# ADR 046: Lite Client Implementation ## Changelog * 13-02-2020: Initial draft * 26-02-2020: Cross-checking the first header * 28-02-2020: Bisection algorithm details ## Context A `Client` struct represents a light client, connected to a single blockchain. The user has an option to verify headers using `VerifyHeader` or `VerifyHeaderAtHeight` or `Update` methods. The latter method downloads the latest header from primary and compares it with the currently trusted one. ```go type Client interface { // verify new headers VerifyHeaderAtHeight(height int64, now time.Time) (*types.SignedHeader, error) VerifyHeader(newHeader *types.SignedHeader, newVals *types.ValidatorSet, now time.Time) error Update(now time.Time) (*types.SignedHeader, error) // get trusted headers & validators TrustedHeader(height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) TrustedValidatorSet(height int64) (valSet *types.ValidatorSet, heightUsed int64, err error) LastTrustedHeight() (int64, error) FirstTrustedHeight() (int64, error) // query configuration options ChainID() string Primary() provider.Provider Witnesses() []provider.Provider Cleanup() error } ``` A new light client can either be created from scratch (via `NewClient`) or using the trusted store (via `NewClientFromTrustedStore`). When there's some data in the trusted store and `NewClient` is called, the light client will a) check if stored header is more recent b) optionally ask the user whenever it should rollback (no confirmation required by default). ```go func NewClient( chainID string, trustOptions TrustOptions, primary provider.Provider, witnesses []provider.Provider, trustedStore store.Store, options ...Option) (*Client, error) { ``` `witnesses` as argument (as opposite to `Option`) is an intentional choice, made to increase security by default. At least one witness is required, although, right now, the light client does not check that primary != witness. When cross-checking a new header with witnesses, minimum number of witnesses required to respond: 1. Note the very first header (`TrustOptions.Hash`) is also cross-checked with witnesses for additional security. Due to bisection algorithm nature, some headers might be skipped. If the light client does not have a header for height `X` and `VerifyHeaderAtHeight(X)` or `VerifyHeader(H#X)` methods are called, it will perform a backwards verification from the latest header back to the header at height `X`. `TrustedHeader`, `TrustedValidatorSet` only communicate with the trusted store. If some header is not there, an error will be returned indicating that verification is required. ```go type Provider interface { ChainID() string SignedHeader(height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) ValidatorSet(height int64) (*types.ValidatorSet, error) } ``` Provider is a full node usually, but can be another light client. The above interface is thin and can accommodate many implementations. If provider (primary or witness) becomes unavailable for a prolonged period of time, it will be removed to ensure smooth operation. Both `Client` and providers expose chain ID to track if there are on the same chain. Note, when chain upgrades or intentionally forks, chain ID changes. The light client stores headers & validators in the trusted store: ```go type Store interface { SaveSignedHeaderAndValidatorSet(sh *types.SignedHeader, valSet *types.ValidatorSet) error DeleteSignedHeaderAndValidatorSet(height int64) error SignedHeader(height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) ValidatorSet(height int64) (*types.ValidatorSet, error) LastSignedHeaderHeight() (int64, error) FirstSignedHeaderHeight() (int64, error) SignedHeaderAfter(height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) } ``` At the moment, the only implementation is the `db` store (wrapper around the KV database, used in Tendermint). In the future, remote adapters are possible (e.g. `Postgresql`). ```go func Verify( chainID string, h1 *types.SignedHeader, h1NextVals *types.ValidatorSet, h2 *types.SignedHeader, h2Vals *types.ValidatorSet, trustingPeriod time.Duration, now time.Time, trustLevel tmmath.Fraction) error { ``` `Verify` pure function is exposed for a header verification. It handles both cases of adjacent and non-adjacent headers. In the former case, it compares the hashes directly (2/3+ signed transition). Otherwise, it verifies 1/3+ (`trustLevel`) of trusted validators are still present in new validators. ### Bisection algorithm details Non-recursive bisection algorithm was implemented despite the spec containing the recursive version. There are two major reasons: 1) Constant memory consumption => no risk of getting OOM (Out-Of-Memory) exceptions; 2) Faster finality (see Fig. 1). _Fig. 1: Differences between recursive and non-recursive bisections_ ![Fig. 1](./img/adr-046-fig1.png) Specification of the non-recursive bisection can be found [here](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/blob/zm_non-recursive-verification/spec/consensus/light-client/non-recursive-verification.md). ## Status Accepted. ## Consequences ### Positive * single `Client` struct, which is easy to use * flexible interfaces for header providers and trusted storage ### Negative * `Verify` needs to be aligned with the current spec ### Neutral * `Verify` function might be misused (called with non-adjacent headers in incorrectly implemented sequential verification)