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Application Architecture Guide
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==============================
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Overview
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--------
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A blockchain application is more than the consensus engine and the
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transaction logic (eg. smart contracts, business logic) as implemented
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in the ABCI app. There are also (mobile, web, desktop) clients that will
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need to connect and make use of the app. We will assume for now that you
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have a well designed transactions and database model, but maybe this
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will be the topic of another article. This article is more interested in
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various ways of setting up the "plumbing" and connecting these pieces,
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and demonstrating some evolving best practices.
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Security
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--------
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A very important aspect when constructing a blockchain is security. The
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consensus model can be DoSed (no consensus possible) by corrupting 1/3
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of the validators and exploited (writing arbitrary blocks) by corrupting
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2/3 of the validators. So, while the security is not that of the
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"weakest link", you should take care that the "average link" is
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sufficiently hardened.
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One big attack surface on the validators is the communication between
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the ABCI app and the tendermint core. This should be highly protected.
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Ideally, the app and the core are running on the same machine, so no
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external agent can target the communication channel. You can use unix
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sockets (with permissions preventing access from other users), or even
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compile the two apps into one binary if the ABCI app is also writen in
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go. If you are unable to do that due to language support, then the ABCI
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app should bind a TCP connection to localhost (127.0.0.1), which is less
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efficient and secure, but still not reachable from outside. If you must
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run the ABCI app and tendermint core on separate machines, make sure you
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have a secure communication channel (ssh tunnel?)
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Now assuming, you have linked together your app and the core securely,
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you must also make sure no one can get on the machine it is hosted on.
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At this point it is basic network security. Run on a secure operating
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system (SELinux?). Limit who has access to the machine (user accounts,
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but also where the physical machine is hosted). Turn off all services
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except for ssh, which should only be accessible by some well-guarded
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public/private key pairs (no password). And maybe even firewall off
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access to the ports used by the validators, so only known validators can
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connect.
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There was also a suggestion on slack from @jhon about compiling
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everything together with a unikernel for more security, such as
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`Mirage <https://mirage.io>`__ or
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`UNIK <https://github.com/emc-advanced-dev/unik>`__.
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Connecting your client to the blockchain
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----------------------------------------
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Tendermint Core RPC
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The concept is that the ABCI app is completely hidden from the outside
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world and only communicated through a tested and secured `interface
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exposed by the tendermint core <./specification/rpc.html>`__. This interface
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exposes a lot of data on the block header and consensus process, which
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is quite useful for externally verifying the system. It also includes
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3(!) methods to broadcast a transaction (propose it for the blockchain,
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and possibly await a response). And one method to query app-specific
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data from the ABCI application.
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Pros:
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* Server code already written
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* Access to block headers to validate merkle proofs (nice for light clients)
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* Basic read/write functionality is supported
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Cons:
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* Limited interface to app. All queries must be serialized into
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[]byte (less expressive than JSON over HTTP) and there is no way to push
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data from ABCI app to the client (eg. notify me if account X receives a
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transaction)
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Custom ABCI server
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This was proposed by @wolfposd on slack and demonstrated by
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`TMChat <https://github.com/wolfposd/TMChat>`__, a sample app. The
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concept is to write a custom server for your app (with typical REST
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API/websockets/etc for easy use by a mobile app). This custom server is
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in the same binary as the ABCI app and data store, so can easily react
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to complex events there that involve understanding the data format (send
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a message if my balance drops below 500). All "writes" sent to this
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server are proxied via websocket/JSON-RPC to tendermint core. When they
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come back as deliver\_tx over ABCI, they will be written to the data
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store. For "reads", we can do any queries we wish that are supported by
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our architecture, using any web technology that is useful. The general
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architecture is shown in the following diagram:
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Pros: \* Separates application logic from blockchain logic \* Allows
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much richer, more flexible client-facing API \* Allows pub-sub, watching
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certain fields, etc.
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Cons: \* Access to ABCI app can be dangerous (be VERY careful not to
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write unless it comes from the validator node) \* No direct access to
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the blockchain headers to verify tx \* You must write your own API (but
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maybe that's a pro...)
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Hybrid solutions
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Likely the least secure but most versatile. The client can access both
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the tendermint node for all blockchain info, as well as a custom app
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server, for complex queries and pub-sub on the abci app.
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Pros: All from both above solutions
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Cons: Even more complexity; even more attack vectors (less
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security)
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Scalability
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-----------
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Read replica using non-validating nodes? They could forward transactions
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to the validators (fewer connections, more security), and locally allow
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all queries in any of the above configurations. Thus, while
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transaction-processing speed is limited by the speed of the abci app and
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the number of validators, one should be able to scale our read
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performance to quite an extent (until the replication process drains too
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many resources from the validator nodes).
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