evidence: fix bug with hashes (#6375)

CHANGELOG_PENDING.md

@@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ Friendly reminder: We have a [bug bounty program](https://hackerone.com/tendermi
 - [privval] \#5638 Increase read/write timeout to 5s and calculate ping interval based on it (@JoeKash)
 - [blockchain/v1] [\#5701](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/pull/5701) Handle peers without blocks (@melekes)
 - [blockchain/v1] \#5711 Fix deadlock (@melekes)
+- [evidence] \#6375 Fix bug with inconsistent LightClientAttackEvidence hashing (cmwaters)

evidence/pool.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"sort"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
@@ -203,9 +202,11 @@ func (evpool *Pool) CheckEvidence(evList types.EvidenceList) error {
 	hashes := make([][]byte, len(evList))
 	for idx, ev := range evList {
 
-		ok := evpool.fastCheck(ev)
+		_, isLightEv := ev.(*types.LightClientAttackEvidence)
 
-		if !ok {
+		// We must verify light client attack evidence regardless because there could be a
+		// different conflicting block with the same hash.
+		if isLightEv || !evpool.isPending(ev) {
 			// check that the evidence isn't already committed
 			if evpool.isCommitted(ev) {
 				return &types.ErrInvalidEvidence{Evidence: ev, Reason: errors.New("evidence was already committed")}
@@ -222,7 +223,7 @@ func (evpool *Pool) CheckEvidence(evList types.EvidenceList) error {
 				evpool.logger.Error("failed to add evidence to pending list", "err", err, "evidence", ev)
 			}
 
-			evpool.logger.Info("verified new evidence of byzantine behavior", "evidence", ev)
+			evpool.logger.Info("check evidence: verified evidence of byzantine behavior", "evidence", ev)
 		}
 
 		// check for duplicate evidence. We cache hashes so we don't have to work them out again.
@@ -260,78 +261,6 @@ func (evpool *Pool) State() sm.State {
 	return evpool.state
 }
 
-// fastCheck leverages the fact that the evidence pool may have already verified
-// the evidence to see if it can quickly conclude that the evidence is already
-// valid.
-func (evpool *Pool) fastCheck(ev types.Evidence) bool {
-	if lcae, ok := ev.(*types.LightClientAttackEvidence); ok {
-		key := keyPending(ev)
-		evBytes, err := evpool.evidenceStore.Get(key)
-		if evBytes == nil { // the evidence is not in the nodes pending list
-			return false
-		}
-
-		if err != nil {
-			evpool.logger.Error("failed to load light client attack evidence", "err", err, "key(height/hash)", key)
-			return false
-		}
-
-		var trustedPb tmproto.LightClientAttackEvidence
-
-		if err = trustedPb.Unmarshal(evBytes); err != nil {
-			evpool.logger.Error(
-				"failed to convert light client attack evidence from bytes",
-				"key(height/hash)", key,
-				"err", err,
-			)
-			return false
-		}
-
-		trustedEv, err := types.LightClientAttackEvidenceFromProto(&trustedPb)
-		if err != nil {
-			evpool.logger.Error(
-				"failed to convert light client attack evidence from protobuf",
-				"key(height/hash)", key,
-				"err", err,
-			)
-			return false
-		}
-
-		// Ensure that all the byzantine validators that the evidence pool has match
-		// the byzantine validators in this evidence.
-		if trustedEv.ByzantineValidators == nil && lcae.ByzantineValidators != nil {
-			return false
-		}
-
-		if len(trustedEv.ByzantineValidators) != len(lcae.ByzantineValidators) {
-			return false
-		}
-
-		byzValsCopy := make([]*types.Validator, len(lcae.ByzantineValidators))
-		for i, v := range lcae.ByzantineValidators {
-			byzValsCopy[i] = v.Copy()
-		}
-
-		// ensure that both validator arrays are in the same order
-		sort.Sort(types.ValidatorsByVotingPower(byzValsCopy))
-
-		for idx, val := range trustedEv.ByzantineValidators {
-			if !bytes.Equal(byzValsCopy[idx].Address, val.Address) {
-				return false
-			}
-			if byzValsCopy[idx].VotingPower != val.VotingPower {
-				return false
-			}
-		}
-
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// For all other evidence the evidence pool just checks if it is already in
-	// the pending db.
-	return evpool.isPending(ev)
-}
-
 // IsExpired checks whether evidence or a polc is expired by checking whether a height and time is older
 // than set by the evidence consensus parameters
 func (evpool *Pool) isExpired(height int64, time time.Time) bool {
@@ -396,7 +325,7 @@ func (evpool *Pool) markEvidenceAsCommitted(evidence types.EvidenceList, height
 	for _, ev := range evidence {
 		if evpool.isPending(ev) {
 			if err := batch.Delete(keyPending(ev)); err != nil {
-				evpool.logger.Error("failed to batch pending evidence", "err", err)
+				evpool.logger.Error("failed to batch delete pending evidence", "err", err)
 			}
 			blockEvidenceMap[evMapKey(ev)] = struct{}{}
 		}
@@ -546,7 +475,7 @@ func (evpool *Pool) batchExpiredPendingEvidence(batch dbm.Batch) (int64, time.Ti
 
 		// else add to the batch
 		if err := batch.Delete(iter.Key()); err != nil {
-			evpool.logger.Error("failed to batch evidence", "err", err, "ev", ev)
+			evpool.logger.Error("failed to batch delete evidence", "err", err, "ev", ev)
 			continue
 		}
 

evidence/pool_test.go

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/evidence"
 	"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/evidence/mocks"
 	"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/libs/log"
-	tmproto "github.com/tendermint/tendermint/proto/tendermint/types"
 	sm "github.com/tendermint/tendermint/state"
 	smmocks "github.com/tendermint/tendermint/state/mocks"
 	"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/store"
@@ -166,6 +165,9 @@ func TestReportConflictingVotes(t *testing.T) {
 	// should be able to retrieve evidence from pool
 	evList, _ = pool.PendingEvidence(defaultEvidenceMaxBytes)
 	require.Equal(t, []types.Evidence{ev}, evList)
+
+	next = pool.EvidenceFront()
+	require.NotNil(t, next)
 }
 
 func TestEvidencePoolUpdate(t *testing.T) {
@@ -262,84 +264,61 @@ func TestVerifyDuplicatedEvidenceFails(t *testing.T) {
 
 // check that valid light client evidence is correctly validated and stored in
 // evidence pool
-func TestCheckEvidenceWithLightClientAttack(t *testing.T) {
+func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 	var (
-		nValidators          = 5
-		validatorPower int64 = 10
-		height         int64 = 10
+		height       int64 = 100
+		commonHeight int64 = 90
 	)
 
-	conflictingVals, conflictingPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(nValidators, validatorPower)
-	trustedHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
-	trustedHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime
-
-	conflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
-	conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
-
-	trustedHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash
-	trustedHeader.NextValidatorsHash = conflictingHeader.NextValidatorsHash
-	trustedHeader.ConsensusHash = conflictingHeader.ConsensusHash
-	trustedHeader.AppHash = conflictingHeader.AppHash
-	trustedHeader.LastResultsHash = conflictingHeader.LastResultsHash
-
-	// For simplicity we are simulating a duplicate vote attack where all the
-	// validators in the conflictingVals set voted twice.
-	blockID := makeBlockID(conflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
-	voteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
-
-	commit, err := types.MakeCommit(blockID, height, 1, voteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	ev := &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
-		ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
-			SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
-				Header: conflictingHeader,
-				Commit: commit,
-			},
-			ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
-		},
-		CommonHeight:        10,
-		TotalVotingPower:    int64(nValidators) * validatorPower,
-		ByzantineValidators: conflictingVals.Validators,
-		Timestamp:           defaultEvidenceTime,
-	}
-
-	trustedBlockID := makeBlockID(trustedHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
-	trustedVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
-	trustedCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(
-		trustedBlockID,
-		height,
-		1,
-		trustedVoteSet,
-		conflictingPrivVals,
-		defaultEvidenceTime,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
+	ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(t, height, commonHeight,
+		10, 5, 5, defaultEvidenceTime, defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1*time.Hour))
 
 	state := sm.State{
-		LastBlockTime:   defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Minute),
-		LastBlockHeight: 11,
+		LastBlockTime:   defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2 * time.Hour),
+		LastBlockHeight: 110,
 		ConsensusParams: *types.DefaultConsensusParams(),
 	}
 
 	stateStore := &smmocks.Store{}
-	stateStore.On("LoadValidators", height).Return(conflictingVals, nil)
+	stateStore.On("LoadValidators", height).Return(trusted.ValidatorSet, nil)
+	stateStore.On("LoadValidators", commonHeight).Return(common.ValidatorSet, nil)
 	stateStore.On("Load").Return(state, nil)
 
 	blockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
-	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", height).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trustedHeader})
-	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", height).Return(trustedCommit)
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", height).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trusted.Header})
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", height).Return(trusted.Commit)
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
 
 	pool, err := evidence.NewPool(log.TestingLogger(), dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
+	hash := ev.Hash()
+
 	require.NoError(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
-	require.NoError(t, pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev}))
+	require.NoError(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
+
+	pendingEv, _ := pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, len(pendingEv))
+	require.Equal(t, ev, pendingEv[0])
+
+	require.NoError(t, pool.CheckEvidence(pendingEv))
+	require.Equal(t, ev, pendingEv[0])
 
-	// Take away the last signature -> there are less validators then what we have detected,
-	// hence this should fail.
-	commit.Signatures = append(commit.Signatures[:nValidators-1], types.NewCommitSigAbsent())
+	state.LastBlockHeight++
+	state.LastBlockTime = state.LastBlockTime.Add(1 * time.Minute)
+	pool.Update(state, pendingEv)
+	require.Equal(t, hash, pendingEv[0].Hash())
+
+	remaindingEv, _ := pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
+	require.Empty(t, remaindingEv)
+
+	// evidence is already committed so it shouldn't pass
 	require.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev}))
+	require.NoError(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
+
+	remaindingEv, _ = pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
+	require.Empty(t, remaindingEv)
 }
 
 // Tests that restarting the evidence pool after a potential failure will recover the
@@ -389,7 +368,7 @@ func TestRecoverPendingEvidence(t *testing.T) {
 			Evidence: types.EvidenceParams{
 				MaxAgeNumBlocks: 20,
 				MaxAgeDuration:  20 * time.Minute,
-				MaxBytes:        1000,
+				MaxBytes:        defaultEvidenceMaxBytes,
 			},
 		},
 	}, nil)

evidence/verify.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"sort"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/light"
@@ -129,56 +128,6 @@ func (evpool *Pool) verify(evidence types.Evidence) error {
 		if err != nil {
 			return types.NewErrInvalidEvidence(evidence, err)
 		}
-
-		// Find out what type of attack this was and thus extract the malicious
-		// validators. Note, in the case of an Amnesia attack we don't have any
-		// malicious validators.
-		validators := ev.GetByzantineValidators(commonVals, trustedHeader)
-
-		// Ensure this matches the validators that are listed in the evidence. They
-		// should be ordered based on power.
-		if validators == nil && ev.ByzantineValidators != nil {
-			return types.NewErrInvalidEvidence(
-				evidence,
-				fmt.Errorf(
-					"expected nil validators from an amnesia light client attack but got %d",
-					len(ev.ByzantineValidators),
-				),
-			)
-		}
-
-		if exp, got := len(validators), len(ev.ByzantineValidators); exp != got {
-			return types.NewErrInvalidEvidence(
-				evidence,
-				fmt.Errorf("expected %d byzantine validators from evidence but got %d", exp, got),
-			)
-		}
-
-		// ensure that both validator arrays are in the same order
-		sort.Sort(types.ValidatorsByVotingPower(ev.ByzantineValidators))
-
-		for idx, val := range validators {
-			if !bytes.Equal(ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address, val.Address) {
-				return types.NewErrInvalidEvidence(
-					evidence,
-					fmt.Errorf(
-						"evidence contained an unexpected byzantine validator address; expected: %v, got: %v",
-						val.Address, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address,
-					),
-				)
-			}
-
-			if ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower != val.VotingPower {
-				return types.NewErrInvalidEvidence(
-					evidence,
-					fmt.Errorf(
-						"evidence contained unexpected byzantine validator power; expected %d, got %d",
-						val.VotingPower, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower,
-					),
-				)
-			}
-		}
-
 		return nil
 
 	default:
@@ -206,7 +155,7 @@ func VerifyLightClientAttack(e *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, commonHeader, t
 		}
 
 		// In the case of equivocation and amnesia we expect all header hashes to be correctly derived
-	} else if isInvalidHeader(trustedHeader.Header, e.ConflictingBlock.Header) {
+	} else if e.ConflictingHeaderIsInvalid(trustedHeader.Header) {
 		return errors.New("common height is the same as conflicting block height so expected the conflicting" +
 			" block to be correctly derived yet it wasn't")
 	}
@@ -235,7 +184,7 @@ func VerifyLightClientAttack(e *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, commonHeader, t
 			trustedHeader.Hash())
 	}
 
-	return nil
+	return validateABCIEvidence(e, commonVals, trustedHeader)
 }
 
 // VerifyDuplicateVote verifies DuplicateVoteEvidence against the state of full node. This involves the
@@ -306,6 +255,55 @@ func VerifyDuplicateVote(e *types.DuplicateVoteEvidence, chainID string, valSet
 	return nil
 }
 
+// validateABCIEvidence validates the ABCI component of the light client attack
+// evidence i.e voting power and byzantine validators
+func validateABCIEvidence(
+	ev *types.LightClientAttackEvidence,
+	commonVals *types.ValidatorSet,
+	trustedHeader *types.SignedHeader,
+) error {
+	if evTotal, valsTotal := ev.TotalVotingPower, commonVals.TotalVotingPower(); evTotal != valsTotal {
+		return fmt.Errorf("total voting power from the evidence and our validator set does not match (%d != %d)",
+			evTotal, valsTotal)
+	}
+
+	// Find out what type of attack this was and thus extract the malicious
+	// validators. Note, in the case of an Amnesia attack we don't have any
+	// malicious validators.
+	validators := ev.GetByzantineValidators(commonVals, trustedHeader)
+
+	// Ensure this matches the validators that are listed in the evidence. They
+	// should be ordered based on power.
+	if validators == nil && ev.ByzantineValidators != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf(
+			"expected nil validators from an amnesia light client attack but got %d",
+			len(ev.ByzantineValidators),
+		)
+	}
+
+	if exp, got := len(validators), len(ev.ByzantineValidators); exp != got {
+		return fmt.Errorf("expected %d byzantine validators from evidence but got %d", exp, got)
+	}
+
+	for idx, val := range validators {
+		if !bytes.Equal(ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address, val.Address) {
+			return fmt.Errorf(
+				"evidence contained an unexpected byzantine validator address; expected: %v, got: %v",
+				val.Address, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].Address,
+			)
+		}
+
+		if ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower != val.VotingPower {
+			return fmt.Errorf(
+				"evidence contained unexpected byzantine validator power; expected %d, got %d",
+				val.VotingPower, ev.ByzantineValidators[idx].VotingPower,
+			)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 func getSignedHeader(blockStore BlockStore, height int64) (*types.SignedHeader, error) {
 	blockMeta := blockStore.LoadBlockMeta(height)
 	if blockMeta == nil {
@@ -320,15 +318,3 @@ func getSignedHeader(blockStore BlockStore, height int64) (*types.SignedHeader,
 		Commit: commit,
 	}, nil
 }
-
-// isInvalidHeader takes a trusted header and matches it againt a conflicting header
-// to determine whether the conflicting header was the product of a valid state transition
-// or not. If it is then all the deterministic fields of the header should be the same.
-// If not, it is an invalid header and constitutes a lunatic attack.
-func isInvalidHeader(trusted, conflicting *types.Header) bool {
-	return !bytes.Equal(trusted.ValidatorsHash, conflicting.ValidatorsHash) ||
-		!bytes.Equal(trusted.NextValidatorsHash, conflicting.NextValidatorsHash) ||
-		!bytes.Equal(trusted.ConsensusHash, conflicting.ConsensusHash) ||
-		!bytes.Equal(trusted.AppHash, conflicting.AppHash) ||
-		!bytes.Equal(trusted.LastResultsHash, conflicting.LastResultsHash)
-}

evidence/verify_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package evidence_test
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -22,139 +23,170 @@ import (
 	"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/version"
 )
 
-func TestVerifyLightClientAttack_Lunatic(t *testing.T) {
-	commonVals, commonPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(2, 10)
-
-	newVal, newPrivVal := types.RandValidator(false, 9)
-
-	conflictingVals, err := types.ValidatorSetFromExistingValidators(append(commonVals.Validators, newVal))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	conflictingPrivVals := append(commonPrivVals, newPrivVal)
-
-	commonHeader := makeHeaderRandom(4)
-	commonHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime
-	trustedHeader := makeHeaderRandom(10)
-	trustedHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
-
-	conflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(10)
-	conflictingHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
-	conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
-
-	// we are simulating a lunatic light client attack
-	blockID := makeBlockID(conflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
-	voteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, 10, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
-	commit, err := types.MakeCommit(blockID, 10, 1, voteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	ev := &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
-		ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
-			SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
-				Header: conflictingHeader,
-				Commit: commit,
-			},
-			ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
-		},
-		CommonHeight:        4,
-		TotalVotingPower:    20,
-		ByzantineValidators: commonVals.Validators,
-		Timestamp:           defaultEvidenceTime,
-	}
+const (
+	defaultVotingPower = 10
+)
 
-	commonSignedHeader := &types.SignedHeader{
-		Header: commonHeader,
-		Commit: &types.Commit{},
-	}
-	trustedBlockID := makeBlockID(trustedHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
-	vals, privVals := types.RandValidatorSet(3, 8)
-	trustedVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, 10, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), vals)
-	trustedCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(trustedBlockID, 10, 1, trustedVoteSet, privVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	trustedSignedHeader := &types.SignedHeader{
-		Header: trustedHeader,
-		Commit: trustedCommit,
-	}
+func TestVerifyLightClientAttack_Lunatic(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		height       int64 = 10
+		commonHeight int64 = 4
+		totalVals          = 10
+		byzVals            = 4
+	)
+	attackTime := defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
+	// create valid lunatic evidence
+	ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(
+		t, height, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
+	require.NoError(t, ev.ValidateBasic())
 
 	// good pass -> no error
-	err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonSignedHeader, trustedSignedHeader, commonVals,
+	err := evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, trusted.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
 		defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
 	assert.NoError(t, err)
 
 	// trusted and conflicting hashes are the same -> an error should be returned
-	err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonSignedHeader, ev.ConflictingBlock.SignedHeader, commonVals,
+	err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, ev.ConflictingBlock.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
 		defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 
 	// evidence with different total validator power should fail
-	ev.TotalVotingPower = 1
-	err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, commonSignedHeader, trustedSignedHeader, commonVals,
+	ev.TotalVotingPower = 1 * defaultVotingPower
+	err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, trusted.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
 		defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
 	assert.Error(t, err)
-	ev.TotalVotingPower = 20
-
-	forwardConflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(11)
-	forwardConflictingHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(30 * time.Minute)
-	forwardConflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
-	forwardBlockID := makeBlockID(forwardConflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
-	forwardVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, 11, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
-	forwardCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(forwardBlockID, 11, 1, forwardVoteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	forwardLunaticEv := &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
-		ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
-			SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
-				Header: forwardConflictingHeader,
-				Commit: forwardCommit,
-			},
-			ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
-		},
-		CommonHeight:        4,
-		TotalVotingPower:    20,
-		ByzantineValidators: commonVals.Validators,
-		Timestamp:           defaultEvidenceTime,
-	}
-	err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(forwardLunaticEv, commonSignedHeader, trustedSignedHeader, commonVals,
+
+	// evidence without enough malicious votes should fail
+	ev, trusted, common = makeLunaticEvidence(
+		t, height, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals-1, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
+	err = evidence.VerifyLightClientAttack(ev, common.SignedHeader, trusted.SignedHeader, common.ValidatorSet,
 		defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2*time.Hour), 3*time.Hour)
-	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestVerify_LunaticAttackAgainstState(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		height       int64 = 10
+		commonHeight int64 = 4
+		totalVals          = 10
+		byzVals            = 4
+	)
+	attackTime := defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
+	// create valid lunatic evidence
+	ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(
+		t, height, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
 
+	// now we try to test verification against state
 	state := sm.State{
 		LastBlockTime:   defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2 * time.Hour),
-		LastBlockHeight: 11,
+		LastBlockHeight: height + 1,
 		ConsensusParams: *types.DefaultConsensusParams(),
 	}
 	stateStore := &smmocks.Store{}
-	stateStore.On("LoadValidators", int64(4)).Return(commonVals, nil)
+	stateStore.On("LoadValidators", commonHeight).Return(common.ValidatorSet, nil)
 	stateStore.On("Load").Return(state, nil)
 	blockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
-	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", int64(4)).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *commonHeader})
-	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", int64(10)).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trustedHeader})
-	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", int64(11)).Return(nil)
-	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", int64(4)).Return(commit)
-	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", int64(10)).Return(trustedCommit)
-	blockStore.On("Height").Return(int64(10))
-
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", height).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trusted.Header})
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", height).Return(trusted.Commit)
 	pool, err := evidence.NewPool(log.TestingLogger(), dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	evList := types.EvidenceList{ev}
-	err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
-	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	// check that the evidence pool correctly verifies the evidence
+	assert.NoError(t, pool.CheckEvidence(evList))
 
+	// as it was not originally in the pending bucket, it should now have been added
 	pendingEvs, _ := pool.PendingEvidence(state.ConsensusParams.Evidence.MaxBytes)
 	assert.Equal(t, 1, len(pendingEvs))
+	assert.Equal(t, ev, pendingEvs[0])
 
 	// if we submit evidence only against a single byzantine validator when we see there are more validators then this
 	// should return an error
-	ev.ByzantineValidators = []*types.Validator{commonVals.Validators[0]}
-	err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
-	assert.Error(t, err)
-	ev.ByzantineValidators = commonVals.Validators // restore evidence
+	ev.ByzantineValidators = ev.ByzantineValidators[:1]
+	t.Log(evList)
+	assert.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(evList))
+	// restore original byz vals
+	ev.ByzantineValidators = ev.GetByzantineValidators(common.ValidatorSet, trusted.SignedHeader)
+
+	// duplicate evidence should be rejected
+	evList = types.EvidenceList{ev, ev}
+	pool, err = evidence.NewPool(log.TestingLogger(), dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(evList))
 
 	// If evidence is submitted with an altered timestamp it should return an error
 	ev.Timestamp = defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Minute)
-	err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
-	assert.Error(t, err)
+	pool, err = evidence.NewPool(log.TestingLogger(), dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Error(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
+	ev.Timestamp = defaultEvidenceTime
 
-	evList = types.EvidenceList{forwardLunaticEv}
-	err = pool.CheckEvidence(evList)
-	assert.NoError(t, err)
+	// Evidence submitted with a different validator power should fail
+	ev.TotalVotingPower = 1
+	pool, err = evidence.NewPool(log.TestingLogger(), dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Error(t, pool.AddEvidence(ev))
+	ev.TotalVotingPower = common.ValidatorSet.TotalVotingPower()
+}
+
+func TestVerify_ForwardLunaticAttack(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		nodeHeight   int64 = 8
+		attackHeight int64 = 10
+		commonHeight int64 = 4
+		totalVals          = 10
+		byzVals            = 5
+	)
+	attackTime := defaultEvidenceTime.Add(1 * time.Hour)
+
+	// create a forward lunatic attack
+	ev, trusted, common := makeLunaticEvidence(
+		t, attackHeight, commonHeight, totalVals, byzVals, totalVals-byzVals, defaultEvidenceTime, attackTime)
+
+	// now we try to test verification against state
+	state := sm.State{
+		LastBlockTime:   defaultEvidenceTime.Add(2 * time.Hour),
+		LastBlockHeight: nodeHeight,
+		ConsensusParams: *types.DefaultConsensusParams(),
+	}
+
+	// modify trusted light block so that it is of a height less than the conflicting one
+	trusted.Header.Height = state.LastBlockHeight
+	trusted.Header.Time = state.LastBlockTime
+
+	stateStore := &smmocks.Store{}
+	stateStore.On("LoadValidators", commonHeight).Return(common.ValidatorSet, nil)
+	stateStore.On("Load").Return(state, nil)
+	blockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", nodeHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *trusted.Header})
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", attackHeight).Return(nil)
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
+	blockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", nodeHeight).Return(trusted.Commit)
+	blockStore.On("Height").Return(nodeHeight)
+	pool, err := evidence.NewPool(log.TestingLogger(), dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, blockStore)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// check that the evidence pool correctly verifies the evidence
+	assert.NoError(t, pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev}))
+
+	// now we use a time which isn't able to contradict the FLA - thus we can't verify the evidence
+	oldBlockStore := &mocks.BlockStore{}
+	oldHeader := trusted.Header
+	oldHeader.Time = defaultEvidenceTime
+	oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", commonHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *common.Header})
+	oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", nodeHeight).Return(&types.BlockMeta{Header: *oldHeader})
+	oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockMeta", attackHeight).Return(nil)
+	oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", commonHeight).Return(common.Commit)
+	oldBlockStore.On("LoadBlockCommit", nodeHeight).Return(trusted.Commit)
+	oldBlockStore.On("Height").Return(nodeHeight)
+	require.Equal(t, defaultEvidenceTime, oldBlockStore.LoadBlockMeta(nodeHeight).Header.Time)
+
+	pool, err = evidence.NewPool(log.TestingLogger(), dbm.NewMemDB(), stateStore, oldBlockStore)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Error(t, pool.CheckEvidence(types.EvidenceList{ev}))
 }
 
 func TestVerifyLightClientAttack_Equivocation(t *testing.T) {
@@ -414,6 +446,84 @@ func TestVerifyDuplicateVoteEvidence(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 }
 
+func makeLunaticEvidence(
+	t *testing.T,
+	height, commonHeight int64,
+	totalVals, byzVals, phantomVals int,
+	commonTime, attackTime time.Time,
+) (ev *types.LightClientAttackEvidence, trusted *types.LightBlock, common *types.LightBlock) {
+	commonValSet, commonPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(totalVals, defaultVotingPower)
+
+	require.Greater(t, totalVals, byzVals)
+
+	// extract out the subset of byzantine validators in the common validator set
+	byzValSet, byzPrivVals := commonValSet.Validators[:byzVals], commonPrivVals[:byzVals]
+
+	phantomValSet, phantomPrivVals := types.RandValidatorSet(phantomVals, defaultVotingPower)
+
+	conflictingVals := phantomValSet.Copy()
+	require.NoError(t, conflictingVals.UpdateWithChangeSet(byzValSet))
+	conflictingPrivVals := append(phantomPrivVals, byzPrivVals...)
+
+	conflictingPrivVals = orderPrivValsByValSet(t, conflictingVals, conflictingPrivVals)
+
+	commonHeader := makeHeaderRandom(commonHeight)
+	commonHeader.Time = commonTime
+	trustedHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
+
+	conflictingHeader := makeHeaderRandom(height)
+	conflictingHeader.Time = attackTime
+	conflictingHeader.ValidatorsHash = conflictingVals.Hash()
+
+	blockID := makeBlockID(conflictingHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
+	voteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), conflictingVals)
+	commit, err := types.MakeCommit(blockID, height, 1, voteSet, conflictingPrivVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	ev = &types.LightClientAttackEvidence{
+		ConflictingBlock: &types.LightBlock{
+			SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
+				Header: conflictingHeader,
+				Commit: commit,
+			},
+			ValidatorSet: conflictingVals,
+		},
+		CommonHeight:        commonHeight,
+		TotalVotingPower:    commonValSet.TotalVotingPower(),
+		ByzantineValidators: byzValSet,
+		Timestamp:           commonTime,
+	}
+
+	common = &types.LightBlock{
+		SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
+			Header: commonHeader,
+			// we can leave this empty because we shouldn't be checking this
+			Commit: &types.Commit{},
+		},
+		ValidatorSet: commonValSet,
+	}
+	trustedBlockID := makeBlockID(trustedHeader.Hash(), 1000, []byte("partshash"))
+	trustedVals, privVals := types.RandValidatorSet(totalVals, defaultVotingPower)
+	trustedVoteSet := types.NewVoteSet(evidenceChainID, height, 1, tmproto.SignedMsgType(2), trustedVals)
+	trustedCommit, err := types.MakeCommit(trustedBlockID, height, 1, trustedVoteSet, privVals, defaultEvidenceTime)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	trusted = &types.LightBlock{
+		SignedHeader: &types.SignedHeader{
+			Header: trustedHeader,
+			Commit: trustedCommit,
+		},
+		ValidatorSet: trustedVals,
+	}
+	return ev, trusted, common
+}
+
+// func makeEquivocationEvidence() *types.LightClientAttackEvidence {
+
+// }
+
+// func makeAmnesiaEvidence() *types.LightClientAttackEvidence {
+
+// }
+
 func makeVote(
 	t *testing.T, val types.PrivValidator, chainID string, valIndex int32, height int64,
 	round int32, step int, blockID types.BlockID, time time.Time) *types.Vote {
@@ -472,3 +582,20 @@ func makeBlockID(hash []byte, partSetSize uint32, partSetHash []byte) types.Bloc
 		},
 	}
 }
+
+func orderPrivValsByValSet(
+	t *testing.T, vals *types.ValidatorSet, privVals []types.PrivValidator) []types.PrivValidator {
+	output := make([]types.PrivValidator, len(privVals))
+	for idx, v := range vals.Validators {
+		for _, p := range privVals {
+			pubKey, err := p.GetPubKey(context.Background())
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			if bytes.Equal(v.Address, pubKey.Address()) {
+				output[idx] = p
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		require.NotEmpty(t, output[idx])
+	}
+	return output
+}

p2p/shim.go

@@ -144,7 +144,10 @@ func (rs *ReactorShim) proxyPeerEnvelopes() {
 					}
 
 					if !src.Send(cs.Descriptor.ID, bz) {
-						rs.Logger.Error(
+						// This usually happens when we try to send across a channel
+						// that the peer doesn't have open. To avoid bloating the
+						// logs we set this to be Debug
+						rs.Logger.Debug(
 							"failed to proxy message to peer",
 							"ch_id", cs.Descriptor.ID,
 							"peer", e.To,

test/e2e/networks/ci.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # functionality with a single network.
 
 disable_legacy_p2p = false
-evidence = 0
+evidence = 5
 initial_height = 1000
 initial_state = {initial01 = "a", initial02 = "b", initial03 = "c"}
 queue_type = "priority"
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ seeds = ["seed01"]
 persist_interval = 3
 perturb = ["kill"]
 privval_protocol = "grpc"
-retain_blocks = 3
+retain_blocks = 5
 
 [node.validator04]
 abci_protocol = "builtin"
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ start_at = 1010
 fast_sync = "v0"
 persistent_peers = ["validator01", "validator02", "validator03", "validator04", "validator05"]
 perturb = ["restart"]
-retain_blocks = 3
+retain_blocks = 5
 
 [node.full02]
 mode = "full"

test/e2e/pkg/testnet.go

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ const (
 	PerturbationPause      Perturbation = "pause"
 	PerturbationRestart    Perturbation = "restart"
 
-	EvidenceAgeHeight int64         = 3
+	EvidenceAgeHeight int64         = 5
 	EvidenceAgeTime   time.Duration = 10 * time.Second
 )
 

test/e2e/runner/evidence.go

@@ -19,11 +19,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/tendermint/tendermint/version"
 )
 
-// 1 in 11 evidence is light client evidence, the rest is duplicate vote
-// FIXME: Setting to 11 disables light client attack evidence since nodes
-// don't follow a minimum retention height invariant. When we fix this we
-// should use a ratio of 4.
-const lightClientEvidenceRatio = 11
+// 1 in 4 evidence is light client evidence, the rest is duplicate vote evidence
+const lightClientEvidenceRatio = 4
 
 // InjectEvidence takes a running testnet and generates an amount of valid
 // evidence and broadcasts it to a random node through the rpc endpoint `/broadcast_evidence`.
@@ -74,7 +71,7 @@ func InjectEvidence(testnet *e2e.Testnet, amount int) error {
 	duplicateVoteTime := status.SyncInfo.LatestBlockTime
 
 	var ev types.Evidence
-	for i := 0; i < amount; i++ {
+	for i := 1; i <= amount; i++ {
 		if i%lightClientEvidenceRatio == 0 {
 			ev, err = generateLightClientAttackEvidence(
 				privVals, lightEvidenceCommonHeight, valSet, testnet.Name, blockRes.Block.Time,

test/e2e/tests/block_test.go

@@ -37,8 +37,12 @@ func TestBlock_Header(t *testing.T) {
 			}
 			resp, err := client.Block(ctx, &block.Header.Height)
 			require.NoError(t, err)
+
 			require.Equal(t, block, resp.Block,
-				"block mismatch for height %v", block.Header.Height)
+				"block mismatch for height %d", block.Header.Height)
+
+			require.NoError(t, resp.Block.ValidateBasic(),
+				"block at height %d is invalid", block.Header.Height)
 		}
 	})
 }

types/evidence.go

@@ -296,7 +296,10 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) ConflictingHeaderIsInvalid(trustedHeader *He
 // with evidence that have the same conflicting header and common height but different permutations
 // of validator commit signatures. The reason for this is that we don't want to allow several
 // permutations of the same evidence to be committed on chain. Ideally we commit the header with the
-// most commit signatures (captures the most byzantine validators) but anything greater than 1/3 is sufficient.
+// most commit signatures (captures the most byzantine validators) but anything greater than 1/3 is
+// sufficient.
+// TODO: We should change the hash to include the commit, header, total voting power, byzantine
+// validators and timestamp
 func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) Hash() []byte {
 	buf := make([]byte, binary.MaxVarintLen64)
 	n := binary.PutVarint(buf, l.CommonHeight)
@@ -315,8 +318,14 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) Height() int64 {
 
 // String returns a string representation of LightClientAttackEvidence
 func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) String() string {
-	return fmt.Sprintf("LightClientAttackEvidence{ConflictingBlock: %v, CommonHeight: %d}",
-		l.ConflictingBlock.String(), l.CommonHeight)
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`LightClientAttackEvidence{
+		ConflictingBlock: %v, 
+		CommonHeight: %d, 
+		ByzatineValidators: %v, 
+		TotalVotingPower: %d, 
+		Timestamp: %v}#%X`,
+		l.ConflictingBlock.String(), l.CommonHeight, l.ByzantineValidators,
+		l.TotalVotingPower, l.Timestamp, l.Hash())
 }
 
 // Time returns the time of the common block where the infraction leveraged off.
@@ -335,8 +344,8 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) ValidateBasic() error {
 		return errors.New("conflicting block missing header")
 	}
 
-	if err := l.ConflictingBlock.ValidateBasic(l.ConflictingBlock.ChainID); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid conflicting light block: %w", err)
+	if l.TotalVotingPower <= 0 {
+		return errors.New("negative or zero total voting power")
 	}
 
 	if l.CommonHeight <= 0 {
@@ -351,6 +360,10 @@ func (l *LightClientAttackEvidence) ValidateBasic() error {
 			l.CommonHeight, l.ConflictingBlock.Height)
 	}
 
+	if err := l.ConflictingBlock.ValidateBasic(l.ConflictingBlock.ChainID); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid conflicting light block: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -422,6 +435,8 @@ func (evl EvidenceList) Hash() []byte {
 	// the Evidence size is capped.
 	evidenceBzs := make([][]byte, len(evl))
 	for i := 0; i < len(evl); i++ {
+		// TODO: We should change this to the hash. Using bytes contains some unexported data that
+		// may cause different hashes
 		evidenceBzs[i] = evl[i].Bytes()
 	}
 	return merkle.HashFromByteSlices(evidenceBzs)

types/evidence_test.go

@@ -89,9 +89,11 @@ func TestDuplicateVoteEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestLightClientAttackEvidence(t *testing.T) {
+func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceBasic(t *testing.T) {
 	height := int64(5)
-	voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, 10, 1)
+	commonHeight := height - 1
+	nValidators := 10
+	voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, nValidators, 1)
 	header := makeHeaderRandom()
 	header.Height = height
 	blockID := makeBlockID(tmhash.Sum([]byte("blockhash")), math.MaxInt32, tmhash.Sum([]byte("partshash")))
@@ -105,56 +107,52 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidence(t *testing.T) {
 			},
 			ValidatorSet: valSet,
 		},
-		CommonHeight: height - 1,
+		CommonHeight:        commonHeight,
+		TotalVotingPower:    valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
+		Timestamp:           header.Time,
+		ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
 	}
 	assert.NotNil(t, lcae.String())
 	assert.NotNil(t, lcae.Hash())
-	// only 7 validators sign
-	differentCommit, err := MakeCommit(blockID, height, 1, voteSet, privVals[:7], defaultVoteTime)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	differentEv := &LightClientAttackEvidence{
-		ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
-			SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
-				Header: header,
-				Commit: differentCommit,
-			},
-			ValidatorSet: valSet,
-		},
-		CommonHeight: height - 1,
-	}
-	assert.Equal(t, lcae.Hash(), differentEv.Hash())
-	// different header hash
-	differentHeader := makeHeaderRandom()
-	differentEv = &LightClientAttackEvidence{
-		ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
-			SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
-				Header: differentHeader,
-				Commit: differentCommit,
-			},
-			ValidatorSet: valSet,
-		},
-		CommonHeight: height - 1,
+	assert.Equal(t, lcae.Height(), commonHeight) // Height should be the common Height
+	assert.NotNil(t, lcae.Bytes())
+
+	// maleate evidence to test hash uniqueness
+	testCases := []struct {
+		testName         string
+		malleateEvidence func(*LightClientAttackEvidence)
+	}{
+		{"Different header", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.ConflictingBlock.Header = makeHeaderRandom() }},
+		{"Different common height", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
+			ev.CommonHeight = height + 1
+		}},
 	}
-	assert.NotEqual(t, lcae.Hash(), differentEv.Hash())
-	// different common height should produce a different header
-	differentEv = &LightClientAttackEvidence{
-		ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
-			SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
-				Header: header,
-				Commit: differentCommit,
+
+	for _, tc := range testCases {
+		lcae := &LightClientAttackEvidence{
+			ConflictingBlock: &LightBlock{
+				SignedHeader: &SignedHeader{
+					Header: header,
+					Commit: commit,
+				},
+				ValidatorSet: valSet,
 			},
-			ValidatorSet: valSet,
-		},
-		CommonHeight: height - 2,
+			CommonHeight:        commonHeight,
+			TotalVotingPower:    valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
+			Timestamp:           header.Time,
+			ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
+		}
+		hash := lcae.Hash()
+		tc.malleateEvidence(lcae)
+		assert.NotEqual(t, hash, lcae.Hash(), tc.testName)
 	}
-	assert.NotEqual(t, lcae.Hash(), differentEv.Hash())
-	assert.Equal(t, lcae.Height(), int64(4)) // Height should be the common Height
-	assert.NotNil(t, lcae.Bytes())
 }
 
 func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
 	height := int64(5)
-	voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, 10, 1)
+	commonHeight := height - 1
+	nValidators := 10
+	voteSet, valSet, privVals := randVoteSet(height, 1, tmproto.PrecommitType, nValidators, 1)
 	header := makeHeaderRandom()
 	header.Height = height
 	header.ValidatorsHash = valSet.Hash()
@@ -169,7 +167,10 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
 			},
 			ValidatorSet: valSet,
 		},
-		CommonHeight: height - 1,
+		CommonHeight:        commonHeight,
+		TotalVotingPower:    valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
+		Timestamp:           header.Time,
+		ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
 	}
 	assert.NoError(t, lcae.ValidateBasic())
 
@@ -178,16 +179,22 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
 		malleateEvidence func(*LightClientAttackEvidence)
 		expectErr        bool
 	}{
-		{"Good DuplicateVoteEvidence", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {}, false},
+		{"Good LightClientAttackEvidence", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {}, false},
 		{"Negative height", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.CommonHeight = -10 }, true},
 		{"Height is greater than divergent block", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
 			ev.CommonHeight = height + 1
 		}, true},
+		{"Height is equal to the divergent block", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
+			ev.CommonHeight = height
+		}, false},
 		{"Nil conflicting header", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.ConflictingBlock.Header = nil }, true},
 		{"Nil conflicting blocl", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) { ev.ConflictingBlock = nil }, true},
 		{"Nil validator set", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
 			ev.ConflictingBlock.ValidatorSet = &ValidatorSet{}
 		}, true},
+		{"Negative total voting power", func(ev *LightClientAttackEvidence) {
+			ev.TotalVotingPower = -1
+		}, true},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range testCases {
 		tc := tc
@@ -200,7 +207,10 @@ func TestLightClientAttackEvidenceValidation(t *testing.T) {
 					},
 					ValidatorSet: valSet,
 				},
-				CommonHeight: height - 1,
+				CommonHeight:        commonHeight,
+				TotalVotingPower:    valSet.TotalVotingPower(),
+				Timestamp:           header.Time,
+				ByzantineValidators: valSet.Validators[:nValidators/2],
 			}
 			tc.malleateEvidence(lcae)
 			if tc.expectErr {

types/light.go

@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ func (sh SignedHeader) ValidateBasic(chainID string) error {
 	if sh.Commit.Height != sh.Height {
 		return fmt.Errorf("header and commit height mismatch: %d vs %d", sh.Height, sh.Commit.Height)
 	}
-	if hhash, chash := sh.Hash(), sh.Commit.BlockID.Hash; !bytes.Equal(hhash, chash) {
+	if hhash, chash := sh.Header.Hash(), sh.Commit.BlockID.Hash; !bytes.Equal(hhash, chash) {
 		return fmt.Errorf("commit signs block %X, header is block %X", chash, hhash)
 	}
 

types/light_test.go

@@ -152,11 +152,13 @@ func TestSignedHeaderValidateBasic(t *testing.T) {
 				Header: tc.shHeader,
 				Commit: tc.shCommit,
 			}
-			assert.Equal(
+			err := sh.ValidateBasic(validSignedHeader.Header.ChainID)
+			assert.Equalf(
 				t,
 				tc.expectErr,
-				sh.ValidateBasic(validSignedHeader.Header.ChainID) != nil,
+				err != nil,
 				"Validate Basic had an unexpected result",
+				err,
 			)
 		})
 	}

types/validator_set.go

@@ -1028,7 +1028,9 @@ func (vals *ValidatorSet) ToProto() (*tmproto.ValidatorSet, error) {
 	}
 	vp.Proposer = valProposer
 
-	vp.TotalVotingPower = vals.totalVotingPower
+	// NOTE: Sometimes we use the bytes of the proto form as a hash. This means that we need to
+	// be consistent with cached data
+	vp.TotalVotingPower = 0
 
 	return vp, nil
 }
@@ -1059,7 +1061,12 @@ func ValidatorSetFromProto(vp *tmproto.ValidatorSet) (*ValidatorSet, error) {
 
 	vals.Proposer = p
 
-	vals.totalVotingPower = vp.GetTotalVotingPower()
+	// NOTE: We can't trust the total voting power given to us by other peers. If someone were to
+	// inject a non-zeo value that wasn't the correct voting power we could assume a wrong total
+	// power hence we need to recompute it.
+	// FIXME: We should look to remove TotalVotingPower from proto or add it in the validators hash
+	// so we don't have to do this
+	vals.TotalVotingPower()
 
 	return vals, vals.ValidateBasic()
 }