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bump version and update changelog

pull/5730/head
Anton Kaliaev 4 years ago
parent
commit
b59ecd68ab
3 changed files with 32 additions and 16 deletions
  1. +30
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      CHANGELOG.md
  2. +1
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      CHANGELOG_PENDING.md
  3. +1
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      version/version.go

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CHANGELOG.md View File

@ -1,5 +1,27 @@
# Changelog # Changelog
## v0.33.9
*November 10, 2020*
This release reduces the pings frequency for remote private validators and the
number of `GetPubKey` requests. Fixes
[\#5550](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/5550).
Special thanks to external contributors on this release:
@JoeKash, @joe-bowman
Friendly reminder, we have a [bug bounty program](https://hackerone.com/tendermint).
### IMPROVEMENTS:
- [consensus] [\#5143](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/5143) Only call `privValidator.GetPubKey` once per block (@melekes)
### BUG FIXES:
- [consensus] [\#4895](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/4895) Cache the address of the validator to reduce querying a remote KMS (@joe-bowman)
- [privval] [\#5638](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/5638) Increase read/write timeout to 5s and calculate ping interval based on it (@JoeKash)
## v0.33.8 ## v0.33.8
*August 11, 2020* *August 11, 2020*
@ -28,12 +50,12 @@ This security release fixes:
Tendermint 0.33.0 and above allow block proposers to include signatures for the Tendermint 0.33.0 and above allow block proposers to include signatures for the
wrong block. This may happen naturally if you start a network, have it run for wrong block. This may happen naturally if you start a network, have it run for
some time and restart it **without changing the chainID**. (It is a
[misconfiguration](https://docs.tendermint.com/master/tendermint-core/using-tendermint.html)
to reuse chainIDs.) Correct block proposers will accidentally include signatures
for the wrong block if they see these signatures, and then commits won't validate,
making all proposed blocks invalid. A malicious validator (even with a minimal
amount of stake) can use this vulnerability to completely halt the network.
some time and restart it **without changing the chainID**. (It is a
[misconfiguration](https://docs.tendermint.com/master/tendermint-core/using-tendermint.html)
to reuse chainIDs.) Correct block proposers will accidentally include signatures
for the wrong block if they see these signatures, and then commits won't validate,
making all proposed blocks invalid. A malicious validator (even with a minimal
amount of stake) can use this vulnerability to completely halt the network.
Tendermint 0.33.6 checks all the signatures are for the block with +2/3 Tendermint 0.33.6 checks all the signatures are for the block with +2/3
majority before creating a commit. majority before creating a commit.
@ -51,7 +73,7 @@ lot of invalid data.
_This was already true of blocks, since they could include invalid txs filled _This was already true of blocks, since they could include invalid txs filled
with garbage, but in that case the application knew that they are invalid and with garbage, but in that case the application knew that they are invalid and
could punish the proposer. But since applications didn't--and don't-- could punish the proposer. But since applications didn't--and don't--
verify commit signatures directly (they trust Tendermint to do that),
verify commit signatures directly (they trust Tendermint to do that),
they won't be able to detect it._ they won't be able to detect it._
This can impact incentivization logic in the application that depends on the This can impact incentivization logic in the application that depends on the
@ -63,7 +85,7 @@ their signatures. There may be other tricks that can be played because of this.
Tendermint 0.33.6 verifies all the signatures during block execution. Tendermint 0.33.6 verifies all the signatures during block execution.
_Please note that the light client does not check nil votes and exits as soon
_Please note that the light client does not check nil votes and exits as soon
as 2/3+ of the signatures are checked._ as 2/3+ of the signatures are checked._
**All clients are recommended to upgrade.** **All clients are recommended to upgrade.**


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CHANGELOG_PENDING.md View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
## v0.33.8
## v0.33.10
\*\* \*\*
@ -21,13 +21,7 @@ Friendly reminder, we have a [bug bounty program](https://hackerone.com/tendermi
### FEATURES: ### FEATURES:
### IMPROVEMENTS: ### IMPROVEMENTS:
- [consensus] \#5143 Only call `privValidator.GetPubKey` once per block (@melekes)
### BUG FIXES: ### BUG FIXES:
- [consensus] [\#4895](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/4895) Cache the address of the validator to reduce querying a remote KMS (@joe-bowman)
- [privval] \#5638 Increase read/write timeout to 5s and calculate ping interval based on it (@JoeKash)

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version/version.go View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ const (
// XXX: Don't change the name of this variable or you will break // XXX: Don't change the name of this variable or you will break
// automation :) // automation :)
TMCoreSemVer = "0.33.8"
TMCoreSemVer = "0.33.9"
// ABCISemVer is the semantic version of the ABCI library // ABCISemVer is the semantic version of the ABCI library
ABCISemVer = "0.16.2" ABCISemVer = "0.16.2"


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