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- \section{Definitions} \label{sec:definitions}
-
- \subsection{Model}
-
- We consider a system of processes that communicate by exchanging messages.
- Processes can be correct or faulty, where a faulty process can behave in an
- arbitrary way, i.e., Byzantine faults. We assume that each process
- has some amount of voting power (voting power of a process can be $0$).
- Processes in our model are not part of a single administrative domain;
- therefore we cannot enforce a direct network connectivity between all
- processes. Instead, we assume that each process is connected to a subset of
- processes called peers, such that there is an indirect communication channel
- between all correct processes. Communication between processes is established
- using a gossip protocol \cite{Dem1987:gossip}.
-
- Formally, we model the network communication using the \emph{partially
- synchronous system model}~\cite{DLS88:jacm}: in all executions of the system
- there is a bound $\Delta$ and an instant GST (Global Stabilization Time) such
- that all communication among correct processes after GST is reliable and
- $\Delta$-timely, i.e., if a correct process $p$ sends message $m$ at time $t
- \ge GST$ to correct process $q$, then $q$ will receive $m$ before $t +
- \Delta$\footnote{Note that as we do not assume direct communication channels
- among all correct processes, this implies that before the message $m$
- reaches $q$, it might pass through a number of correct processes that will
- forward the message $m$ using gossip protocol towards $q$.}. Messages among
- correct processes can be delayed, dropped or duplicated before GST.
- Spoofing/impersonation attacks are assumed to be impossible at all times due to
- the use of public-key cryptography. The bound $\Delta$ and GST are system
- parameters whose values are not required to be known for the safety of our
- algorithm. Termination of the algorithm is guaranteed within a bounded duration
- after GST. In practice, the algorithm will work correctly in the slightly
- weaker variant of the model where the system alternates between (long enough)
- good periods (corresponds to the \emph{after} GST period where system is
- reliable and $\Delta$-timely) and bad periods (corresponds to the period
- \emph{before} GST during which the system is asynchronous and messages can be
- lost), but consideration of the GST model simplifies the discussion.
-
- We assume that process steps (which might include sending and receiving
- messages) take zero time. Processes are equipped with clocks so they can
- measure local timeouts. All protocol messages are signed, i.e., when a correct
- process $q$ receives a signed message $m$ from its peer, the process $q$ can
- verify who was the original sender of the message $m$.
-
- The details of the Tendermint gossip protocol will be discussed in a separate
- technical report. For the sake of this paper it is sufficient to assume that
- messages are being gossiped between processes and the following property holds
- (in addition to the partial synchrony network assumptions):
-
- \begin{itemize} \item \emph{Gossip communication:} If a correct process $p$
- receives some message $m$ at time $t$, all correct processes will receive
- $m$ before $max\{t, GST\} + \Delta$. \end{itemize}
-
-
- %Messages that are being gossiped are created by the consensus layer. We can
- %think about consensus protocol as a content creator, which %defines what
- %messages should be disseminated using the gossip protocol. A correct
- %process creates the message for dissemination either i) %explicitly, by
- %invoking \emph{send} function as part of the consensus protocol or ii)
- %implicitly, by receiving a message from some other %process. Note that in
- %the case ii) gossiping of messages is implicit, i.e., it happens without
- %explicit send clause in the consensus algorithm %whenever a correct
- %process receives some messages in the consensus algorithm\footnote{If a
- %message is received by a correct process at %the consensus level then it
- %is considered valid from the protocol point of view, i.e., it has a
- %correct signature, a proper message structure %and a valid height and
- %round number.}.
-
- %\item Processes keep resending messages (in case of failures or message loss)
- %until all its peers get them. This ensures that every message %sent or
- %received by a correct process is eventually received by all correct
- %processes.
-
- \subsection{State Machine Replication}
-
- State machine replication (SMR) is a general approach for replicating services
- modeled as a deterministic state machine~\cite{Lam78:cacm,Sch90:survey}. The
- key idea of this approach is to guarantee that all replicas start in the same
- state and then apply requests from clients in the same order, thereby
- guaranteeing that the replicas' states will not diverge. Following
- Schneider~\cite{Sch90:survey}, we note that the following is key for
- implementing a replicated state machine tolerant to (Byzantine) faults:
-
- \begin{itemize} \item \emph{Replica Coordination.} All [non-faulty] replicas
- receive and process the same sequence of requests. \end{itemize}
-
- Moreover, as Schneider also notes, this property can be decomposed into two
- parts, \emph{Agreement} and \emph{Order}: Agreement requires all (non-faulty)
- replicas to receive all requests, and Order requires that the order of received
- requests is the same at all replicas.
-
- There is an additional requirement that needs to be ensured by Byzantine
- tolerant state machine replication: only requests (called transactions in the
- Tendermint terminology) proposed by clients are executed. In Tendermint,
- transaction verification is the responsibility of the service that is being
- replicated; upon receiving a transaction from the client, the Tendermint
- process will ask the service if the request is valid, and only valid requests
- will be processed.
-
- \subsection{Consensus} \label{sec:consensus}
-
- Tendermint solves state machine replication by sequentially executing consensus
- instances to agree on each block of transactions that are
- then executed by the service being replicated. We consider a variant of the
- Byzantine consensus problem called Validity Predicate-based Byzantine consensus
- that is motivated by blockchain systems~\cite{GLR17:red-belly-bc}. The problem
- is defined by an agreement, a termination, and a validity property.
-
- \begin{itemize} \item \emph{Agreement:} No two correct processes decide on
- different values. \item \emph{Termination:} All correct processes
- eventually decide on a value. \item \emph{Validity:} A decided value
- is valid, i.e., it satisfies the predefined predicate denoted
- \emph{valid()}. \end{itemize}
-
- This variant of the Byzantine consensus problem has an application-specific
- \emph{valid()} predicate to indicate whether a value is valid. In the context
- of blockchain systems, for example, a value is not valid if it does not
- contain an appropriate hash of the last value (block) added to the blockchain.
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