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284 lines
11 KiB
284 lines
11 KiB
package evidence
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/light"
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"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/types"
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)
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// verify verifies the evidence fully by checking:
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// - It has not already been committed
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// - it is sufficiently recent (MaxAge)
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// - it is from a key who was a validator at the given height
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// - it is internally consistent with state
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// - it was properly signed by the alleged equivocator and meets the individual evidence verification requirements
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func (evpool *Pool) verify(evidence types.Evidence) (*info, error) {
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var (
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state = evpool.State()
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height = state.LastBlockHeight
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evidenceParams = state.ConsensusParams.Evidence
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ageNumBlocks = height - evidence.Height()
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)
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// verify the time of the evidence
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blockMeta := evpool.blockStore.LoadBlockMeta(evidence.Height())
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if blockMeta == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("don't have header at height #%d", evidence.Height())
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}
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evTime := blockMeta.Header.Time
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ageDuration := state.LastBlockTime.Sub(evTime)
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// check that the evidence hasn't expired
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if ageDuration > evidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration && ageNumBlocks > evidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf(
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"evidence from height %d (created at: %v) is too old; min height is %d and evidence can not be older than %v",
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evidence.Height(),
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evTime,
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height-evidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks,
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state.LastBlockTime.Add(evidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration),
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)
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}
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// apply the evidence-specific verification logic
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switch ev := evidence.(type) {
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case *types.DuplicateVoteEvidence:
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valSet, err := evpool.stateDB.LoadValidators(evidence.Height())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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err = VerifyDuplicateVote(ev, state.ChainID, valSet)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("verifying duplicate vote evidence: %w", err)
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}
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_, val := valSet.GetByAddress(ev.VoteA.ValidatorAddress)
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return &info{
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Evidence: evidence,
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Time: evTime,
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Validators: []*types.Validator{val}, // just a single validator for duplicate vote evidence
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TotalVotingPower: valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
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}, nil
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case *types.LightClientAttackEvidence:
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commonHeader, err := getSignedHeader(evpool.blockStore, evidence.Height())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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commonVals, err := evpool.stateDB.LoadValidators(evidence.Height())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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trustedHeader := commonHeader
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// in the case of lunatic the trusted header is different to the common header
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if evidence.Height() != ev.ConflictingBlock.Height {
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trustedHeader, err = getSignedHeader(evpool.blockStore, ev.ConflictingBlock.Height)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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err = VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonHeader, trustedHeader, commonVals, state.LastBlockTime,
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state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxAgeDuration)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// find out what type of attack this was and thus extract the malicious validators. Note in the case of an
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// Amnesia attack we don't have any malicious validators.
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validators, attackType := getMaliciousValidators(ev, commonVals, trustedHeader)
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totalVotingPower := ev.ConflictingBlock.ValidatorSet.TotalVotingPower()
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if attackType == lunaticType {
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totalVotingPower = commonVals.TotalVotingPower()
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}
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return &info{
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Evidence: evidence,
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Time: evTime,
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Validators: validators,
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TotalVotingPower: totalVotingPower,
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}, nil
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unrecognized evidence type: %T", evidence)
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}
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}
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// VerifyLightClientAttack verifies LightClientAttackEvidence against the state of the full node. This involves
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// the following checks:
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// - the common header from the full node has at least 1/3 voting power which is also present in
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// the conflicting header's commit
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// - the nodes trusted header at the same height as the conflicting header has a different hash
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func VerifyLightClientAttack(e *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, commonHeader, trustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
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commonVals *types.ValidatorSet, now time.Time, trustPeriod time.Duration) error {
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// In the case of lunatic attack we need to perform a single verification jump between the
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// common header and the conflicting one
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if commonHeader.Height != trustedHeader.Height {
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err := light.Verify(commonHeader, commonVals, e.ConflictingBlock.SignedHeader, e.ConflictingBlock.ValidatorSet,
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trustPeriod, now, 0*time.Second, light.DefaultTrustLevel)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("skipping verification from common to conflicting header failed: %w", err)
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}
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} else {
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// in the case of equivocation and amnesia we expect some header hashes to be correctly derived
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if isInvalidHeader(trustedHeader.Header, e.ConflictingBlock.Header) {
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return errors.New("common height is the same as conflicting block height so expected the conflicting" +
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" block to be correctly derived yet it wasn't")
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}
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// ensure that 2/3 of the validator set did vote for this block
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if err := e.ConflictingBlock.ValidatorSet.VerifyCommitLight(trustedHeader.ChainID, e.ConflictingBlock.Commit.BlockID,
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e.ConflictingBlock.Height, e.ConflictingBlock.Commit); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid commit from conflicting block: %w", err)
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}
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}
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if bytes.Equal(trustedHeader.Hash(), e.ConflictingBlock.Hash()) {
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return fmt.Errorf("trusted header hash matches the evidence conflicting header hash: %X",
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trustedHeader.Hash())
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}
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return nil
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}
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// VerifyDuplicateVote verifies DuplicateVoteEvidence against the state of full node. This involves the
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// following checks:
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// - the validator is in the validator set at the height of the evidence
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// - the height, round, type and validator address of the votes must be the same
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// - the block ID's must be different
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// - The signatures must both be valid
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func VerifyDuplicateVote(e *types.DuplicateVoteEvidence, chainID string, valSet *types.ValidatorSet) error {
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_, val := valSet.GetByAddress(e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress)
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if val == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("address %X was not a validator at height %d", e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress, e.Height())
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}
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pubKey := val.PubKey
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// H/R/S must be the same
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if e.VoteA.Height != e.VoteB.Height ||
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e.VoteA.Round != e.VoteB.Round ||
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e.VoteA.Type != e.VoteB.Type {
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return fmt.Errorf("h/r/s does not match: %d/%d/%v vs %d/%d/%v",
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e.VoteA.Height, e.VoteA.Round, e.VoteA.Type,
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e.VoteB.Height, e.VoteB.Round, e.VoteB.Type)
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}
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// Address must be the same
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if !bytes.Equal(e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress, e.VoteB.ValidatorAddress) {
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return fmt.Errorf("validator addresses do not match: %X vs %X",
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e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress,
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e.VoteB.ValidatorAddress,
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)
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}
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// BlockIDs must be different
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if e.VoteA.BlockID.Equals(e.VoteB.BlockID) {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"block IDs are the same (%v) - not a real duplicate vote",
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e.VoteA.BlockID,
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)
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}
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// pubkey must match address (this should already be true, sanity check)
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addr := e.VoteA.ValidatorAddress
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if !bytes.Equal(pubKey.Address(), addr) {
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return fmt.Errorf("address (%X) doesn't match pubkey (%v - %X)",
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addr, pubKey, pubKey.Address())
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}
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va := e.VoteA.ToProto()
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vb := e.VoteB.ToProto()
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// Signatures must be valid
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if !pubKey.VerifySignature(types.VoteSignBytes(chainID, va), e.VoteA.Signature) {
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return fmt.Errorf("verifying VoteA: %w", types.ErrVoteInvalidSignature)
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}
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if !pubKey.VerifySignature(types.VoteSignBytes(chainID, vb), e.VoteB.Signature) {
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return fmt.Errorf("verifying VoteB: %w", types.ErrVoteInvalidSignature)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func getSignedHeader(blockStore BlockStore, height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
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blockMeta := blockStore.LoadBlockMeta(height)
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if blockMeta == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("don't have header at height #%d", height)
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}
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commit := blockStore.LoadBlockCommit(height)
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if commit == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("don't have commit at height #%d", height)
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}
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return &types.SignedHeader{
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Header: &blockMeta.Header,
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Commit: commit,
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}, nil
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}
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// getMaliciousValidators finds out what style of attack LightClientAttackEvidence was and then works out who
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// the malicious validators were and returns them.
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func getMaliciousValidators(evidence *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, commonVals *types.ValidatorSet,
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trusted *types.SignedHeader) ([]*types.Validator, lightClientAttackType) {
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var validators []*types.Validator
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// First check if the header is invalid. This means that it is a lunatic attack and therefore we take the
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// validators who are in the commonVals and voted for the lunatic header
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if isInvalidHeader(trusted.Header, evidence.ConflictingBlock.Header) {
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for _, commitSig := range evidence.ConflictingBlock.Commit.Signatures {
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if !commitSig.ForBlock() {
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continue
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}
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_, val := commonVals.GetByAddress(commitSig.ValidatorAddress)
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if val == nil {
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// validator wasn't in the common validator set
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continue
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}
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validators = append(validators, val)
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}
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return validators, lunaticType
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// Next, check to see if it is an equivocation attack and both commits are in the same round. If this is the
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// case then we take the validators from the conflicting light block validator set that voted in both headers.
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} else if trusted.Commit.Round == evidence.ConflictingBlock.Commit.Round {
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// validator hashes are the same therefore the indexing order of validators are the same and thus we
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// only need a single loop to find the validators that voted twice.
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for i := 0; i < len(evidence.ConflictingBlock.Commit.Signatures); i++ {
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sigA := evidence.ConflictingBlock.Commit.Signatures[i]
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if sigA.Absent() {
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continue
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}
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sigB := trusted.Commit.Signatures[i]
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if sigB.Absent() {
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continue
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}
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_, val := evidence.ConflictingBlock.ValidatorSet.GetByAddress(sigA.ValidatorAddress)
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validators = append(validators, val)
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}
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return validators, equivocationType
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}
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// if the rounds are different then this is an amnesia attack. Unfortunately, given the nature of the attack,
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// we aren't able yet to deduce which are malicious validators and which are not hence we return an
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// empty validator set.
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return validators, amnesiaType
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}
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// isInvalidHeader takes a trusted header and matches it againt a conflicting header
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// to determine whether the conflicting header was the product of a valid state transition
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// or not. If it is then all the deterministic fields of the header should be the same.
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// If not, it is an invalid header and constitutes a lunatic attack.
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func isInvalidHeader(trusted, conflicting *types.Header) bool {
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return !bytes.Equal(trusted.ValidatorsHash, conflicting.ValidatorsHash) ||
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!bytes.Equal(trusted.NextValidatorsHash, conflicting.NextValidatorsHash) ||
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!bytes.Equal(trusted.ConsensusHash, conflicting.ConsensusHash) ||
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!bytes.Equal(trusted.AppHash, conflicting.AppHash) ||
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!bytes.Equal(trusted.LastResultsHash, conflicting.LastResultsHash)
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}
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type lightClientAttackType int
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const (
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lunaticType lightClientAttackType = iota + 1
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equivocationType
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amnesiaType
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)
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