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- # RFC 005: ReverseSync - fetching historical data
-
- ## Changelog
-
- - 2021-04-19: Use P2P to gossip necessary data for reverse sync.
- - 2021-03-03: Simplify proposal to the state sync case.
- - 2021-02-17: Add notes on asynchronicity of processes.
- - 2020-12-10: Rename backfill blocks to reverse sync.
- - 2020-11-25: Initial draft.
-
- ## Author(s)
-
- - Callum Waters (@cmwaters)
-
- ## Context
-
- Two new features: [Block pruning](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/3652)
- and [State sync](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/blob/master/docs/architecture/adr-042-state-sync.md)
- meant nodes no longer needed a complete history of the blockchain. This
- introduced some challenges of its own which were covered and subsequently
- tackled with [RFC-001](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/blob/master/rfc/001-block-retention.md).
- The RFC allowed applications to set a block retention height; an upper bound on
- what blocks would be pruned. However nodes who state sync past this upper bound
- (which is necessary as snapshots must be saved within the trusting period for
- the assisting light client to verify) have no means of backfilling the blocks
- to meet the retention limit. This could be a problem as nodes who state sync and
- then eventually switch to consensus (or fast sync) may not have the block and
- validator history to verify evidence causing them to panic if they see 2/3
- commit on what the node believes to be an invalid block.
-
- Thus, this RFC sets out to instil a minimum block history invariant amongst
- honest nodes.
-
- ## Proposal
-
- A backfill mechanism can simply be defined as an algorithm for fetching,
- verifying and storing, headers and validator sets of a height prior to the
- current base of the node's blockchain. In matching the terminology used for
- other data retrieving protocols (i.e. fast sync and state sync), we
- call this method **ReverseSync**.
-
- We will define the mechanism in four sections:
-
- - Usage
- - Design
- - Verification
- - Termination
-
- ### Usage
-
- For now, we focus purely on the case of a state syncing node, whom after
- syncing to a height will need to verify historical data in order to be capable
- of processing new blocks. We can denote the earliest height that the node will
- need to verify and store in order to be able to verify any evidence that might
- arise as the `max_historical_height`/`time`. Both height and time are necessary
- as this maps to the BFT time used for evidence expiration. After acquiring
- `State`, we calculate these parameters as:
-
- ```go
- max_historical_height = max(state.InitialHeight, state.LastBlockHeight - state.ConsensusParams.EvidenceAgeHeight)
- max_historical_time = max(GenesisTime, state.LastBlockTime.Sub(state.ConsensusParams.EvidenceAgeTime))
- ```
-
- Before starting either fast sync or consensus, we then run the following
- synchronous process:
-
- ```go
- func ReverseSync(max_historical_height int64, max_historical_time time.Time) error
- ```
-
- Where we fetch and verify blocks until a block `A` where
- `A.Height <= max_historical_height` and `A.Time <= max_historical_time`.
-
- Upon successfully reverse syncing, a node can now safely continue. As this
- feature is only used as part of state sync, one can think of this as merely an
- extension to it.
-
- In the future we may want to extend this functionality to allow nodes to fetch
- historical blocks for reasons of accountability or data accessibility.
-
- ### Design
-
- This section will provide a high level overview of some of the more important
- characteristics of the design, saving the more tedious details as an ADR.
-
- #### P2P
-
- Implementation of this RFC will require the addition of a new channel and two
- new messages.
-
- ```proto
- message LightBlockRequest {
- uint64 height = 1;
- }
- ```
-
- ```proto
- message LightBlockResponse {
- Header header = 1;
- Commit commit = 2;
- ValidatorSet validator_set = 3;
- }
- ```
-
- The P2P path may also enable P2P networked light clients and a state sync that
- also doesn't need to rely on RPC.
-
- ### Verification
-
- ReverseSync is used to fetch the following data structures:
-
- - `Header`
- - `Commit`
- - `ValidatorSet`
-
- Nodes will also need to be able to verify these. This can be achieved by first
- retrieving the header at the base height from the block store. From this trusted
- header, the node hashes each of the three data structures and checks that they are correct.
-
- 1. The trusted header's last block ID matches the hash of the new header
-
- ```go
- header[height].LastBlockID == hash(header[height-1])
- ```
-
- 2. The trusted header's last commit hash matches the hash of the new commit
-
- ```go
- header[height].LastCommitHash == hash(commit[height-1])
- ```
-
- 3. Given that the node now trusts the new header, check that the header's validator set
- hash matches the hash of the validator set
-
- ```go
- header[height-1].ValidatorsHash == hash(validatorSet[height-1])
- ```
-
- ### Termination
-
- ReverseSync draws a lot of parallels with fast sync. An important consideration
- for fast sync that also extends to ReverseSync is termination. ReverseSync will
- finish it's task when one of the following conditions have been met:
-
- 1. It reaches a block `A` where `A.Height <= max_historical_height` and
- `A.Time <= max_historical_time`.
- 2. None of it's peers reports to have the block at the height below the
- processes current block.
- 3. A global timeout.
-
- This implies that we can't guarantee adequate history and thus the term
- "invariant" can't be used in the strictest sense. In the case that the first
- condition isn't met, the node will log an error and optimistically attempt
- to continue with either fast sync or consensus.
-
- ## Alternative Solutions
-
- The need for a minimum block history invariant stems purely from the need to
- validate evidence (although there may be some application relevant needs as
- well). Because of this, an alternative, could be to simply trust whatever the
- 2/3+ majority has agreed upon and in the case where a node is at the head of the
- blockchain, you simply abstain from voting.
-
- As it stands, if 2/3+ vote on evidence you can't verify, in the same manner if
- 2/3+ vote on a header that a node sees as invalid (perhaps due to a different
- app hash), the node will halt.
-
- Another alternative is the method with which the relevant data is retrieved.
- Instead of introducing new messages to the P2P layer, RPC could have been used
- instead.
-
- The aforementioned data is already available via the following RPC endpoints:
- `/commit` for `Header`'s' and `/validators` for `ValidatorSet`'s'. It was
- decided predominantly due to the instability of the current RPC infrastructure
- that P2P be used instead.
-
- ## Status
-
- Proposed
-
- ## Consequences
-
- ### Positive
-
- - Ensures a minimum block history invariant for honest nodes. This will allow
- nodes to verify evidence.
-
- ### Negative
-
- - Statesync will be slower as more processing is required.
-
- ### Neutral
-
- - By having validator sets served through p2p, this would make it easier to
- extend p2p support to light clients and state sync.
- - In the future, it may also be possible to extend this feature to allow for
- nodes to freely fetch and verify prior blocks
-
- ## References
-
- - [RFC-001: Block retention](https://github.com/tendermint/spec/blob/master/rfc/001-block-retention.md)
- - [Original issue](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/4629)
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