Introduces heuristics that track the amount of no responses or unavailable blocks a provider has for more robust provider handling by the light client. Use concurrent calls to all witnesses when a new primary is needed.
also
- replace `MaxReconnectAttempts`, `ReadWait`, `WriteWait` and `PingPeriod` options with `WSOptions` in `WSClient` (rpc/jsonrpc/client/ws_client.go).
- set default write wait to 10s for `WSClient`(rpc/jsonrpc/client/ws_client.go)
- unexpose `WSEvents`(rpc/client/http.go)
Closes#6162
## Description
I'm just doing a self audit of the light client. There's a few things I've changed
- Validate trust level in `VerifyNonAdjacent` function
- Make errNoWitnesses public (it's something people running software on top of a light client should be able to parse)
- Remove `ChainID` check of witnesses on start up. We do this already when we compare the first header with witnesses
- Remove `ChainID()` from provider interface
Closes: #4538
This is the first iteration of model-based testing in Go Tendermint. The test runner is using the static JSON fixtures located under the ./json directory. In the future, the Rust tensgen binary will be used to generate those (given the static intermediate scenarios and the test seed, which will be published along with each testgen release).
Closes: #5322
## Description
Check block protocol version in header validate basic.
I tried searching for where we check the P2P protocol version but was unable to find it. When we check compatibility with a node we check we both have the same block protocol and are on the same network, but we do not check if we are on the same P2P protocol. It makes sense if there is a handshake change because we would not be able to establish a secure connection, but a p2p protocol version bump may be because of a p2p message change, which would go unnoticed until that message is sent over the wire. Is this purposeful?
Closes: #4790
## Description
This PR wraps the stdlib sync.(RW)Mutex & godeadlock.(RW)Mutex. This enables using go-deadlock via a build flag instead of using sed to replace sync with godeadlock in all files
Closes: #3242
Closes#4934
* light: do not compare trusted header w/ witnesses
we don't have trusted state to bisect from
* check header before checking height
otherwise you can get nil panic
Since the light client work introduced in v0.33 it appears full nodes
are no longer fully verifying commit signatures during block execution -
they stop after +2/3. See in VerifyCommit:
0c7fd316eb/types/validator_set.go (L700-L703)
This means proposers can propose blocks that contain valid +2/3
signatures and then the rest of the signatures can be whatever they
want. They can claim that all the other validators signed just by
including a CommitSig with arbitrary signature data. While this doesn't
seem to impact safety of Tendermint per se, it means that Commits may
contain a lot of invalid data. This is already true of blocks, since
they can include invalid txs filled with garbage, but in that case the
application knows they they are invalid and can punish the proposer. But
since applications dont verify commit signatures directly (they trust
tendermint to do that), they won't be able to detect it.
This can impact incentivization logic in the application that depends on
the LastCommitInfo sent in BeginBlock, which includes which validators
signed. For instance, Gaia incentivizes proposers with a bonus for
including more than +2/3 of the signatures. But a proposer can now claim
that bonus just by including arbitrary data for the final -1/3 of
validators without actually waiting for their signatures. There may be
other tricks that can be played because of this.
In general, the full node should be a fully verifying machine. While
it's true that the light client can avoid verifying all signatures by
stopping after +2/3, the full node can not. Thus the light client and
full node should use distinct VerifyCommit functions if one is going to
stop after +2/3 or otherwise perform less validation (for instance light
clients can also skip verifying votes for nil while full nodes can not).
See a commit with a bad signature that verifies here: 56367fd. From what
I can tell, Tendermint will go on to think this commit is valid and
forward this data to the app, so the app will think the second validator
actually signed when it clearly did not.
fix bug so that PotentialAmnesiaEvidence is being gossiped
handle inbound amnesia evidence correctly
add method to check if potential amnesia evidence is on trial
fix a bug with the height when we upgrade to amnesia evidence
change evidence to using just pointers.
More logging in the evidence module
Co-authored-by: Marko <marbar3778@yahoo.com>
Callum Waters
Anton Kaliaev
Bipul Prasad
Marko
Erik Grinaker