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move reactor descriptions to relevant specs

pull/1618/head
Anton Kaliaev 6 years ago
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7 changed files with 87 additions and 90 deletions
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      docs/running-in-production.rst
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      docs/spec/consensus/wal.md
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      docs/spec/reactors/block_sync/reactor.md
  4. +8
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      docs/spec/reactors/consensus/consensus-reactor.md
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      docs/spec/reactors/evidence/reactor.md
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      docs/spec/reactors/mempool/reactor.md
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      docs/spec/reactors/pex/reactor.md

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docs/running-in-production.rst View File

@ -12,41 +12,6 @@ modules can be found `here <./how-to-read-logs.html#list-of-modules>`__. If
you're trying to debug Tendermint or asked to provide logs with debug logging
level, you can do so by running tendermint with ``--log_level="*:debug"``.
Consensus WAL
-------------
Consensus module writes every message to the WAL (write-ahead log).
It also issues fsync syscall through `File#Sync
<https://golang.org/pkg/os/#File.Sync>`__ for messages signed by this node (to
prevent double signing).
Under the hood, it uses `autofile.Group
<https://godoc.org/github.com/tendermint/tmlibs/autofile#Group>`__, which
rotates files when those get too big (> 10MB).
The total maximum size is 1GB. We only need the latest block and the block before it,
but if the former is dragging on across many rounds, we want all those rounds.
Replay
~~~~~~
Consensus module will replay all the messages of the last height written to WAL
before a crash (if such occurs).
The private validator may try to sign messages during replay because it runs
somewhat autonomously and does not know about replay process.
For example, if we got all the way to precommit in the WAL and then crash,
after we replay the proposal message, the private validator will try to sign a
prevote. But it will fail. That's ok because we’ll see the prevote later in the
WAL. Then it will go to precommit, and that time it will work because the
private validator contains the ``LastSignBytes`` and then we’ll replay the
precommit from the WAL.
Make sure to read about `WAL corruption
<./specification/corruption.html#wal-corruption>`__ and recovery strategies.
DOS Exposure and Mitigation
---------------------------
@ -55,61 +20,6 @@ Validators are supposed to setup `Sentry Node Architecture
to prevent Denial-of-service attacks. You can read more about it `here
<https://github.com/tendermint/aib-data/blob/develop/medium/TendermintBFT.md>`__.
Blockchain Reactor
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Defines ``maxMsgSize`` for the maximum size of incoming messages,
``SendQueueCapacity`` and ``RecvBufferCapacity`` for maximum sending and
receiving buffers respectively. These are supposed to prevent amplification
attacks by setting up the upper limit on how much data we can receive & send to
a peer.
Sending incorrectly encoded data will result in stopping the peer.
Consensus Reactor
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Defines 4 channels: state, data, vote and vote_set_bits. Each channel
has ``SendQueueCapacity`` and ``RecvBufferCapacity`` and
``RecvMessageCapacity`` set to ``maxMsgSize``.
Sending incorrectly encoded data will result in stopping the peer.
Evidence Reactor
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
`#1503 <https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/1503>`__
Sending invalid evidence will result in stopping the peer.
Sending incorrectly encoded data or data exceeding ``maxMsgSize`` will result
in stopping the peer.
PEX Reactor
~~~~~~~~~~~
Defines only ``SendQueueCapacity``. `#1503 <https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/1503>`__
Implements rate-limiting by enforcing minimal time between two consecutive
``pexRequestMessage`` requests. If the peer sends us addresses we did not ask,
it is stopped.
Sending incorrectly encoded data or data exceeding ``maxMsgSize`` will result
in stopping the peer.
Mempool Reactor
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
`#1503 <https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/1503>`__
Mempool maintains a cache of the last 10000 transactions to prevent replaying
old transactions (plus transactions coming from other validators, who are
continually exchanging transactions). Read `Replay Protection
<./app-development.html#replay-protection>`__ for details.
Sending incorrectly encoded data or data exceeding ``maxMsgSize`` will result
in stopping the peer.
P2P
~~~


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docs/spec/consensus/wal.md View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
# WAL
Consensus module writes every message to the WAL (write-ahead log).
It also issues fsync syscall through
[File#Sync](https://golang.org/pkg/os/#File.Sync) for messages signed by this
node (to prevent double signing).
Under the hood, it uses
[autofile.Group](https://godoc.org/github.com/tendermint/tmlibs/autofile#Group),
which rotates files when those get too big (> 10MB).
The total maximum size is 1GB. We only need the latest block and the block before it,
but if the former is dragging on across many rounds, we want all those rounds.
## Replay
Consensus module will replay all the messages of the last height written to WAL
before a crash (if such occurs).
The private validator may try to sign messages during replay because it runs
somewhat autonomously and does not know about replay process.
For example, if we got all the way to precommit in the WAL and then crash,
after we replay the proposal message, the private validator will try to sign a
prevote. But it will fail. That's ok because we’ll see the prevote later in the
WAL. Then it will go to precommit, and that time it will work because the
private validator contains the `LastSignBytes` and then we’ll replay the
precommit from the WAL.
Make sure to read about [WAL
corruption](https://tendermint.readthedocs.io/projects/tools/en/master/specification/corruption.html#wal-corruption)
and recovery strategies.

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- 0
docs/spec/reactors/block_sync/reactor.md View File

@ -47,3 +47,13 @@ type bcStatusResponseMessage struct {
## Protocol
TODO
## Channels
Defines `maxMsgSize` for the maximum size of incoming messages,
`SendQueueCapacity` and `RecvBufferCapacity` for maximum sending and
receiving buffers respectively. These are supposed to prevent amplification
attacks by setting up the upper limit on how much data we can receive & send to
a peer.
Sending incorrectly encoded data will result in stopping the peer.

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- 0
docs/spec/reactors/consensus/consensus-reactor.md View File

@ -342,3 +342,11 @@ It broadcasts `NewRoundStepMessage` or `CommitStepMessage` upon new round state
broadcasting these messages does not depend on the PeerRoundState; it is sent on the StateChannel.
Upon receiving VoteMessage it broadcasts `HasVoteMessage` message to its peers on the StateChannel.
`ProposalHeartbeatMessage` is sent the same way on the StateChannel.
## Channels
Defines 4 channels: state, data, vote and vote_set_bits. Each channel
has `SendQueueCapacity` and `RecvBufferCapacity` and
`RecvMessageCapacity` set to `maxMsgSize`.
Sending incorrectly encoded data will result in stopping the peer.

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- 0
docs/spec/reactors/evidence/reactor.md View File

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
# Evidence Reactor
## Channels
[#1503](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/1503)
Sending invalid evidence will result in stopping the peer.
Sending incorrectly encoded data or data exceeding `maxMsgSize` will result
in stopping the peer.

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- 0
docs/spec/reactors/mempool/reactor.md View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# Mempool Reactor
## Channels
[#1503](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/1503)
Mempool maintains a cache of the last 10000 transactions to prevent
replaying old transactions (plus transactions coming from other
validators, who are continually exchanging transactions). Read [Replay
Protection](https://tendermint.readthedocs.io/projects/tools/en/master/app-development.html?#replay-protection)
for details.
Sending incorrectly encoded data or data exceeding `maxMsgSize` will result
in stopping the peer.

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- 0
docs/spec/reactors/pex/reactor.md View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
# PEX Reactor
## Channels
Defines only `SendQueueCapacity`. [#1503](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/1503)
Implements rate-limiting by enforcing minimal time between two consecutive
`pexRequestMessage` requests. If the peer sends us addresses we did not ask,
it is stopped.
Sending incorrectly encoded data or data exceeding `maxMsgSize` will result
in stopping the peer.

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