time_iota_ms is intended to ensure that an honest validator always generates timestamps
with time increasing monotonically. For this purpose, it always suffices to have this parameter
set to `1ms`. Allowing users to choose different numbers increases bug surface area.
Thus the code now ignores the user provided time_iota_ms parameter (marking it as unused),
and uses 1ms internally.
## Description
Check block protocol version in header validate basic.
I tried searching for where we check the P2P protocol version but was unable to find it. When we check compatibility with a node we check we both have the same block protocol and are on the same network, but we do not check if we are on the same P2P protocol. It makes sense if there is a handshake change because we would not be able to establish a secure connection, but a p2p protocol version bump may be because of a p2p message change, which would go unnoticed until that message is sent over the wire. Is this purposeful?
Closes: #4790
## Description
This PR aims to make the crypto.PubKey interface more intuitive.
Changes:
- `VerfiyBytes` -> `VerifySignature`
Before `Bytes()` was amino encoded, now since it is the byte representation should we get rid of it entirely?
EDIT: decided to keep `Bytes()` as it is useful if you are using the interface instead of the concrete key
Closes: #XXX
Adds a genesis parameter `initial_height` which specifies the initial block height, as well as ABCI `RequestInitChain.InitialHeight` to pass it to the ABCI application, and `State.InitialHeight` to keep track of the initial height throughout the code. Fixes#2543, based on [RFC-002](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/pull/119). Spec changes in https://github.com/tendermint/spec/pull/135.
Fixes#5192.
@liamsi Can you verify that the test vectors match the Rust implementation? I updated `ProofsFromByteSlices()` as well, anything else that should be updated?
Solves #5138 in the way that if a validatorSet is nil or empty it will not try to transform it to protobug
Co-authored-by: Callum Michael Waters <cmwaters19@gmail.com>
ValidateBasic() for PotentialAmnesiaEvidence checks that the rounds of the two votes are different and does not check Vote Type
ValidateBasic() now also ensures that the first block is not a nil block (else the validator hasn't actually locked onto a block)
## Description
This PR wraps the stdlib sync.(RW)Mutex & godeadlock.(RW)Mutex. This enables using go-deadlock via a build flag instead of using sed to replace sync with godeadlock in all files
Closes: #3242
Closes#4926
The dump consensus state had this:
"last_commit": {
"votes": [
"Vote{0:04CBBF43CA3E 385085/00/2(Precommit) 1B73DA9FC4C8 42C97B86D89D @ 2020-05-27T06:46:51.042392895Z}",
"Vote{1:055799E028FA 385085/00/2(Precommit) 652B08AD61EA 0D507D7FA3AB @ 2020-06-28T04:57:29.20793209Z}",
"Vote{2:056024CFA910 385085/00/2(Precommit) 652B08AD61EA C8E95532A4C3 @ 2020-06-28T04:57:29.452696998Z}",
"Vote{3:0741C95814DA 385085/00/2(Precommit) 652B08AD61EA 36D567615F7C @ 2020-06-28T04:57:29.279788593Z}",
Note there's a precommit in there from the first val from May (2020-05-27) while the rest are from today (2020-06-28). It suggests there's a validator from an old instance of the network at this height (they're using the same chain-id!). Obviously a single bad validator shouldn't be an issue. But the Commit refactor work introduced a bug.
When we propose a block, we get the block.LastCommit by calling MakeCommit on the set of precommits we saw for the last height. This set may include precommits for a different block, and hence the block.LastCommit we propose may include precommits that aren't actually for the last block (but of course +2/3 will be). Before v0.33, we just skipped over these precommits during verification. But in v0.33, we expect all signatures for a blockID to be for the same block ID! Thus we end up proposing a block that we can't verify.
Dev Ojha
Callum Waters
Alessio Treglia
Aleksandr Bezobchuk
Marko
Anton Kaliaev
Erik Grinaker
