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187 lines
5.3 KiB
187 lines
5.3 KiB
From 125924e47db3713a85a70e0f8d6c23818d2ea054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
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Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 22:41:28 +0000
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Subject: upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
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remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
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This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
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sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
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files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
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For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
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reported by Harry Sintonen
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fix approach suggested by markus@;
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has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
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CVE-2019-6111
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Origin: backport, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
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Last-Update: 2019-02-08
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Patch-Name: check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
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---
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scp.1 | 12 +++++++++++-
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scp.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
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2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
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index 0e5cc1b2d..397e77091 100644
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--- a/scp.1
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+++ b/scp.1
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
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.Sh SYNOPSIS
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.Nm scp
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-.Op Fl 346BCpqrv
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+.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv
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.Op Fl c Ar cipher
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.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
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.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
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@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
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The program must understand
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.Xr ssh 1
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options.
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+.It Fl T
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+Disable strict filename checking.
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+By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
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+.Nm
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+checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
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+to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
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+Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
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+filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
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+This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
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+the server will not send unexpected filenames.
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.It Fl v
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Verbose mode.
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Causes
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diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
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index 1971c80cd..035037bcc 100644
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--- a/scp.c
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+++ b/scp.c
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@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
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#include <dirent.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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+#include <fnmatch.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <locale.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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@@ -383,14 +384,14 @@ void verifydir(char *);
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struct passwd *pwd;
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uid_t userid;
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int errs, remin, remout;
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-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
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+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
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#define CMDNEEDS 64
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char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
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int response(void);
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void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
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-void sink(int, char *[]);
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+void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
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void source(int, char *[]);
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void tolocal(int, char *[]);
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void toremote(int, char *[]);
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@@ -429,8 +430,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
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addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
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- fflag = tflag = 0;
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- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1)
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+ fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
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+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
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+ "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) {
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switch (ch) {
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/* User-visible flags. */
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case '1':
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@@ -509,9 +511,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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setmode(0, O_BINARY);
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#endif
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break;
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+ case 'T':
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+ Tflag = 1;
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+ break;
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default:
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usage();
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}
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+ }
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argc -= optind;
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argv += optind;
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@@ -542,7 +548,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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}
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if (tflag) {
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/* Receive data. */
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- sink(argc, argv);
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+ sink(argc, argv, NULL);
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exit(errs != 0);
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}
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if (argc < 2)
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@@ -800,7 +806,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
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continue;
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}
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free(bp);
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- sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
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+ sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
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(void) close(remin);
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remin = remout = -1;
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}
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@@ -976,7 +982,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
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(sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
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void
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-sink(int argc, char **argv)
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+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
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{
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static BUF buffer;
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struct stat stb;
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@@ -992,6 +998,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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unsigned long long ull;
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int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
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char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
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+ char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
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struct timeval tv[2];
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#define atime tv[0]
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@@ -1016,6 +1023,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
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if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
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targisdir = 1;
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+ if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
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+ /*
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+ * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
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+ * the requested destination file glob.
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+ */
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+ if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
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+ fatal("strdup failed");
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+ if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
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+ *restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
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+ }
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+ }
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for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
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cp = buf;
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if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
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@@ -1120,6 +1138,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
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exit(1);
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}
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+ if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
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+ fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
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+ SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
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if (targisdir) {
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static char *namebuf;
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static size_t cursize;
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@@ -1157,7 +1178,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
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goto bad;
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}
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vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
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- sink(1, vect);
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+ sink(1, vect, src);
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if (setimes) {
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setimes = 0;
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if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
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