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evidence: fix bug with hashes (backport #6375) (#6381)

pull/6436/head
mergify[bot] 3 years ago
committed by GitHub
parent
commit
353e3a3243
No known key found for this signature in database GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
11 changed files with 418 additions and 316 deletions
  1. +2
    -0
      CHANGELOG_PENDING.md
  2. +5
    -66
      evidence/pool.go
  3. +42
    -54
      evidence/pool_test.go
  4. +51
    -43
      evidence/verify.go
  5. +224
    -97
      evidence/verify_test.go
  6. +5
    -1
      test/e2e/tests/block_test.go
  7. +20
    -5
      types/evidence.go
  8. +55
    -45
      types/evidence_test.go
  9. +1
    -1
      types/light.go
  10. +4
    -2
      types/light_test.go
  11. +9
    -2
      types/validator_set.go

+ 2
- 0
CHANGELOG_PENDING.md View File

@ -25,3 +25,5 @@ Friendly reminder, we have a [bug bounty program](https://hackerone.com/tendermi
- [statesync] \#6378 Retry requests for snapshots and add a minimum discovery time (5s) for new snapshots.
### BUG FIXES
- [evidence] \#6375 Fix bug with inconsistent LightClientAttackEvidence hashing (cmwaters)

+ 5
- 66
evidence/pool.go View File

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sort"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
@ -194,9 +193,11 @@ func (evpool *Pool) CheckEvidence(evList types.EvidenceList) error {
hashes := make([][]byte, len(evList))
for idx, ev := range evList {
ok := evpool.fastCheck(ev)
_, isLightEv := ev.(*types.LightClientAttackEvidence)
if !ok {
// We must verify light client attack evidence regardless because there could be a
// different conflicting block with the same hash.
if isLightEv || !evpool.isPending(ev) {
// check that the evidence isn't already committed
if evpool.isCommitted(ev) {
return &types.ErrInvalidEvidence{Evidence: ev, Reason: errors.New("evidence was already committed")}
@ -213,7 +214,7 @@ func (evpool *Pool) CheckEvidence(evList types.EvidenceList) error {
evpool.logger.Error("Can't add evidence to pending list", "err", err, "ev", ev)
}
evpool.logger.Info("Verified new evidence of byzantine behavior", "evidence", ev)
evpool.logger.Info("Check evidence: verified evidence of byzantine behavior", "evidence", ev)
}
// check for duplicate evidence. We cache hashes so we don't have to work them out again.
@ -255,68 +256,6 @@ func (evpool *Pool) State() sm.State {
return evpool.state
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
// fastCheck leverages the fact that the evidence pool may have already verified the evidence to see if it can
// quickly conclude that the evidence is already valid.
func (evpool *Pool) fastCheck(ev types.Evidence) bool {
if lcae, ok := ev.(*types.LightClientAttackEvidence); ok {
key := keyPending(ev)
evBytes, err := evpool.evidenceStore.Get(key)
if evBytes == nil { // the evidence is not in the nodes pending list
return false
}
if err != nil {
evpool.logger.Error("Failed to load light client attack evidence", "err", err, "key(height/hash)", key)
return false
}
var trustedPb tmproto.LightClientAttackEvidence
err = trustedPb.Unmarshal(evBytes)
if err != nil {
evpool.logger.Error("Failed to convert light client attack evidence from bytes",
"err", err, "key(height/hash)", key)
return false
}
trustedEv, err := types.LightClientAttackEvidenceFromProto(&trustedPb)
if err != nil {
evpool.logger.Error("Failed to convert light client attack evidence from protobuf",
"err", err, "key(height/hash)", key)
return false
}
// ensure that all the byzantine validators that the evidence pool has match the byzantine validators
// in this evidence
if trustedEv.ByzantineValidators == nil && lcae.ByzantineValidators != nil {
return false
}
if len(trustedEv.ByzantineValidators) != len(lcae.ByzantineValidators) {
return false
}
byzValsCopy := make([]*types.Validator, len(lcae.ByzantineValidators))
for i, v := range lcae.ByzantineValidators {
byzValsCopy[i] = v.Copy()
}
// ensure that both validator arrays are in the same order
sort.Sort(types.ValidatorsByVotingPower(byzValsCopy))
for idx, val := range trustedEv.ByzantineValidators {
if !bytes.Equal(byzValsCopy[idx].Address, val.Address) {
return false
}
if byzValsCopy[idx].VotingPower != val.VotingPower {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// for all other evidence the evidence pool just checks if it is already in the pending db
return evpool.isPending(ev)
}
// IsExpired checks whether evidence or a polc is expired by checking whether a height and time is older
// than set by the evidence consensus parameters
func (evpool *Pool) isExpired(height int64, time time.Time) bool {


+ 42
- 54
evidence/pool_test.go View File

@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ func TestReportConflictingVotes(t *testing.T) {
// should be able to retrieve evidence from pool
evList, _ = pool.PendingEvidence(defaultEvidenceMaxBytes)
require.Equal(t, []types.Evidence{ev}, evList)
next = pool.EvidenceFront()
require.NotNil(t, next)
}
func TestEvidencePoolUpdate(t *testing.T) {
@ -234,62 +237,29 @@ func TestVerifyDuplicatedEvidenceFails(t *testing.T) {
// check that valid light client evidence is correctly validated and stored in
// evidence pool
func TestCheckEvidenceWithLightClientAttack(t *testing.T) {
func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
var (
nValidators = 5
validatorPower int64 = 10
height int64 = 10
height int64 = 100
commonHeight int64 = 90
)
conflictingVals, conflictingPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(nValidators, validatorPower)
trustedHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
trustedHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime
conflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
trustedHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash
trustedHeader.NextValidatorsHash = conflictingHeader.NextValidatorsHash
trustedHeader.ConsensusHash = conflictingHeader.ConsensusHash
trustedHeader.AppHash = conflictingHeader.AppHash
trustedHeader.LastResultsHash = conflictingHeader.LastResultsHash
// for simplicity we are simulating a duplicate vote attack where all the validators in the
// conflictingVals set voted twice
blockID := makeBlockID(conflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
voteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
commit, err := types.MakeCommit(blockID, height, 1, voteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
ev := &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
Header: conflictingHeader,
Commit: commit,
},
ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
},
CommonHeight: 10,
TotalVotingPower: int64(nValidators) * validatorPower,
ByzantineValidators: conflictingVals.Validators,
Timestamp: defaultEvidenceTime,
}
trustedBlockID := makeBlockID(trustedHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
trustedVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
trustedCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(trustedBlockID, height, 1, trustedVoteSet, conflictingPrivVals,
defaultEvidenceTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(t, height, commonHeight,
10, 5, 5, defaultEvidenceTime, defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1*time.Hour))
state := sm.State{
LastBlockTime: defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Minute),
LastBlockHeight: 11,
LastBlockTime: defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2 * time.Hour),
LastBlockHeight: 110,
ConsensusParams: *types.DefaultConsensusParams(),
}
stateStore := &smmocks.Store{}
stateStore.On("LoadValidators", height).Return(conflictingVals, nil)
stateStore.On("LoadValidators", height).Return(trusted.ValidatorSet, nil)
stateStore.On("LoadValidators", commonHeight).Return(common.ValidatorSet, nil)
stateStore.On("Load").Return(state, nil)
blockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", height).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trustedHeader})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", height).Return(trustedCommit)
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", height).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trusted.Header})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", height).Return(trusted.Commit)
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
pool, err := evidence.NewPool(dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
require.NoError(t, err)
@ -298,14 +268,32 @@ func TestCheckEvidenceWithLightClientAttack(t *testing.T) {
err = pool.AddEvidence(ev)
assert.NoError(t, err)
err = pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev})
assert.NoError(t, err)
hash := ev.Hash()
// take away the last signature -> there are less validators then what we have detected,
// hence this should fail
commit.Signatures = append(commit.Signatures[:nValidators-1], types.NewCommitSigAbsent())
err = pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev})
assert.Error(t, err)
require.NoError(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
require.NoError(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
pendingEv, _ := pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
require.Equal(t, 1, len(pendingEv))
require.Equal(t, ev, pendingEv[0])
require.NoError(t, pool.CheckEvidence(pendingEv))
require.Equal(t, ev, pendingEv[0])
state.LastBlockHeight++
state.LastBlockTime = state.LastBlockTime.Add(1 * time.Minute)
pool.Update(state, pendingEv)
require.Equal(t, hash, pendingEv[0].Hash())
remaindingEv, _ := pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
require.Empty(t, remaindingEv)
// evidence is already committed so it shouldn't pass
require.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev}))
require.NoError(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
remaindingEv, _ = pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
require.Empty(t, remaindingEv)
}
// Tests that restarting the evidence pool after a potential failure will recover the
@ -345,7 +333,7 @@ func TestRecoverPendingEvidence(t *testing.T) {
Evidence: tmproto.EvidenceParams{
MaxAgeNumBlocks: 20,
MaxAgeDuration: 20 * time.Minute,
MaxBytes: 1000,
MaxBytes: defaultEvidenceMaxBytes,
},
},
}, nil)


+ 51
- 43
evidence/verify.go View File

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sort"
"time"
"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/light"
@ -94,34 +93,6 @@ func (evpool *Pool) verify(evidence types.Evidence) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
// find out what type of attack this was and thus extract the malicious validators. Note in the case of an
// Amnesia attack we don't have any malicious validators.
validators := ev.GetByzantineValidators(commonVals, trustedHeader)
// ensure this matches the validators that are listed in the evidence. They should be ordered based on power.
if validators == nil && ev.ByzantineValidators != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("expected nil validators from an amnesia light client attack but got %d",
len(ev.ByzantineValidators))
}
if exp, got := len(validators), len(ev.ByzantineValidators); exp != got {
return fmt.Errorf("expected %d byzantine validators from evidence but got %d",
exp, got)
}
// ensure that both validator arrays are in the same order
sort.Sort(types.ValidatorsByVotingPower(ev.ByzantineValidators))
for idx, val := range validators {
if !bytes.Equal(ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address, val.Address) {
return fmt.Errorf("evidence contained a different byzantine validator address to the one we were expecting."+
"Expected %v, got %v", val.Address, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address)
}
if ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower != val.VotingPower {
return fmt.Errorf("evidence contained a byzantine validator with a different power to the one we were expecting."+
"Expected %d, got %d", val.VotingPower, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower)
}
}
return nil
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unrecognized evidence type: %T", evidence)
@ -149,7 +120,7 @@ func VerifyLightClientAttack(e *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, commonHeader, t
}
// In the case of equivocation and amnesia we expect all header hashes to be correctly derived
} else if isInvalidHeader(trustedHeader.Header, e.ConflictingBlock.Header) {
} else if e.ConflictingHeaderIsInvalid(trustedHeader.Header) {
return errors.New("common height is the same as conflicting block height so expected the conflicting" +
" block to be correctly derived yet it wasn't")
}
@ -178,7 +149,7 @@ func VerifyLightClientAttack(e *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, commonHeader, t
trustedHeader.Hash())
}
return nil
return validateABCIEvidence(e, commonVals, trustedHeader)
}
// VerifyDuplicateVote verifies DuplicateVoteEvidence against the state of full node. This involves the
@ -249,6 +220,55 @@ func VerifyDuplicateVote(e *types.DuplicateVoteEvidence, chainID string, valSet
return nil
}
// validateABCIEvidence validates the ABCI component of the light client attack
// evidence i.e voting power and byzantine validators
func validateABCIEvidence(
ev *types.LightClientAttackEvidence,
commonVals *types.ValidatorSet,
trustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
) error {
if evTotal, valsTotal := ev.TotalVotingPower, commonVals.TotalVotingPower(); evTotal != valsTotal {
return fmt.Errorf("total voting power from the evidence and our validator set does not match (%d != %d)",
evTotal, valsTotal)
}
// Find out what type of attack this was and thus extract the malicious
// validators. Note, in the case of an Amnesia attack we don't have any
// malicious validators.
validators := ev.GetByzantineValidators(commonVals, trustedHeader)
// Ensure this matches the validators that are listed in the evidence. They
// should be ordered based on power.
if validators == nil && ev.ByzantineValidators != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"expected nil validators from an amnesia light client attack but got %d",
len(ev.ByzantineValidators),
)
}
if exp, got := len(validators), len(ev.ByzantineValidators); exp != got {
return fmt.Errorf("expected %d byzantine validators from evidence but got %d", exp, got)
}
for idx, val := range validators {
if !bytes.Equal(ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address, val.Address) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"evidence contained an unexpected byzantine validator address; expected: %v, got: %v",
val.Address, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address,
)
}
if ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower != val.VotingPower {
return fmt.Errorf(
"evidence contained unexpected byzantine validator power; expected %d, got %d",
val.VotingPower, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower,
)
}
}
return nil
}
func getSignedHeader(blockStore BlockStore, height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
blockMeta := blockStore.LoadBlockMeta(height)
if blockMeta == nil {
@ -263,15 +283,3 @@ func getSignedHeader(blockStore BlockStore, height int64) (*types.SignedHeader,
Commit: commit,
}, nil
}
// isInvalidHeader takes a trusted header and matches it againt a conflicting header
// to determine whether the conflicting header was the product of a valid state transition
// or not. If it is then all the deterministic fields of the header should be the same.
// If not, it is an invalid header and constitutes a lunatic attack.
func isInvalidHeader(trusted, conflicting *types.Header) bool {
return !bytes.Equal(trusted.ValidatorsHash, conflicting.ValidatorsHash) ||
!bytes.Equal(trusted.NextValidatorsHash, conflicting.NextValidatorsHash) ||
!bytes.Equal(trusted.ConsensusHash, conflicting.ConsensusHash) ||
!bytes.Equal(trusted.AppHash, conflicting.AppHash) ||
!bytes.Equal(trusted.LastResultsHash, conflicting.LastResultsHash)
}

+ 224
- 97
evidence/verify_test.go View File

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package evidence_test
import (
"bytes"
"testing"
"time"
@ -22,140 +23,171 @@ import (
"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/version"
)
func TestVerifyLightClientAttack_Lunatic(t *testing.T) {
commonVals, commonPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(2, 10)
newVal, newPrivVal := types.RandValidator(false, 9)
conflictingVals, err := types.ValidatorSetFromExistingValidators(append(commonVals.Validators, newVal))
require.NoError(t, err)
conflictingPrivVals := append(commonPrivVals, newPrivVal)
commonHeader := makeHeaderRandom(4)
commonHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime
trustedHeader := makeHeaderRandom(10)
trustedHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
conflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(10)
conflictingHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
// we are simulating a lunatic light client attack
blockID := makeBlockID(conflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
voteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, 10, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
commit, err := types.MakeCommit(blockID, 10, 1, voteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
ev := &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
Header: conflictingHeader,
Commit: commit,
},
ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
},
CommonHeight: 4,
TotalVotingPower: 20,
ByzantineValidators: commonVals.Validators,
Timestamp: defaultEvidenceTime,
}
const (
defaultVotingPower = 10
)
commonSignedHeader := &types.SignedHeader{
Header: commonHeader,
Commit: &types.Commit{},
}
trustedBlockID := makeBlockID(trustedHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
vals, privVals := types.RandValidatorSet(3, 8)
trustedVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, 10, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), vals)
trustedCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(trustedBlockID, 10, 1, trustedVoteSet, privVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
trustedSignedHeader := &types.SignedHeader{
Header: trustedHeader,
Commit: trustedCommit,
}
func TestVerifyLightClientAttack_Lunatic(t *testing.T) {
const (
height int64 = 10
commonHeight int64 = 4
totalVals = 10
byzVals = 4
)
attackTime := defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
// create valid lunatic evidence
ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(
t, height, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
require.NoError(t, ev.ValidateBasic())
// good pass -> no error
err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonSignedHeader, trustedSignedHeader, commonVals,
err := evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, trusted.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
assert.NoError(t, err)
// trusted and conflicting hashes are the same -> an error should be returned
err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonSignedHeader, ev.ConflictingBlock.SignedHeader, commonVals,
err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, ev.ConflictingBlock.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
assert.Error(t, err)
// evidence with different total validator power should fail
ev.TotalVotingPower = 1
err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonSignedHeader, trustedSignedHeader, commonVals,
ev.TotalVotingPower = 1 * defaultVotingPower
err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, trusted.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
assert.Error(t, err)
ev.TotalVotingPower = 20
forwardConflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(11)
forwardConflictingHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(30 * time.Minute)
forwardConflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
forwardBlockID := makeBlockID(forwardConflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
forwardVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, 11, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
forwardCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(forwardBlockID, 11, 1, forwardVoteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
forwardLunaticEv := &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
Header: forwardConflictingHeader,
Commit: forwardCommit,
},
ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
},
CommonHeight: 4,
TotalVotingPower: 20,
ByzantineValidators: commonVals.Validators,
Timestamp: defaultEvidenceTime,
}
err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(forwardLunaticEv, commonSignedHeader, trustedSignedHeader, commonVals,
// evidence without enough malicious votes should fail
ev, trusted, common = makeLunaticEvidence(
t, height, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals-1, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, trusted.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Error(t, err)
}
func TestVerify_LunaticAttackAgainstState(t *testing.T) {
const (
height int64 = 10
commonHeight int64 = 4
totalVals = 10
byzVals = 4
)
attackTime := defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
// create valid lunatic evidence
ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(
t, height, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
// now we try to test verification against state
state := sm.State{
LastBlockTime: defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2 * time.Hour),
LastBlockHeight: 11,
LastBlockHeight: height + 1,
ConsensusParams: *types.DefaultConsensusParams(),
}
stateStore := &smmocks.Store{}
stateStore.On("LoadValidators", int64(4)).Return(commonVals, nil)
stateStore.On("LoadValidators", commonHeight).Return(common.ValidatorSet, nil)
stateStore.On("Load").Return(state, nil)
blockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", int64(4)).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *commonHeader})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", int64(10)).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trustedHeader})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", int64(11)).Return(nil)
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", int64(4)).Return(commit)
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", int64(10)).Return(trustedCommit)
blockStore.On("Height").Return(int64(10))
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", height).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trusted.Header})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", height).Return(trusted.Commit)
pool, err := evidence.NewPool(dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
require.NoError(t, err)
pool.SetLogger(log.TestingLogger())
evList := types.EvidenceList{ev}
err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
assert.NoError(t, err)
// check that the evidence pool correctly verifies the evidence
assert.NoError(t, pool.CheckEvidence(evList))
// as it was not originally in the pending bucket, it should now have been added
pendingEvs, _ := pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
assert.Equal(t, 1, len(pendingEvs))
assert.Equal(t, ev, pendingEvs[0])
// if we submit evidence only against a single byzantine validator when we see there are more validators then this
// should return an error
ev.ByzantineValidators = []*types.Validator{commonVals.Validators[0]}
err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
assert.Error(t, err)
ev.ByzantineValidators = commonVals.Validators // restore evidence
ev.ByzantineValidators = ev.ByzantineValidators[:1]
t.Log(evList)
assert.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(evList))
// restore original byz vals
ev.ByzantineValidators = ev.GetByzantineValidators(common.ValidatorSet, trusted.SignedHeader)
// duplicate evidence should be rejected
evList = types.EvidenceList{ev, ev}
pool, err = evidence.NewPool(dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(evList))
// If evidence is submitted with an altered timestamp it should return an error
ev.Timestamp = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Minute)
err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
assert.Error(t, err)
pool, err = evidence.NewPool(dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Error(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
ev.Timestamp = defaultEvidenceTime
evList = types.EvidenceList{forwardLunaticEv}
err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
assert.NoError(t, err)
// Evidence submitted with a different validator power should fail
ev.TotalVotingPower = 1
pool, err = evidence.NewPool(dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Error(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
ev.TotalVotingPower = common.ValidatorSet.TotalVotingPower()
}
func TestVerify_ForwardLunaticAttack(t *testing.T) {
const (
nodeHeight int64 = 8
attackHeight int64 = 10
commonHeight int64 = 4
totalVals = 10
byzVals = 5
)
attackTime := defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
// create a forward lunatic attack
ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(
t, attackHeight, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
// now we try to test verification against state
state := sm.State{
LastBlockTime: defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2 * time.Hour),
LastBlockHeight: nodeHeight,
ConsensusParams: *types.DefaultConsensusParams(),
}
// modify trusted light block so that it is of a height less than the conflicting one
trusted.Header.Height = state.LastBlockHeight
trusted.Header.Time = state.LastBlockTime
stateStore := &smmocks.Store{}
stateStore.On("LoadValidators", commonHeight).Return(common.ValidatorSet, nil)
stateStore.On("Load").Return(state, nil)
blockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", nodeHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trusted.Header})
blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", attackHeight).Return(nil)
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", nodeHeight).Return(trusted.Commit)
blockStore.On("Height").Return(nodeHeight)
pool, err := evidence.NewPool(dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
require.NoError(t, err)
// check that the evidence pool correctly verifies the evidence
assert.NoError(t, pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev}))
// now we use a time which isn't able to contradict the FLA - thus we can't verify the evidence
oldBlockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
oldHeader := trusted.Header
oldHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime
oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", nodeHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *oldHeader})
oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", attackHeight).Return(nil)
oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", nodeHeight).Return(trusted.Commit)
oldBlockStore.On("Height").Return(nodeHeight)
require.Equal(t, defaultEvidenceTime, oldBlockStore.LoadBlockMeta(nodeHeight).Header.Time)
pool, err = evidence.NewPool(dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, oldBlockStore)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev}))
}
func TestVerifyLightClientAttack_Equivocation(t *testing.T) {
@ -417,6 +449,84 @@ func TestVerifyDuplicateVoteEvidence(t *testing.T) {
assert.Error(t, err)
}
func makeLunaticEvidence(
t *testing.T,
height, commonHeight int64,
totalVals, byzVals, phantomVals int,
commonTime, attackTime time.Time,
) (ev *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, trusted *types.LightBlock, common *types.LightBlock) {
commonValSet, commonPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(totalVals, defaultVotingPower)
require.Greater(t, totalVals, byzVals)
// extract out the subset of byzantine validators in the common validator set
byzValSet, byzPrivVals := commonValSet.Validators[:byzVals], commonPrivVals[:byzVals]
phantomValSet, phantomPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(phantomVals, defaultVotingPower)
conflictingVals := phantomValSet.Copy()
require.NoError(t, conflictingVals.UpdateWithChangeSet(byzValSet))
conflictingPrivVals := append(phantomPrivVals, byzPrivVals...)
conflictingPrivVals = orderPrivValsByValSet(t, conflictingVals, conflictingPrivVals)
commonHeader := makeHeaderRandom(commonHeight)
commonHeader.Time = commonTime
trustedHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
conflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
conflictingHeader.Time = attackTime
conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
blockID := makeBlockID(conflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
voteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
commit, err := types.MakeCommit(blockID, height, 1, voteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
ev = &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
Header: conflictingHeader,
Commit: commit,
},
ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
},
CommonHeight: commonHeight,
TotalVotingPower: commonValSet.TotalVotingPower(),
ByzantineValidators: byzValSet,
Timestamp: commonTime,
}
common = &types.LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
Header: commonHeader,
// we can leave this empty because we shouldn't be checking this
Commit: &types.Commit{},
},
ValidatorSet: commonValSet,
}
trustedBlockID := makeBlockID(trustedHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
trustedVals, privVals := types.RandValidatorSet(totalVals, defaultVotingPower)
trustedVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), trustedVals)
trustedCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(trustedBlockID, height, 1, trustedVoteSet, privVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
trusted = &types.LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
Header: trustedHeader,
Commit: trustedCommit,
},
ValidatorSet: trustedVals,
}
return ev, trusted, common
}
// func makeEquivocationEvidence() *types.LightClientAttackEvidence {
// }
// func makeAmnesiaEvidence() *types.LightClientAttackEvidence {
// }
func makeVote(
t *testing.T, val types.PrivValidator, chainID string, valIndex int32, height int64,
round int32, step int, blockID types.BlockID, time time.Time) *types.Vote {
@ -475,3 +585,20 @@ func makeBlockID(hash []byte, partSetSize uint32, partSetHash []byte) types.Bloc
},
}
}
func orderPrivValsByValSet(
t *testing.T, vals *types.ValidatorSet, privVals []types.PrivValidator) []types.PrivValidator {
output := make([]types.PrivValidator, len(privVals))
for idx, v := range vals.Validators {
for _, p := range privVals {
pubKey, err := p.GetPubKey()
require.NoError(t, err)
if bytes.Equal(v.Address, pubKey.Address()) {
output[idx] = p
break
}
}
require.NotEmpty(t, output[idx])
}
return output
}

+ 5
- 1
test/e2e/tests/block_test.go View File

@ -37,8 +37,12 @@ func TestBlock_Header(t *testing.T) {
}
resp, err := client.Block(ctx, &block.Header.Height)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, block, resp.Block,
"block mismatch for height %v", block.Header.Height)
"block mismatch for height %d", block.Header.Height)
require.NoError(t, resp.Block.ValidateBasic(),
"block at height %d is invalid", block.Header.Height)
}
})
}


+ 20
- 5
types/evidence.go View File

@ -295,7 +295,10 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) ConflictingHeaderIsInvalid(trustedHeader *He
// with evidence that have the same conflicting header and common height but different permutations
// of validator commit signatures. The reason for this is that we don't want to allow several
// permutations of the same evidence to be committed on chain. Ideally we commit the header with the
// most commit signatures (captures the most byzantine validators) but anything greater than 1/3 is sufficient.
// most commit signatures (captures the most byzantine validators) but anything greater than 1/3 is
// sufficient.
// TODO: We should change the hash to include the commit, header, total voting power, byzantine
// validators and timestamp
func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) Hash() []byte {
buf := make([]byte, binary.MaxVarintLen64)
n := binary.PutVarint(buf, l.CommonHeight)
@ -314,8 +317,14 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) Height() int64 {
// String returns a string representation of LightClientAttackEvidence
func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("LightClientAttackEvidence{ConflictingBlock: %v, CommonHeight: %d}",
l.ConflictingBlock.String(), l.CommonHeight)
return fmt.Sprintf(`LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: %v,
CommonHeight: %d,
ByzatineValidators: %v,
TotalVotingPower: %d,
Timestamp: %v}#%X`,
l.ConflictingBlock.String(), l.CommonHeight, l.ByzantineValidators,
l.TotalVotingPower, l.Timestamp, l.Hash())
}
// Time returns the time of the common block where the infraction leveraged off.
@ -334,8 +343,8 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) ValidateBasic() error {
return errors.New("conflicting block missing header")
}
if err := l.ConflictingBlock.ValidateBasic(l.ConflictingBlock.ChainID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid conflicting light block: %w", err)
if l.TotalVotingPower <= 0 {
return errors.New("negative or zero total voting power")
}
if l.CommonHeight <= 0 {
@ -350,6 +359,10 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) ValidateBasic() error {
l.CommonHeight, l.ConflictingBlock.Height)
}
if err := l.ConflictingBlock.ValidateBasic(l.ConflictingBlock.ChainID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid conflicting light block: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
@ -421,6 +434,8 @@ func (evl EvidenceList) Hash() []byte {
// the Evidence size is capped.
evidenceBzs := make([][]byte, len(evl))
for i := 0; i < len(evl); i++ {
// TODO: We should change this to the hash. Using bytes contains some unexported data that
// may cause different hashes
evidenceBzs[i] = evl[i].Bytes()
}
return merkle.HashFromByteSlices(evidenceBzs)


+ 55
- 45
types/evidence_test.go View File

@ -89,9 +89,11 @@ func TestDuplicateVoteEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLightClientAttackEvidence(t *testing.T) {
func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceBasic(t *testing.T) {
height := int64(5)
voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, 10, 1)
commonHeight := height - 1
nValidators := 10
voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, nValidators, 1)
header := makeHeaderRandom()
header.Height = height
blockID := makeBlockID(tmhash.Sum([]byte("blockhash")), math.MaxInt32, tmhash.Sum([]byte("partshash")))
@ -105,56 +107,52 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidence(t *testing.T) {
},
ValidatorSet: valSet,
},
CommonHeight: height - 1,
CommonHeight: commonHeight,
TotalVotingPower: valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
Timestamp: header.Time,
ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
}
assert.NotNil(t, lcae.String())
assert.NotNil(t, lcae.Hash())
// only 7 validators sign
differentCommit, err := MakeCommit(blockID, height, 1, voteSet, privVals[:7], defaultVoteTime)
require.NoError(t, err)
differentEv := &LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
Header: header,
Commit: differentCommit,
},
ValidatorSet: valSet,
},
CommonHeight: height - 1,
}
assert.Equal(t, lcae.Hash(), differentEv.Hash())
// different header hash
differentHeader := makeHeaderRandom()
differentEv = &LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
Header: differentHeader,
Commit: differentCommit,
},
ValidatorSet: valSet,
},
CommonHeight: height - 1,
assert.Equal(t, lcae.Height(), commonHeight) // Height should be the common Height
assert.NotNil(t, lcae.Bytes())
// maleate evidence to test hash uniqueness
testCases := []struct {
testName string
malleateEvidence func(*LightClientAttackEvidence)
}{
{"Different header", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.ConflictingBlock.Header = makeHeaderRandom() }},
{"Different common height", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
ev.CommonHeight = height + 1
}},
}
assert.NotEqual(t, lcae.Hash(), differentEv.Hash())
// different common height should produce a different header
differentEv = &LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
Header: header,
Commit: differentCommit,
for _, tc := range testCases {
lcae := &LightClientAttackEvidence{
ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
Header: header,
Commit: commit,
},
ValidatorSet: valSet,
},
ValidatorSet: valSet,
},
CommonHeight: height - 2,
CommonHeight: commonHeight,
TotalVotingPower: valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
Timestamp: header.Time,
ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
}
hash := lcae.Hash()
tc.malleateEvidence(lcae)
assert.NotEqual(t, hash, lcae.Hash(), tc.testName)
}
assert.NotEqual(t, lcae.Hash(), differentEv.Hash())
assert.Equal(t, lcae.Height(), int64(4)) // Height should be the common Height
assert.NotNil(t, lcae.Bytes())
}
func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
height := int64(5)
voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, 10, 1)
commonHeight := height - 1
nValidators := 10
voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, nValidators, 1)
header := makeHeaderRandom()
header.Height = height
header.ValidatorsHash = valSet.Hash()
@ -169,7 +167,10 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
},
ValidatorSet: valSet,
},
CommonHeight: height - 1,
CommonHeight: commonHeight,
TotalVotingPower: valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
Timestamp: header.Time,
ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
}
assert.NoError(t, lcae.ValidateBasic())
@ -178,16 +179,22 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
malleateEvidence func(*LightClientAttackEvidence)
expectErr bool
}{
{"Good DuplicateVoteEvidence", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {}, false},
{"Good LightClientAttackEvidence", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {}, false},
{"Negative height", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.CommonHeight = -10 }, true},
{"Height is greater than divergent block", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
ev.CommonHeight = height + 1
}, true},
{"Height is equal to the divergent block", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
ev.CommonHeight = height
}, false},
{"Nil conflicting header", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.ConflictingBlock.Header = nil }, true},
{"Nil conflicting blocl", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.ConflictingBlock = nil }, true},
{"Nil validator set", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
ev.ConflictingBlock.ValidatorSet = &ValidatorSet{}
}, true},
{"Negative total voting power", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
ev.TotalVotingPower = -1
}, true},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
tc := tc
@ -200,7 +207,10 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
},
ValidatorSet: valSet,
},
CommonHeight: height - 1,
CommonHeight: commonHeight,
TotalVotingPower: valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
Timestamp: header.Time,
ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
}
tc.malleateEvidence(lcae)
if tc.expectErr {


+ 1
- 1
types/light.go View File

@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ func (sh SignedHeader) ValidateBasic(chainID string) error {
if sh.Commit.Height != sh.Height {
return fmt.Errorf("header and commit height mismatch: %d vs %d", sh.Height, sh.Commit.Height)
}
if hhash, chash := sh.Hash(), sh.Commit.BlockID.Hash; !bytes.Equal(hhash, chash) {
if hhash, chash := sh.Header.Hash(), sh.Commit.BlockID.Hash; !bytes.Equal(hhash, chash) {
return fmt.Errorf("commit signs block %X, header is block %X", chash, hhash)
}


+ 4
- 2
types/light_test.go View File

@ -153,11 +153,13 @@ func TestSignedHeaderValidateBasic(t *testing.T) {
Header: tc.shHeader,
Commit: tc.shCommit,
}
assert.Equal(
err := sh.ValidateBasic(validSignedHeader.Header.ChainID)
assert.Equalf(
t,
tc.expectErr,
sh.ValidateBasic(validSignedHeader.Header.ChainID) != nil,
err != nil,
"Validate Basic had an unexpected result",
err,
)
})
}


+ 9
- 2
types/validator_set.go View File

@ -946,7 +946,9 @@ func (vals *ValidatorSet) ToProto() (*tmproto.ValidatorSet, error) {
}
vp.Proposer = valProposer
vp.TotalVotingPower = vals.totalVotingPower
// NOTE: Sometimes we use the bytes of the proto form as a hash. This means that we need to
// be consistent with cached data
vp.TotalVotingPower = 0
return vp, nil
}
@ -977,7 +979,12 @@ func ValidatorSetFromProto(vp *tmproto.ValidatorSet) (*ValidatorSet, error) {
vals.Proposer = p
vals.totalVotingPower = vp.GetTotalVotingPower()
// NOTE: We can't trust the total voting power given to us by other peers. If someone were to
// inject a non-zeo value that wasn't the correct voting power we could assume a wrong total
// power hence we need to recompute it.
// FIXME: We should look to remove TotalVotingPower from proto or add it in the validators hash
// so we don't have to do this
vals.TotalVotingPower()
return vals, vals.ValidateBasic()
}


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