## Description
Remove secp256k1 as discussed in the tendermint dev call. The implementation has been moved to the [Cosmos-SDK](443e0c1f89/crypto/keys/secp256k1)
Closes: #XXX
## Description
Add chainid to requests to privval. This is a non-breaking change and hardware devices can opt to ignore the field.
Closes: #4503
Took the approach of passing chainID to the client instead of modifying `GetPubKey` because it would lead to a larger change throughout the codebase and in some places it could get tricky to get chainID.
## Description
This PR aims to make the crypto.PubKey interface more intuitive.
Changes:
- `VerfiyBytes` -> `VerifySignature`
Before `Bytes()` was amino encoded, now since it is the byte representation should we get rid of it entirely?
EDIT: decided to keep `Bytes()` as it is useful if you are using the interface instead of the concrete key
Closes: #XXX
Followup from #5227. Instead of checking `ResponseInitChain.app_hash` against the genesis doc app hash, we instead replace it. We should probably remove the genesis doc app hash completely, and rely solely on the one from `InitChain`, I'll open a separate issue to discuss this.
Adds a genesis parameter `initial_height` which specifies the initial block height, as well as ABCI `RequestInitChain.InitialHeight` to pass it to the ABCI application, and `State.InitialHeight` to keep track of the initial height throughout the code. Fixes#2543, based on [RFC-002](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/pull/119). Spec changes in https://github.com/tendermint/spec/pull/135.
Fixes#5192.
@liamsi Can you verify that the test vectors match the Rust implementation? I updated `ProofsFromByteSlices()` as well, anything else that should be updated?
## Description
This Pr changes `GenPrivKeySecp256k1` to `GenPrivKeyFromSecret` to be consistent with the other keys. Also the previous name was not descriptive on what it did.
Closes: #XXX
Closes#1581
This fixes the error in #1581, and also documents the purpose of this line. It ensures that if a peer tells us an address we know about, whose ID is the same as our current ID, we ignore it.
This removes the previous case where the ID's matched, but the IP's did not, which could yield a potential overwrite of the IP associated with the address later on. (This then would yield an eclipse attack)
This was not a vulnerability before though, thanks to a defensive check here 95fc7e58ee/p2p/pex/addrbook.go (L522))
## Description
This PR wraps the stdlib sync.(RW)Mutex & godeadlock.(RW)Mutex. This enables using go-deadlock via a build flag instead of using sed to replace sync with godeadlock in all files
Closes: #3242
Closes#5074
Old code does not work when --consensus.create_empty_blocks=false
(because it only calls tmos.Kill when ApplyBlock fails). New code is
listening ABCI clients for Quit and kills TM process if there were any
errors.
Since the light client work introduced in v0.33 it appears full nodes
are no longer fully verifying commit signatures during block execution -
they stop after +2/3. See in VerifyCommit:
0c7fd316eb/types/validator_set.go (L700-L703)
This means proposers can propose blocks that contain valid +2/3
signatures and then the rest of the signatures can be whatever they
want. They can claim that all the other validators signed just by
including a CommitSig with arbitrary signature data. While this doesn't
seem to impact safety of Tendermint per se, it means that Commits may
contain a lot of invalid data. This is already true of blocks, since
they can include invalid txs filled with garbage, but in that case the
application knows they they are invalid and can punish the proposer. But
since applications dont verify commit signatures directly (they trust
tendermint to do that), they won't be able to detect it.
This can impact incentivization logic in the application that depends on
the LastCommitInfo sent in BeginBlock, which includes which validators
signed. For instance, Gaia incentivizes proposers with a bonus for
including more than +2/3 of the signatures. But a proposer can now claim
that bonus just by including arbitrary data for the final -1/3 of
validators without actually waiting for their signatures. There may be
other tricks that can be played because of this.
In general, the full node should be a fully verifying machine. While
it's true that the light client can avoid verifying all signatures by
stopping after +2/3, the full node can not. Thus the light client and
full node should use distinct VerifyCommit functions if one is going to
stop after +2/3 or otherwise perform less validation (for instance light
clients can also skip verifying votes for nil while full nodes can not).
See a commit with a bad signature that verifies here: 56367fd. From what
I can tell, Tendermint will go on to think this commit is valid and
forward this data to the app, so the app will think the second validator
actually signed when it clearly did not.
In order to have more control over the mempool implementation,
introduce a new exported function RemoveTxByKey.
Export also TxKey() and TxKeySize. Use TxKeySize const instead of
sha256.size, so future changes on the hash function won't break the API.
Allows using a TxKey (32 bytes reference) as parameter instead of
the complete array set. So the application layer does not need to
keep track of the whole transaction but only of the sha256 hash (32 bytes).
This function is useful when mempool.Recheck is disabled.
Allows the Application layer to implement its own cleaning mechanism
without having to re-implement the whole mempool interface.
Mempool.Update() would probably also need to change from txBytes to txKey,
but that would require to change the Interface thus will break backwards
compatibility. For now RemoveTxByKey() looks like a good compromise,
it won't break anything and will help to solve some mempool issues from the
application layer.
Signed-off-by: p4u <pau@dabax.net>
## Description
This PR removes simple prefix from all types in the crypto/merkle directory.
The two proto types `Proof` & `ProofOp` have been moved to the `proto/crypto/merkle` directory.
proto messge `Proof` was renamed to `ProofOps` and `SimpleProof` message to `Proof`.
Closes: #2755
LastCommitRound should always be >= 0 for heights > 1.
In State.updateToState, last precommit is computed only when round
greater than -1 and has votes. But "LastCommit" is always updated
regardless of the condition. If there's no last precommit, "LastCommit"
is set to (*types.VoteSet)(nil). That's why "LastCommit" can be -1 for
heights > 1.
To fix it, only update State.RoundState.LastCommit when there is last
precommit.
Fixes#2737
Co-authored-by: Cuong Manh Le <cuong.manhle.vn@gmail.com>
Marko
Erik Grinaker
Callum Waters
Sad Pencil
Anton Kaliaev
Dev Ojha
Tess Rinearson
Pau