signatures directly (they trust
tendermint to do that), they won't be able to detect it.
This can impact incentivization logic in the application that depends on
the LastCommitInfo sent in BeginBlock, which includes which validators
signed. For instance, Gaia incentivizes proposers with a bonus for
including more than +2/3 of the signatures. But a proposer can now claim
that bonus just by including arbitrary data for the final -1/3 of
validators without actually waiting for their signatures. There may be
other tricks that can be played because of this.
In general, the full node should be a fully verifying machine. While
it's true that the light client can avoid verifying all signatures by
stopping after +2/3, the full node can not. Thus the light client and
full node should use distinct VerifyCommit functions if one is going to
stop after +2/3 or otherwise perform less validation (for instance light
clients can also skip verifying votes for nil while full nodes can not).
See a commit with a bad signature that verifies here: 56367fd. From what
I can tell, Tendermint will go on to think this commit is valid and
forward this data to the app, so the app will think the second validator
actually signed when it clearly did not.
mergify[bot]
Sam Kleinman
Anton Kaliaev
Callum Waters
Marko
Erik Grinaker
