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285 lines
11 KiB
285 lines
11 KiB
package evidence
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/light"
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"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/types"
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)
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// verify verifies the evidence fully by checking:
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// - It has not already been committed
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// - it is sufficiently recent (MaxAge)
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// - it is from a key who was a validator at the given height
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// - it is internally consistent with state
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// - it was properly signed by the alleged equivocator and meets the individual evidence verification requirements
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func (evpool *Pool) verify(evidence types.Evidence) error {
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var (
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state = evpool.State()
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height = state.LastBlockHeight
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evidenceParams = state.ConsensusParams.Evidence
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ageNumBlocks = height - evidence.Height()
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)
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// verify the time of the evidence
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blockMeta := evpool.blockStore.LoadBlockMeta(evidence.Height())
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if blockMeta == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("don't have header #%d", evidence.Height())
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}
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evTime := blockMeta.Header.Time
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if evidence.Time() != evTime {
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return fmt.Errorf("evidence has a different time to the block it is associated with (%v != %v)",
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evidence.Time(), evTime)
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}
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ageDuration := state.LastBlockTime.Sub(evTime)
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// check that the evidence hasn't expired
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if ageDuration > evidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration && ageNumBlocks > evidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"evidence from height %d (created at: %v) is too old; min height is %d and evidence can not be older than %v",
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evidence.Height(),
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evTime,
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height-evidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks,
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state.LastBlockTime.Add(evidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration),
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)
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}
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// apply the evidence-specific verification logic
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switch ev := evidence.(type) {
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case *types.DuplicateVoteEvidence:
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valSet, err := evpool.stateDB.LoadValidators(evidence.Height())
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return VerifyDuplicateVote(ev, state.ChainID, valSet)
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case *types.LightClientAttackEvidence:
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commonHeader, err := getSignedHeader(evpool.blockStore, evidence.Height())
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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commonVals, err := evpool.stateDB.LoadValidators(evidence.Height())
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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trustedHeader := commonHeader
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// in the case of lunatic the trusted header is different to the common header
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if evidence.Height() != ev.ConflictingBlock.Height {
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trustedHeader, err = getSignedHeader(evpool.blockStore, ev.ConflictingBlock.Height)
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if err != nil {
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// FIXME: This multi step process is a bit unergonomic. We may want to consider a more efficient process
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// that doesn't require as much io and is atomic.
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// If the node doesn't have a block at the height of the conflicting block, then this could be
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// a forward lunatic attack. Thus the node must get the latest height it has
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latestHeight := evpool.blockStore.Height()
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trustedHeader, err = getSignedHeader(evpool.blockStore, latestHeight)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if trustedHeader.Time.Before(ev.ConflictingBlock.Time) {
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return fmt.Errorf("latest block time (%v) is before conflicting block time (%v)",
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trustedHeader.Time, ev.ConflictingBlock.Time,
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)
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}
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}
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}
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err = VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonHeader, trustedHeader, commonVals, state.LastBlockTime,
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state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxAgeDuration)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("unrecognized evidence type: %T", evidence)
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}
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}
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// VerifyLightClientAttack verifies LightClientAttackEvidence against the state of the full node. This involves
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// the following checks:
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// - the common header from the full node has at least 1/3 voting power which is also present in
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// the conflicting header's commit
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// - 2/3+ of the conflicting validator set correctly signed the conflicting block
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// - the nodes trusted header at the same height as the conflicting header has a different hash
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//
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// CONTRACT: must run ValidateBasic() on the evidence before verifying
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// must check that the evidence has not expired (i.e. is outside the maximum age threshold)
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func VerifyLightClientAttack(e *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, commonHeader, trustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
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commonVals *types.ValidatorSet, now time.Time, trustPeriod time.Duration) error {
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// In the case of lunatic attack there will be a different commonHeader height. Therefore the node perform a single
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// verification jump between the common header and the conflicting one
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if commonHeader.Height != e.ConflictingBlock.Height {
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err := commonVals.VerifyCommitLightTrusting(trustedHeader.ChainID, e.ConflictingBlock.Commit, light.DefaultTrustLevel)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("skipping verification of conflicting block failed: %w", err)
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}
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// In the case of equivocation and amnesia we expect all header hashes to be correctly derived
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} else if e.ConflictingHeaderIsInvalid(trustedHeader.Header) {
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return errors.New("common height is the same as conflicting block height so expected the conflicting" +
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" block to be correctly derived yet it wasn't")
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}
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// Verify that the 2/3+ commits from the conflicting validator set were for the conflicting header
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if err := e.ConflictingBlock.ValidatorSet.VerifyCommitLight(trustedHeader.ChainID, e.ConflictingBlock.Commit.BlockID,
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e.ConflictingBlock.Height, e.ConflictingBlock.Commit); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid commit from conflicting block: %w", err)
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}
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// Assert the correct amount of voting power of the validator set
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if evTotal, valsTotal := e.TotalVotingPower, commonVals.TotalVotingPower(); evTotal != valsTotal {
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return fmt.Errorf("total voting power from the evidence and our validator set does not match (%d != %d)",
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evTotal, valsTotal)
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}
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// check in the case of a forward lunatic attack that monotonically increasing time has been violated
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if e.ConflictingBlock.Height > trustedHeader.Height && e.ConflictingBlock.Time.After(trustedHeader.Time) {
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return fmt.Errorf("conflicting block doesn't violate monotonically increasing time (%v is after %v)",
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e.ConflictingBlock.Time, trustedHeader.Time,
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)
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// In all other cases check that the hashes of the conflicting header and the trusted header are different
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} else if bytes.Equal(trustedHeader.Hash(), e.ConflictingBlock.Hash()) {
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return fmt.Errorf("trusted header hash matches the evidence's conflicting header hash: %X",
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trustedHeader.Hash())
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}
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return validateABCIEvidence(e, commonVals, trustedHeader)
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}
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// VerifyDuplicateVote verifies DuplicateVoteEvidence against the state of full node. This involves the
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// following checks:
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// - the validator is in the validator set at the height of the evidence
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// - the height, round, type and validator address of the votes must be the same
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// - the block ID's must be different
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// - The signatures must both be valid
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func VerifyDuplicateVote(e *types.DuplicateVoteEvidence, chainID string, valSet *types.ValidatorSet) error {
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_, val := valSet.GetByAddress(e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress)
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if val == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("address %X was not a validator at height %d", e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress, e.Height())
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}
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pubKey := val.PubKey
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// H/R/S must be the same
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if e.VoteA.Height != e.VoteB.Height ||
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e.VoteA.Round != e.VoteB.Round ||
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e.VoteA.Type != e.VoteB.Type {
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return fmt.Errorf("h/r/s does not match: %d/%d/%v vs %d/%d/%v",
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e.VoteA.Height, e.VoteA.Round, e.VoteA.Type,
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e.VoteB.Height, e.VoteB.Round, e.VoteB.Type)
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}
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// Address must be the same
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if !bytes.Equal(e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress, e.VoteB.ValidatorAddress) {
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return fmt.Errorf("validator addresses do not match: %X vs %X",
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e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress,
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e.VoteB.ValidatorAddress,
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)
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}
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// BlockIDs must be different
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if e.VoteA.BlockID.Equals(e.VoteB.BlockID) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"block IDs are the same (%v) - not a real duplicate vote",
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e.VoteA.BlockID,
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)
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}
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// pubkey must match address (this should already be true, sanity check)
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addr := e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress
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if !bytes.Equal(pubKey.Address(), addr) {
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return fmt.Errorf("address (%X) doesn't match pubkey (%v - %X)",
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addr, pubKey, pubKey.Address())
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}
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// validator voting power and total voting power must match
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if val.VotingPower != e.ValidatorPower {
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return fmt.Errorf("validator power from evidence and our validator set does not match (%d != %d)",
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e.ValidatorPower, val.VotingPower)
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}
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if valSet.TotalVotingPower() != e.TotalVotingPower {
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return fmt.Errorf("total voting power from the evidence and our validator set does not match (%d != %d)",
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e.TotalVotingPower, valSet.TotalVotingPower())
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}
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va := e.VoteA.ToProto()
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vb := e.VoteB.ToProto()
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// Signatures must be valid
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if !pubKey.VerifySignature(types.VoteSignBytes(chainID, va), e.VoteA.Signature) {
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return fmt.Errorf("verifying VoteA: %w", types.ErrVoteInvalidSignature)
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}
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if !pubKey.VerifySignature(types.VoteSignBytes(chainID, vb), e.VoteB.Signature) {
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return fmt.Errorf("verifying VoteB: %w", types.ErrVoteInvalidSignature)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateABCIEvidence validates the ABCI component of the light client attack
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// evidence i.e voting power and byzantine validators
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func validateABCIEvidence(
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ev *types.LightClientAttackEvidence,
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commonVals *types.ValidatorSet,
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trustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
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) error {
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if evTotal, valsTotal := ev.TotalVotingPower, commonVals.TotalVotingPower(); evTotal != valsTotal {
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return fmt.Errorf("total voting power from the evidence and our validator set does not match (%d != %d)",
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evTotal, valsTotal)
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}
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// Find out what type of attack this was and thus extract the malicious
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// validators. Note, in the case of an Amnesia attack we don't have any
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// malicious validators.
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validators := ev.GetByzantineValidators(commonVals, trustedHeader)
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// Ensure this matches the validators that are listed in the evidence. They
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// should be ordered based on power.
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if validators == nil && ev.ByzantineValidators != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"expected nil validators from an amnesia light client attack but got %d",
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len(ev.ByzantineValidators),
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)
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}
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if exp, got := len(validators), len(ev.ByzantineValidators); exp != got {
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return fmt.Errorf("expected %d byzantine validators from evidence but got %d", exp, got)
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}
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for idx, val := range validators {
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if !bytes.Equal(ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address, val.Address) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"evidence contained an unexpected byzantine validator address; expected: %v, got: %v",
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val.Address, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address,
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)
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}
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if ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower != val.VotingPower {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"evidence contained unexpected byzantine validator power; expected %d, got %d",
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val.VotingPower, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower,
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)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func getSignedHeader(blockStore BlockStore, height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
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blockMeta := blockStore.LoadBlockMeta(height)
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if blockMeta == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("don't have header at height #%d", height)
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}
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commit := blockStore.LoadBlockCommit(height)
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if commit == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("don't have commit at height #%d", height)
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}
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return &types.SignedHeader{
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Header: &blockMeta.Header,
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Commit: commit,
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}, nil
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}
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