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package light
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/libs/log"
tmmath "github.com/tendermint/tendermint/libs/math"
"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/light/provider"
"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/light/store"
"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/types"
)
type mode byte
const (
sequential mode = iota + 1
skipping
defaultPruningSize = 1000
defaultMaxRetryAttempts = 10
// For bisection, when using the cache of headers from the previous batch,
// they will always be at a height greater than 1/2 (normal bisection) so to
// find something in between the range, 9/16 is used.
bisectionNumerator = 9
bisectionDenominator = 16
// 10s should cover most of the clients.
// References:
// - http://vancouver-webpages.com/time/web.html
// - https://blog.codinghorror.com/keeping-time-on-the-pc/
defaultMaxClockDrift = 10 * time.Second
)
// Option sets a parameter for the light client.
type Option func(*Client)
// SequentialVerification option configures the light client to sequentially
// check the headers (every header, in ascending height order). Note this is
// much slower than SkippingVerification, albeit more secure.
func SequentialVerification() Option {
return func(c *Client) {
c.verificationMode = sequential
}
}
// SkippingVerification option configures the light client to skip headers as
// long as {trustLevel} of the old validator set signed the new header. The
// bisection algorithm from the specification is used for finding the minimal
// "trust path".
//
// trustLevel - fraction of the old validator set (in terms of voting power),
// which must sign the new header in order for us to trust it. NOTE this only
// applies to non-adjacent headers. For adjacent headers, sequential
// verification is used.
func SkippingVerification(trustLevel tmmath.Fraction) Option {
return func(c *Client) {
c.verificationMode = skipping
c.trustLevel = trustLevel
}
}
// PruningSize option sets the maximum amount of headers & validator set pairs
// that the light client stores. When Prune() is run, all headers (along with
// the associated validator sets) that are earlier than the h amount of headers
// will be removed from the store. Default: 1000. A pruning size of 0 will not
// prune the light client at all.
func PruningSize(h uint16) Option {
return func(c *Client) {
c.pruningSize = h
}
}
// ConfirmationFunction option can be used to prompt to confirm an action. For
// example, remove newer headers if the light client is being reset with an
// older header. No confirmation is required by default!
func ConfirmationFunction(fn func(action string) bool) Option {
return func(c *Client) {
c.confirmationFn = fn
}
}
// Logger option can be used to set a logger for the client.
func Logger(l log.Logger) Option {
return func(c *Client) {
c.logger = l
}
}
// MaxRetryAttempts option can be used to set max attempts before replacing
// primary with a witness.
func MaxRetryAttempts(max uint16) Option {
return func(c *Client) {
c.maxRetryAttempts = max
}
}
// MaxClockDrift defines how much new (untrusted) header's Time can drift into
// the future. Default: 10s.
func MaxClockDrift(d time.Duration) Option {
return func(c *Client) {
c.maxClockDrift = d
}
}
// Client represents a light client, connected to a single chain, which gets
// headers from a primary provider, verifies them either sequentially or by
// skipping some and stores them in a trusted store (usually, a local FS).
//
// Default verification: SkippingVerification(DefaultTrustLevel)
type Client struct {
chainID string
trustingPeriod time.Duration // see TrustOptions.Period
verificationMode mode
trustLevel tmmath.Fraction
maxRetryAttempts uint16 // see MaxRetryAttempts option
maxClockDrift time.Duration
// Mutex for locking during changes of the light clients providers
providerMutex sync.Mutex
// Primary provider of new headers.
primary provider.Provider
// See Witnesses option
witnesses []provider.Provider
// Where trusted headers are stored.
trustedStore store.Store
// Highest trusted header from the store (height=H).
latestTrustedHeader *types.SignedHeader
// Highest validator set from the store (height=H).
latestTrustedVals *types.ValidatorSet
// See RemoveNoLongerTrustedHeadersPeriod option
pruningSize uint16
// See ConfirmationFunction option
confirmationFn func(action string) bool
quit chan struct{}
logger log.Logger
}
// NewClient returns a new light client. It returns an error if it fails to
// obtain the header & vals from the primary or they are invalid (e.g. trust
// hash does not match with the one from the header).
//
// Witnesses are providers, which will be used for cross-checking the primary
// provider. At least one witness must be given when skipping verification is
// used (default). A witness can become a primary iff the current primary is
// unavailable.
//
// See all Option(s) for the additional configuration.
func NewClient(
chainID string,
trustOptions TrustOptions,
primary provider.Provider,
witnesses []provider.Provider,
trustedStore store.Store,
options ...Option) (*Client, error) {
if err := trustOptions.ValidateBasic(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid TrustOptions: %w", err)
}
c, err := NewClientFromTrustedStore(chainID, trustOptions.Period, primary, witnesses, trustedStore, options...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if c.latestTrustedHeader != nil {
c.logger.Info("Checking trusted header using options")
if err := c.checkTrustedHeaderUsingOptions(trustOptions); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if c.latestTrustedHeader == nil || c.latestTrustedHeader.Height < trustOptions.Height {
c.logger.Info("Downloading trusted header using options")
if err := c.initializeWithTrustOptions(trustOptions); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return c, err
}
// NewClientFromTrustedStore initializes existing client from the trusted store.
//
// See NewClient
func NewClientFromTrustedStore(
chainID string,
trustingPeriod time.Duration,
primary provider.Provider,
witnesses []provider.Provider,
trustedStore store.Store,
options ...Option) (*Client, error) {
c := &Client{
chainID: chainID,
trustingPeriod: trustingPeriod,
verificationMode: skipping,
trustLevel: DefaultTrustLevel,
maxRetryAttempts: defaultMaxRetryAttempts,
maxClockDrift: defaultMaxClockDrift,
primary: primary,
witnesses: witnesses,
trustedStore: trustedStore,
pruningSize: defaultPruningSize,
confirmationFn: func(action string) bool { return true },
quit: make(chan struct{}),
logger: log.NewNopLogger(),
}
for _, o := range options {
o(c)
}
// Validate the number of witnesses.
if len(c.witnesses) < 1 && c.verificationMode == skipping {
return nil, errNoWitnesses{}
}
// Verify witnesses are all on the same chain.
for i, w := range witnesses {
if w.ChainID() != chainID {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("witness #%d: %v is on another chain %s, expected %s",
i, w, w.ChainID(), chainID)
}
}
// Validate trust level.
if err := ValidateTrustLevel(c.trustLevel); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := c.restoreTrustedHeaderAndVals(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c, nil
}
// restoreTrustedHeaderAndVals loads trustedHeader and trustedVals from
// trustedStore.
func (c *Client) restoreTrustedHeaderAndVals() error {
lastHeight, err := c.trustedStore.LastSignedHeaderHeight()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't get last trusted header height: %w", err)
}
if lastHeight > 0 {
trustedHeader, err := c.trustedStore.SignedHeader(lastHeight)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't get last trusted header: %w", err)
}
trustedVals, err := c.trustedStore.ValidatorSet(lastHeight)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't get last trusted validators: %w", err)
}
c.latestTrustedHeader = trustedHeader
c.latestTrustedVals = trustedVals
c.logger.Info("Restored trusted header and vals", "height", lastHeight)
}
return nil
}
// if options.Height:
//
// 1) ahead of trustedHeader.Height => fetch header (same height as
// trustedHeader) from primary provider and check it's hash matches the
// trustedHeader's hash (if not, remove trustedHeader and all the headers
// before)
//
// 2) equals trustedHeader.Height => check options.Hash matches the
// trustedHeader's hash (if not, remove trustedHeader and all the headers
// before)
//
// 3) behind trustedHeader.Height => remove all the headers between
// options.Height and trustedHeader.Height, update trustedHeader, then
// check options.Hash matches the trustedHeader's hash (if not, remove
// trustedHeader and all the headers before)
//
// The intuition here is the user is always right. I.e. if she decides to reset
// the light client with an older header, there must be a reason for it.
func (c *Client) checkTrustedHeaderUsingOptions(options TrustOptions) error {
var primaryHash []byte
switch {
case options.Height > c.latestTrustedHeader.Height:
h, err := c.signedHeaderFromPrimary(c.latestTrustedHeader.Height)
if err != nil {
return err
}
primaryHash = h.Hash()
case options.Height == c.latestTrustedHeader.Height:
primaryHash = options.Hash
case options.Height < c.latestTrustedHeader.Height:
c.logger.Info("Client initialized with old header (trusted is more recent)",
"old", options.Height,
"trustedHeight", c.latestTrustedHeader.Height,
"trustedHash", hash2str(c.latestTrustedHeader.Hash()))
action := fmt.Sprintf(
"Rollback to %d (%X)? Note this will remove newer headers up to %d (%X)",
options.Height, options.Hash,
c.latestTrustedHeader.Height, c.latestTrustedHeader.Hash())
if c.confirmationFn(action) {
// remove all the headers (options.Height, trustedHeader.Height]
err := c.cleanupAfter(options.Height)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cleanupAfter(%d): %w", options.Height, err)
}
c.logger.Info("Rolled back to older header (newer headers were removed)",
"old", options.Height)
} else {
return nil
}
primaryHash = options.Hash
}
if !bytes.Equal(primaryHash, c.latestTrustedHeader.Hash()) {
c.logger.Info("Prev. trusted header's hash (h1) doesn't match hash from primary provider (h2)",
"h1", hash2str(c.latestTrustedHeader.Hash()), "h2", hash2str(primaryHash))
action := fmt.Sprintf(
"Prev. trusted header's hash %X doesn't match hash %X from primary provider. Remove all the stored headers?",
c.latestTrustedHeader.Hash(), primaryHash)
if c.confirmationFn(action) {
err := c.Cleanup()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to cleanup: %w", err)
}
} else {
return errors.New("refused to remove the stored headers despite hashes mismatch")
}
}
return nil
}
// initializeWithTrustOptions fetches the weakly-trusted header and vals from
// primary provider. The header is cross-checked with witnesses for additional
// security.
func (c *Client) initializeWithTrustOptions(options TrustOptions) error {
// 1) Fetch and verify the header.
h, err := c.signedHeaderFromPrimary(options.Height)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// NOTE: - Verify func will check if it's expired or not.
// - h.Time is not being checked against time.Now() because we don't
// want to add yet another argument to NewClient* functions.
if err := h.ValidateBasic(c.chainID); err != nil {
return err
}
if !bytes.Equal(h.Hash(), options.Hash) {
return fmt.Errorf("expected header's hash %X, but got %X", options.Hash, h.Hash())
}
err = c.compareNewHeaderWithWitnesses(h)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// 2) Fetch and verify the vals.
vals, err := c.validatorSetFromPrimary(options.Height)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !bytes.Equal(h.ValidatorsHash, vals.Hash()) {
return fmt.Errorf("expected header's validators (%X) to match those that were supplied (%X)",
h.ValidatorsHash,
vals.Hash(),
)
}
// Ensure that +2/3 of validators signed correctly.
err = vals.VerifyCommit(c.chainID, h.Commit.BlockID, h.Height, h.Commit)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid commit: %w", err)
}
// 3) Persist both of them and continue.
return c.updateTrustedHeaderAndVals(h, vals)
}
// TrustedHeader returns a trusted header at the given height (0 - the latest).
//
// Headers along with validator sets, which can't be trusted anymore, are
// removed once a day (can be changed with RemoveNoLongerTrustedHeadersPeriod
// option).
// .
// height must be >= 0.
//
// It returns an error if:
// - there are some issues with the trusted store, although that should not
// happen normally;
// - negative height is passed;
// - header has not been verified yet and is therefore not in the store
//
// Safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
func (c *Client) TrustedHeader(height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
height, err := c.compareWithLatestHeight(height)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c.trustedStore.SignedHeader(height)
}
// TrustedValidatorSet returns a trusted validator set at the given height (0 -
// latest). The second return parameter is the height used (useful if 0 was
// passed; otherwise can be ignored).
//
// height must be >= 0.
//
// Headers along with validator sets are
// removed once a day (can be changed with RemoveNoLongerTrustedHeadersPeriod
// option).
//
// Function returns an error if:
// - there are some issues with the trusted store, although that should not
// happen normally;
// - negative height is passed;
// - header signed by that validator set has not been verified yet
//
// Safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
func (c *Client) TrustedValidatorSet(height int64) (valSet *types.ValidatorSet, heightUsed int64, err error) {
heightUsed, err = c.compareWithLatestHeight(height)
if err != nil {
return nil, heightUsed, err
}
valSet, err = c.trustedStore.ValidatorSet(heightUsed)
if err != nil {
return nil, heightUsed, err
}
return valSet, heightUsed, err
}
func (c *Client) compareWithLatestHeight(height int64) (int64, error) {
latestHeight, err := c.LastTrustedHeight()
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("can't get last trusted height: %w", err)
}
if latestHeight == -1 {
return 0, errors.New("no headers exist")
}
switch {
case height > latestHeight:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("unverified header/valset requested (latest: %d)", latestHeight)
case height == 0:
return latestHeight, nil
case height < 0:
return 0, errors.New("negative height")
}
return height, nil
}
// VerifyHeaderAtHeight fetches header and validators at the given height
// and calls VerifyHeader. It returns header immediately if such exists in
// trustedStore (no verification is needed).
//
// height must be > 0.
//
// It returns provider.ErrSignedHeaderNotFound if header is not found by
// primary.
func (c *Client) VerifyHeaderAtHeight(height int64, now time.Time) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
if height <= 0 {
return nil, errors.New("negative or zero height")
}
// Check if header already verified.
h, err := c.TrustedHeader(height)
if err == nil {
c.logger.Info("Header has already been verified", "height", height, "hash", hash2str(h.Hash()))
// Return already trusted header
return h, nil
}
// Request the header and the vals.
newHeader, newVals, err := c.fetchHeaderAndValsAtHeight(height)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return newHeader, c.verifyHeader(newHeader, newVals, now)
}
// VerifyHeader verifies new header against the trusted state. It returns
// immediately if newHeader exists in trustedStore (no verification is
// needed). Else it performs one of the two types of verification:
//
// SequentialVerification: verifies that 2/3 of the trusted validator set has
// signed the new header. If the headers are not adjacent, **all** intermediate
// headers will be requested. Intermediate headers are not saved to database.
//
// SkippingVerification(trustLevel): verifies that {trustLevel} of the trusted
// validator set has signed the new header. If it's not the case and the
// headers are not adjacent, bisection is performed and necessary (not all)
// intermediate headers will be requested. See the specification for details.
// Intermediate headers are not saved to database.
// https://github.com/tendermint/spec/blob/master/spec/consensus/light-client.md
//
// If the header, which is older than the currently trusted header, is
// requested and the light client does not have it, VerifyHeader will perform:
// a) bisection verification if nearest trusted header is found & not expired
// b) backwards verification in all other cases
//
// It returns ErrOldHeaderExpired if the latest trusted header expired.
//
// If the primary provides an invalid header (ErrInvalidHeader), it is rejected
// and replaced by another provider until all are exhausted.
//
// If, at any moment, SignedHeader or ValidatorSet are not found by the primary
// provider, provider.ErrSignedHeaderNotFound /
// provider.ErrValidatorSetNotFound error is returned.
func (c *Client) VerifyHeader(newHeader *types.SignedHeader, newVals *types.ValidatorSet, now time.Time) error {
if newHeader.Height <= 0 {
return errors.New("negative or zero height")
}
// Check if newHeader already verified.
h, err := c.TrustedHeader(newHeader.Height)
if err == nil {
// Make sure it's the same header.
if !bytes.Equal(h.Hash(), newHeader.Hash()) {
return fmt.Errorf("existing trusted header %X does not match newHeader %X", h.Hash(), newHeader.Hash())
}
c.logger.Info("Header has already been verified",
"height", newHeader.Height, "hash", hash2str(newHeader.Hash()))
return nil
}
return c.verifyHeader(newHeader, newVals, now)
}
func (c *Client) verifyHeader(newHeader *types.SignedHeader, newVals *types.ValidatorSet, now time.Time) error {
c.logger.Info("VerifyHeader", "height", newHeader.Height, "hash", hash2str(newHeader.Hash()),
"vals", hash2str(newVals.Hash()))
var err error
// 1) If going forward, perform either bisection or sequential verification.
if newHeader.Height >= c.latestTrustedHeader.Height {
switch c.verificationMode {
case sequential:
err = c.sequence(c.latestTrustedHeader, newHeader, newVals, now)
case skipping:
err = c.bisection(c.latestTrustedHeader, c.latestTrustedVals, newHeader, newVals, now)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("Unknown verification mode: %b", c.verificationMode))
}
} else {
// 2) If verifying before the first trusted header, perform backwards
// verification.
var (
closestHeader *types.SignedHeader
firstHeaderHeight int64
)
firstHeaderHeight, err = c.FirstTrustedHeight()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't get first header height: %w", err)
}
if newHeader.Height < firstHeaderHeight {
closestHeader, err = c.TrustedHeader(firstHeaderHeight)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't get first signed header: %w", err)
}
if HeaderExpired(closestHeader, c.trustingPeriod, now) {
closestHeader = c.latestTrustedHeader
}
err = c.backwards(closestHeader, newHeader, now)
} else {
// 3) OR if between trusted headers where the nearest has not expired,
// perform bisection verification, else backwards.
closestHeader, err = c.trustedStore.SignedHeaderBefore(newHeader.Height)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't get signed header before height %d: %w", newHeader.Height, err)
}
var closestValidatorSet *types.ValidatorSet
if c.verificationMode == sequential || HeaderExpired(closestHeader, c.trustingPeriod, now) {
err = c.backwards(c.latestTrustedHeader, newHeader, now)
} else {
closestValidatorSet, _, err = c.TrustedValidatorSet(closestHeader.Height)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't get validator set at height %d: %w", closestHeader.Height, err)
}
err = c.bisection(closestHeader, closestValidatorSet, newHeader, newVals, now)
}
}
}
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("Can't verify", "err", err)
return err
}
// 4) Once verified, save and return
return c.updateTrustedHeaderAndVals(newHeader, newVals)
}
// see VerifyHeader
func (c *Client) sequence(
initiallyTrustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
newHeader *types.SignedHeader,
newVals *types.ValidatorSet,
now time.Time) error {
var (
trustedHeader = initiallyTrustedHeader
interimHeader *types.SignedHeader
interimVals *types.ValidatorSet
err error
)
for height := initiallyTrustedHeader.Height + 1; height <= newHeader.Height; height++ {
// 1) Fetch interim headers and vals if needed.
if height == newHeader.Height { // last header
interimHeader, interimVals = newHeader, newVals
} else { // intermediate headers
interimHeader, interimVals, err = c.fetchHeaderAndValsAtHeight(height)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
// 2) Verify them
c.logger.Debug("Verify newHeader against trustedHeader",
"trustedHeight", trustedHeader.Height,
"trustedHash", hash2str(trustedHeader.Hash()),
"newHeight", interimHeader.Height,
"newHash", hash2str(interimHeader.Hash()))
err = VerifyAdjacent(c.chainID, trustedHeader, interimHeader, interimVals,
c.trustingPeriod, now, c.maxClockDrift)
if err != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("verify adjacent from #%d to #%d failed: %w",
trustedHeader.Height, interimHeader.Height, err)
switch errors.Unwrap(err).(type) {
case ErrInvalidHeader:
c.logger.Error("primary sent invalid header -> replacing", "err", err)
replaceErr := c.replacePrimaryProvider()
if replaceErr != nil {
c.logger.Error("Can't replace primary", "err", replaceErr)
return err // return original error
}
// attempt to verify header again
height--
continue
default:
return err
}
}
// 3) Update trustedHeader
trustedHeader = interimHeader
}
return nil
}
// see VerifyHeader
// Bisection finds the middle header between a trusted and new header, reiterating the action until it
// verifies a header. A cache of headers requested by the primary is kept such that when a
// verification is made, and the light client tries again to verify the new header in the middle,
// the light client does not need to ask for all the same headers again.
func (c *Client) bisection(
initiallyTrustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
initiallyTrustedVals *types.ValidatorSet,
newHeader *types.SignedHeader,
newVals *types.ValidatorSet,
now time.Time) error {
type headerSet struct {
sh *types.SignedHeader
valSet *types.ValidatorSet
}
var (
headerCache = []headerSet{{newHeader, newVals}}
depth = 0
trustedHeader = initiallyTrustedHeader
trustedVals = initiallyTrustedVals
)
for {
c.logger.Debug("Verify newHeader against trustedHeader",
"trustedHeight", trustedHeader.Height,
"trustedHash", hash2str(trustedHeader.Hash()),
"newHeight", headerCache[depth].sh.Height,
"newHash", hash2str(headerCache[depth].sh.Hash()))
err := Verify(c.chainID, trustedHeader, trustedVals, headerCache[depth].sh, headerCache[depth].valSet,
c.trustingPeriod, now, c.maxClockDrift, c.trustLevel)
switch err.(type) {
case nil:
// Have we verified the last header
if depth == 0 {
// Compare header with the witnesses to ensure it's not a fork.
// More witnesses we have, more chance to notice one.
//
// CORRECTNESS ASSUMPTION: there's at least 1 correct full node
// (primary or one of the witnesses).
if err := c.compareNewHeaderWithWitnesses(newHeader); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("Failed to compare new header with witnesses", "err", err)
return err
}
return nil
}
// If not, update the lower bound to the previous upper bound
trustedHeader, trustedVals = headerCache[depth].sh, headerCache[depth].valSet
// Remove the untrusted header at the lower bound in the header cache - it's no longer useful
headerCache = headerCache[:depth]
// Reset the cache depth so that we start from the upper bound again
depth = 0
case ErrNewValSetCantBeTrusted:
// do add another header to the end of the cache
if depth == len(headerCache)-1 {
pivotHeight := trustedHeader.Height + (headerCache[depth].sh.Height-trustedHeader.
Height)*bisectionNumerator/bisectionDenominator
interimHeader, interimVals, err := c.fetchHeaderAndValsAtHeight(pivotHeight)
if err != nil {
return err
}
headerCache = append(headerCache, headerSet{interimHeader, interimVals})
}
depth++
case ErrInvalidHeader:
c.logger.Error("primary sent invalid header -> replacing", "err", err)
replaceErr := c.replacePrimaryProvider()
if replaceErr != nil {
c.logger.Error("Can't replace primary", "err", replaceErr)
// return original error
return fmt.Errorf("verify non adjacent from #%d to #%d failed: %w",
trustedHeader.Height, headerCache[depth].sh.Height, err)
}
// attempt to verify the header again
continue
default:
return fmt.Errorf("verify non adjacent from #%d to #%d failed: %w",
trustedHeader.Height, headerCache[depth].sh.Height, err)
}
}
}
// LastTrustedHeight returns a last trusted height. -1 and nil are returned if
// there are no trusted headers.
//
// Safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
func (c *Client) LastTrustedHeight() (int64, error) {
return c.trustedStore.LastSignedHeaderHeight()
}
// FirstTrustedHeight returns a first trusted height. -1 and nil are returned if
// there are no trusted headers.
//
// Safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
func (c *Client) FirstTrustedHeight() (int64, error) {
return c.trustedStore.FirstSignedHeaderHeight()
}
// ChainID returns the chain ID the light client was configured with.
//
// Safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
func (c *Client) ChainID() string {
return c.chainID
}
// Primary returns the primary provider.
//
// NOTE: provider may be not safe for concurrent access.
func (c *Client) Primary() provider.Provider {
c.providerMutex.Lock()
defer c.providerMutex.Unlock()
return c.primary
}
// Witnesses returns the witness providers.
//
// NOTE: providers may be not safe for concurrent access.
func (c *Client) Witnesses() []provider.Provider {
c.providerMutex.Lock()
defer c.providerMutex.Unlock()
return c.witnesses
}
// Cleanup removes all the data (headers and validator sets) stored. Note: the
// client must be stopped at this point.
func (c *Client) Cleanup() error {
c.logger.Info("Removing all the data")
c.latestTrustedHeader = nil
c.latestTrustedVals = nil
return c.trustedStore.Prune(0)
}
// cleanupAfter deletes all headers & validator sets after +height+. It also
// resets latestTrustedHeader to the latest header.
func (c *Client) cleanupAfter(height int64) error {
prevHeight := c.latestTrustedHeader.Height
for {
h, err := c.trustedStore.SignedHeaderBefore(prevHeight)
if err == store.ErrSignedHeaderNotFound || (h != nil && h.Height <= height) {
break
} else if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get header before %d: %w", prevHeight, err)
}
err = c.trustedStore.DeleteSignedHeaderAndValidatorSet(h.Height)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("can't remove a trusted header & validator set", "err", err,
"height", h.Height)
}
prevHeight = h.Height
}
c.latestTrustedHeader = nil
c.latestTrustedVals = nil
err := c.restoreTrustedHeaderAndVals()
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (c *Client) updateTrustedHeaderAndVals(h *types.SignedHeader, vals *types.ValidatorSet) error {
if !bytes.Equal(h.ValidatorsHash, vals.Hash()) {
return fmt.Errorf("expected validator's hash %X, but got %X", h.ValidatorsHash, vals.Hash())
}
if err := c.trustedStore.SaveSignedHeaderAndValidatorSet(h, vals); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save trusted header: %w", err)
}
if c.pruningSize > 0 {
if err := c.trustedStore.Prune(c.pruningSize); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("prune: %w", err)
}
}
if c.latestTrustedHeader == nil || h.Height > c.latestTrustedHeader.Height {
c.latestTrustedHeader = h
c.latestTrustedVals = vals
}
return nil
}
// fetch header and validators for the given height (0 - latest) from primary
// provider.
func (c *Client) fetchHeaderAndValsAtHeight(height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, *types.ValidatorSet, error) {
h, err := c.signedHeaderFromPrimary(height)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to obtain the header #%d: %w", height, err)
}
vals, err := c.validatorSetFromPrimary(height)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to obtain the vals #%d: %w", height, err)
}
return h, vals, nil
}
// backwards verification (see VerifyHeaderBackwards func in the spec) verifies
// headers before a trusted header. If a sent header is invalid the primary is
// replaced with another provider and the operation is repeated.
func (c *Client) backwards(
initiallyTrustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
newHeader *types.SignedHeader,
now time.Time) error {
if HeaderExpired(initiallyTrustedHeader, c.trustingPeriod, now) {
c.logger.Error("Header Expired")
return ErrOldHeaderExpired{initiallyTrustedHeader.Time.Add(c.trustingPeriod), now}
}
var (
trustedHeader = initiallyTrustedHeader
interimHeader *types.SignedHeader
err error
)
for trustedHeader.Height > newHeader.Height {
interimHeader, err = c.signedHeaderFromPrimary(trustedHeader.Height - 1)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to obtain the header at height #%d: %w", trustedHeader.Height-1, err)
}
c.logger.Debug("Verify newHeader against trustedHeader",
"trustedHeight", trustedHeader.Height,
"trustedHash", hash2str(trustedHeader.Hash()),
"newHeight", interimHeader.Height,
"newHash", hash2str(interimHeader.Hash()))
if err := VerifyBackwards(c.chainID, interimHeader, trustedHeader); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("primary sent invalid header -> replacing", "err", err)
if replaceErr := c.replacePrimaryProvider(); replaceErr != nil {
c.logger.Error("Can't replace primary", "err", replaceErr)
// return original error
return fmt.Errorf("verify backwards from %d to %d failed: %w",
trustedHeader.Height, interimHeader.Height, err)
}
}
trustedHeader = interimHeader
}
// Initially trusted header might have expired at this point.
if HeaderExpired(initiallyTrustedHeader, c.trustingPeriod, now) {
return ErrOldHeaderExpired{initiallyTrustedHeader.Time.Add(c.trustingPeriod), now}
}
return nil
}
// compare header with all witnesses provided.
func (c *Client) compareNewHeaderWithWitnesses(h *types.SignedHeader) error {
c.providerMutex.Lock()
defer c.providerMutex.Unlock()
// 1. Make sure AT LEAST ONE witness returns the same header.
var (
headerMatched bool
lastErrConfHeaders error
)
for attempt := uint16(1); attempt <= c.maxRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
if len(c.witnesses) == 0 {
return errNoWitnesses{}
}
// launch one goroutine per witness
errc := make(chan error, len(c.witnesses))
for i, witness := range c.witnesses {
go c.compareNewHeaderWithWitness(errc, h, witness, i)
}
witnessesToRemove := make([]int, 0)
// handle errors as they come
for i := 0; i < cap(errc); i++ {
err := <-errc
switch e := err.(type) {
case nil: // at least one header matched
headerMatched = true
case ErrConflictingHeaders: // potential fork
c.logger.Error(err.Error(), "witness", e.Witness)
c.sendConflictingHeadersEvidence(types.ConflictingHeadersEvidence{H1: h, H2: e.H2})
lastErrConfHeaders = e
case errBadWitness:
c.logger.Error(err.Error(), "witness", c.witnesses[e.WitnessIndex])
// if witness sent us invalid header, remove it
if e.Code == invalidHeader {
witnessesToRemove = append(witnessesToRemove, e.WitnessIndex)
}
}
}
for _, idx := range witnessesToRemove {
c.removeWitness(idx)
}
if lastErrConfHeaders != nil {
// NOTE: all of the potential forks will be reported, but we only return
// the last ErrConflictingHeaders error here.
return lastErrConfHeaders
} else if headerMatched {
return nil
}
// 2. Otherwise, sleep
time.Sleep(backoffTimeout(attempt))
}
return errors.New("awaiting response from all witnesses exceeded dropout time")
}
func (c *Client) compareNewHeaderWithWitness(errc chan error, h *types.SignedHeader,
witness provider.Provider, witnessIndex int) {
altH, err := witness.SignedHeader(h.Height)
if err != nil {
errc <- errBadWitness{err, noResponse, witnessIndex}
return
}
if err = altH.ValidateBasic(c.chainID); err != nil {
errc <- errBadWitness{err, invalidHeader, witnessIndex}
return
}
if !bytes.Equal(h.Hash(), altH.Hash()) {
// FIXME: call bisection instead of VerifyCommitTrusting
// https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/4934
if err = c.latestTrustedVals.VerifyCommitTrusting(c.chainID, altH.Commit, c.trustLevel); err != nil {
errc <- errBadWitness{err, invalidHeader, witnessIndex}
return
}
errc <- ErrConflictingHeaders{H1: h, Primary: c.primary, H2: altH, Witness: witness}
}
errc <- nil
}
// NOTE: requires a providerMutex locked.
func (c *Client) removeWitness(idx int) {
switch len(c.witnesses) {
case 0:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("wanted to remove %d element from empty witnesses slice", idx))
case 1:
c.witnesses = make([]provider.Provider, 0)
default:
c.witnesses[idx] = c.witnesses[len(c.witnesses)-1]
c.witnesses = c.witnesses[:len(c.witnesses)-1]
}
}
// Update attempts to advance the state by downloading the latest header and
// comparing it with the existing one. It returns a new header on a successful
// update. Otherwise, it returns nil (plus an error, if any).
func (c *Client) Update(now time.Time) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
lastTrustedHeight, err := c.LastTrustedHeight()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("can't get last trusted height: %w", err)
}
if lastTrustedHeight == -1 {
// no headers yet => wait
return nil, nil
}
latestHeader, latestVals, err := c.fetchHeaderAndValsAtHeight(0)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if latestHeader.Height > lastTrustedHeight {
err = c.VerifyHeader(latestHeader, latestVals, now)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.logger.Info("Advanced to new state", "height", latestHeader.Height, "hash", hash2str(latestHeader.Hash()))
return latestHeader, nil
}
return nil, nil
}
// replaceProvider takes the first alternative provider and promotes it as the
// primary provider.
func (c *Client) replacePrimaryProvider() error {
c.providerMutex.Lock()
defer c.providerMutex.Unlock()
c.logger.Info("Primary is unavailable. Replacing with the first witness")
if len(c.witnesses) <= 1 {
return errNoWitnesses{}
}
c.primary = c.witnesses[0]
c.witnesses = c.witnesses[1:]
c.logger.Info("New primary", "p", c.primary)
return nil
}
// signedHeaderFromPrimary retrieves the SignedHeader from the primary provider
// at the specified height. Handles dropout by the primary provider by swapping
// with an alternative provider.
func (c *Client) signedHeaderFromPrimary(height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
for attempt := uint16(1); attempt <= c.maxRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
c.providerMutex.Lock()
h, providerErr := c.primary.SignedHeader(height)
c.providerMutex.Unlock()
if providerErr == nil {
err := c.validateHeader(h, height)
if err != nil {
replaceErr := c.replacePrimaryProvider()
if replaceErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%v. Tried to replace primary but: %w", err.Error(), replaceErr)
}
// replace primary and request signed header again
return c.signedHeaderFromPrimary(height)
}
// valid header has been received
return h, nil
}
if providerErr == provider.ErrSignedHeaderNotFound {
return nil, providerErr
}
c.logger.Error("Failed to get signed header from primary", "attempt", attempt, "err", providerErr)
time.Sleep(backoffTimeout(attempt))
}
err := c.replacePrimaryProvider()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("primary dropped out. Tried to replace but: %w", err)
}
return c.signedHeaderFromPrimary(height)
}
func (c *Client) validateHeader(h *types.SignedHeader, expectedHeight int64) error {
if h == nil {
return errors.New("nil header")
}
if expectedHeight > 0 && h.Height != expectedHeight {
return errors.New("height mismatch")
}
return h.ValidateBasic(c.chainID)
}
// validatorSetFromPrimary retrieves the ValidatorSet from the primary provider
// at the specified height. Handles dropout by the primary provider after 5
// attempts by replacing it with an alternative provider.
func (c *Client) validatorSetFromPrimary(height int64) (*types.ValidatorSet, error) {
for attempt := uint16(1); attempt <= c.maxRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
c.providerMutex.Lock()
vals, providerErr := c.primary.ValidatorSet(height)
c.providerMutex.Unlock()
if providerErr == nil {
err := c.validateValidatorSet(vals)
if err != nil {
replaceErr := c.replacePrimaryProvider()
if replaceErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%v. Tried to replace primary but: %w", err.Error(), replaceErr)
}
// replace primary and request signed header again
return c.validatorSetFromPrimary(height)
}
return vals, nil
}
if providerErr == provider.ErrValidatorSetNotFound {
return vals, providerErr
}
c.logger.Error("Failed to get validator set from primary", "attempt", attempt, "err", providerErr)
time.Sleep(backoffTimeout(attempt))
}
err := c.replacePrimaryProvider()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("primary dropped out. Tried to replace but: %w", err)
}
return c.validatorSetFromPrimary(height)
}
func (c *Client) validateValidatorSet(vals *types.ValidatorSet) error {
if vals == nil {
return errors.New("validator set is nil")
}
return vals.ValidateBasic()
}
// sendConflictingHeadersEvidence sends evidence to all witnesses and primary
// on best effort basis.
//
// Evidence needs to be submitted to all full nodes since there's no way to
// determine which full node is correct (honest).
func (c *Client) sendConflictingHeadersEvidence(ev types.ConflictingHeadersEvidence) {
err := c.primary.ReportEvidence(ev)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("Failed to report evidence to primary", "ev", ev, "primary", c.primary)
}
for _, w := range c.witnesses {
err := w.ReportEvidence(ev)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("Failed to report evidence to witness", "ev", ev, "witness", w)
}
}
}
// exponential backoff (with jitter)
// 0.5s -> 2s -> 4.5s -> 8s -> 12.5 with 1s variation
func backoffTimeout(attempt uint16) time.Duration {
return time.Duration(500*attempt*attempt)*time.Millisecond + time.Duration(rand.Intn(1000))*time.Millisecond
}
func hash2str(hash []byte) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%X", hash)
}