package conn import ( "bytes" crand "crypto/rand" "crypto/sha256" "encoding/binary" "errors" "io" "net" "time" // forked to github.com/tendermint/crypto "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305" "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" "golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/box" "github.com/tendermint/tendermint/crypto" cmn "github.com/tendermint/tendermint/libs/common" "golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf" ) // 4 + 1024 == 1028 total frame size const dataLenSize = 4 const dataMaxSize = 1024 const totalFrameSize = dataMaxSize + dataLenSize const aeadSizeOverhead = 16 // overhead of poly 1305 authentication tag const aeadKeySize = chacha20poly1305.KeySize const aeadNonceSize = chacha20poly1305.NonceSize // SecretConnection implements net.conn. // It is an implementation of the STS protocol. // Note we do not (yet) assume that a remote peer's pubkey // is known ahead of time, and thus we are technically // still vulnerable to MITM. (TODO!) // See docs/sts-final.pdf for more info type SecretConnection struct { conn io.ReadWriteCloser recvBuffer []byte recvNonce *[aeadNonceSize]byte sendNonce *[aeadNonceSize]byte recvSecret *[aeadKeySize]byte sendSecret *[aeadKeySize]byte remPubKey crypto.PubKey } // MakeSecretConnection performs handshake and returns a new authenticated // SecretConnection. // Returns nil if there is an error in handshake. // Caller should call conn.Close() // See docs/sts-final.pdf for more information. func MakeSecretConnection(conn io.ReadWriteCloser, locPrivKey crypto.PrivKey) (*SecretConnection, error) { locPubKey := locPrivKey.PubKey() // Generate ephemeral keys for perfect forward secrecy. locEphPub, locEphPriv := genEphKeys() // Write local ephemeral pubkey and receive one too. // NOTE: every 32-byte string is accepted as a Curve25519 public key // (see DJB's Curve25519 paper: http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf) remEphPub, err := shareEphPubKey(conn, locEphPub) if err != nil { return nil, err } // Sort by lexical order. loEphPub, _ := sort32(locEphPub, remEphPub) // Check if the local ephemeral public key // was the least, lexicographically sorted. locIsLeast := bytes.Equal(locEphPub[:], loEphPub[:]) // Compute common diffie hellman secret using X25519. dhSecret := computeDHSecret(remEphPub, locEphPriv) // generate the secret used for receiving, sending, challenge via hkdf-sha2 on dhSecret recvSecret, sendSecret, challenge := deriveSecretAndChallenge(dhSecret, locIsLeast) // Construct SecretConnection. sc := &SecretConnection{ conn: conn, recvBuffer: nil, recvNonce: new([aeadNonceSize]byte), sendNonce: new([aeadNonceSize]byte), recvSecret: recvSecret, sendSecret: sendSecret, } // Sign the challenge bytes for authentication. locSignature := signChallenge(challenge, locPrivKey) // Share (in secret) each other's pubkey & challenge signature authSigMsg, err := shareAuthSignature(sc, locPubKey, locSignature) if err != nil { return nil, err } remPubKey, remSignature := authSigMsg.Key, authSigMsg.Sig if !remPubKey.VerifyBytes(challenge[:], remSignature) { return nil, errors.New("Challenge verification failed") } // We've authorized. sc.remPubKey = remPubKey return sc, nil } // RemotePubKey returns authenticated remote pubkey func (sc *SecretConnection) RemotePubKey() crypto.PubKey { return sc.remPubKey } // Writes encrypted frames of `sealedFrameSize` // CONTRACT: data smaller than dataMaxSize is read atomically. func (sc *SecretConnection) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) { for 0 < len(data) { var frame = make([]byte, totalFrameSize) var chunk []byte if dataMaxSize < len(data) { chunk = data[:dataMaxSize] data = data[dataMaxSize:] } else { chunk = data data = nil } chunkLength := len(chunk) binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(frame, uint32(chunkLength)) copy(frame[dataLenSize:], chunk) aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(sc.sendSecret[:]) if err != nil { return n, errors.New("Invalid SecretConnection Key") } // encrypt the frame var sealedFrame = make([]byte, aeadSizeOverhead+totalFrameSize) aead.Seal(sealedFrame[:0], sc.sendNonce[:], frame, nil) incrNonce(sc.sendNonce) // end encryption _, err = sc.conn.Write(sealedFrame) if err != nil { return n, err } n += len(chunk) } return } // CONTRACT: data smaller than dataMaxSize is read atomically. func (sc *SecretConnection) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) { if 0 < len(sc.recvBuffer) { n = copy(data, sc.recvBuffer) sc.recvBuffer = sc.recvBuffer[n:] return } aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(sc.recvSecret[:]) if err != nil { return n, errors.New("Invalid SecretConnection Key") } sealedFrame := make([]byte, totalFrameSize+aeadSizeOverhead) _, err = io.ReadFull(sc.conn, sealedFrame) if err != nil { return } // decrypt the frame var frame = make([]byte, totalFrameSize) _, err = aead.Open(frame[:0], sc.recvNonce[:], sealedFrame, nil) if err != nil { return n, errors.New("Failed to decrypt SecretConnection") } incrNonce(sc.recvNonce) // end decryption var chunkLength = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(frame) // read the first four bytes if chunkLength > dataMaxSize { return 0, errors.New("chunkLength is greater than dataMaxSize") } var chunk = frame[dataLenSize : dataLenSize+chunkLength] n = copy(data, chunk) sc.recvBuffer = chunk[n:] return } // Implements net.Conn // nolint func (sc *SecretConnection) Close() error { return sc.conn.Close() } func (sc *SecretConnection) LocalAddr() net.Addr { return sc.conn.(net.Conn).LocalAddr() } func (sc *SecretConnection) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { return sc.conn.(net.Conn).RemoteAddr() } func (sc *SecretConnection) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error { return sc.conn.(net.Conn).SetDeadline(t) } func (sc *SecretConnection) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { return sc.conn.(net.Conn).SetReadDeadline(t) } func (sc *SecretConnection) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { return sc.conn.(net.Conn).SetWriteDeadline(t) } func genEphKeys() (ephPub, ephPriv *[32]byte) { var err error ephPub, ephPriv, err = box.GenerateKey(crand.Reader) if err != nil { panic("Could not generate ephemeral keypairs") } return } func shareEphPubKey(conn io.ReadWriteCloser, locEphPub *[32]byte) (remEphPub *[32]byte, err error) { // Send our pubkey and receive theirs in tandem. var trs, _ = cmn.Parallel( func(_ int) (val interface{}, err error, abort bool) { var _, err1 = cdc.MarshalBinaryLengthPrefixedWriter(conn, locEphPub) if err1 != nil { return nil, err1, true // abort } return nil, nil, false }, func(_ int) (val interface{}, err error, abort bool) { var _remEphPub [32]byte var _, err2 = cdc.UnmarshalBinaryLengthPrefixedReader(conn, &_remEphPub, 1024*1024) // TODO if err2 != nil { return nil, err2, true // abort } return _remEphPub, nil, false }, ) // If error: if trs.FirstError() != nil { err = trs.FirstError() return } // Otherwise: var _remEphPub = trs.FirstValue().([32]byte) return &_remEphPub, nil } func deriveSecretAndChallenge(dhSecret *[32]byte, locIsLeast bool) (recvSecret, sendSecret *[aeadKeySize]byte, challenge *[32]byte) { hash := sha256.New hkdf := hkdf.New(hash, dhSecret[:], nil, []byte("TENDERMINT_SECRET_CONNECTION_KEY_AND_CHALLENGE_GEN")) // get enough data for 2 aead keys, and a 32 byte challenge res := new([2*aeadKeySize + 32]byte) _, err := io.ReadFull(hkdf, res[:]) if err != nil { panic(err) } challenge = new([32]byte) recvSecret = new([aeadKeySize]byte) sendSecret = new([aeadKeySize]byte) // Use the last 32 bytes as the challenge copy(challenge[:], res[2*aeadKeySize:2*aeadKeySize+32]) // bytes 0 through aeadKeySize - 1 are one aead key. // bytes aeadKeySize through 2*aeadKeySize -1 are another aead key. // which key corresponds to sending and receiving key depends on whether // the local key is less than the remote key. if locIsLeast { copy(recvSecret[:], res[0:aeadKeySize]) copy(sendSecret[:], res[aeadKeySize:aeadKeySize*2]) } else { copy(sendSecret[:], res[0:aeadKeySize]) copy(recvSecret[:], res[aeadKeySize:aeadKeySize*2]) } return } func computeDHSecret(remPubKey, locPrivKey *[32]byte) (shrKey *[32]byte) { shrKey = new([32]byte) curve25519.ScalarMult(shrKey, locPrivKey, remPubKey) return } func sort32(foo, bar *[32]byte) (lo, hi *[32]byte) { if bytes.Compare(foo[:], bar[:]) < 0 { lo = foo hi = bar } else { lo = bar hi = foo } return } func signChallenge(challenge *[32]byte, locPrivKey crypto.PrivKey) (signature []byte) { signature, err := locPrivKey.Sign(challenge[:]) // TODO(ismail): let signChallenge return an error instead if err != nil { panic(err) } return } type authSigMessage struct { Key crypto.PubKey Sig []byte } func shareAuthSignature(sc *SecretConnection, pubKey crypto.PubKey, signature []byte) (recvMsg authSigMessage, err error) { // Send our info and receive theirs in tandem. var trs, _ = cmn.Parallel( func(_ int) (val interface{}, err error, abort bool) { var _, err1 = cdc.MarshalBinaryLengthPrefixedWriter(sc, authSigMessage{pubKey, signature}) if err1 != nil { return nil, err1, true // abort } return nil, nil, false }, func(_ int) (val interface{}, err error, abort bool) { var _recvMsg authSigMessage var _, err2 = cdc.UnmarshalBinaryLengthPrefixedReader(sc, &_recvMsg, 1024*1024) // TODO if err2 != nil { return nil, err2, true // abort } return _recvMsg, nil, false }, ) // If error: if trs.FirstError() != nil { err = trs.FirstError() return } var _recvMsg = trs.FirstValue().(authSigMessage) return _recvMsg, nil } //-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Increment nonce little-endian by 1 with wraparound. // Due to chacha20poly1305 expecting a 12 byte nonce we do not use the first four // bytes. We only increment a 64 bit unsigned int in the remaining 8 bytes // (little-endian in nonce[4:]). func incrNonce(nonce *[aeadNonceSize]byte) { counter := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(nonce[4:]) counter++ binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nonce[4:], counter) }