- Update haproxy download URL and hash - Updated upstream patches Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner <gladiac@gmail.com>lilik-openwrt-22.03
@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ | |||
commit 0a55591b2c9140dee31dbedb6126fbb0b2eb3367 | |||
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
Date: Fri Dec 24 11:27:53 2021 +0100 | |||
BUG/MEDIUM: backend: fix possible sockaddr leak on redispatch | |||
A subtle change of target address allocation was introduced with commit | |||
68cf3959b ("MINOR: backend: rewrite alloc of stream target address") in | |||
2.4. Prior to this patch, a target address was allocated by function | |||
assign_server_address() only if none was previously allocated. After | |||
the change, the allocation became unconditional. Most of the time it | |||
makes no difference, except when we pass multiple times through | |||
connect_server() with SF_ADDR_SET cleared. | |||
The most obvious fix would be to avoid allocating that address there | |||
when already set, but the root cause is that since introduction of | |||
dynamically allocated addresses, the SF_ADDR_SET flag lies. It can | |||
be cleared during redispatch or during a queue redistribution without | |||
the address being released. | |||
This patch instead gives back all its correct meaning to SF_ADDR_SET | |||
and guarantees that when not set no address is allocated, by freeing | |||
that address at the few places the flag is cleared. The flag could | |||
even be removed so that only the address is checked but that would | |||
require to touch many areas for no benefit. | |||
The easiest way to test it is to send requests to a proxy with l7 | |||
retries enabled, which forwards to a server returning 500: | |||
defaults | |||
mode http | |||
timeout client 1s | |||
timeout server 1s | |||
timeout connect 1s | |||
retry-on all-retryable-errors | |||
retries 1 | |||
option redispatch | |||
listen proxy | |||
bind *:5000 | |||
server app 0.0.0.0:5001 | |||
frontend dummy-app | |||
bind :5001 | |||
http-request return status 500 | |||
Issuing "show pools" on the CLI will show that pool "sockaddr" grows | |||
as requests are redispatched, and remains stable with the fix. Even | |||
"ps" will show that the process' RSS grows by ~160B per request. | |||
This fix will need to be backported to 2.4. Note that before 2.5, | |||
there's no strm->si[1].dst, strm->target_addr must be used instead. | |||
This addresses github issue #1499. Special thanks to Daniil Leontiev | |||
for providing a well-documented reproducer. | |||
(cherry picked from commit 266d5405490050adeaf414158f7f4b9bad5298bc) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
(cherry picked from commit 11f5fdd07202f2d39b02c48e29b437aacd286c4d) | |||
[wt: used target_addr] | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
--- a/include/haproxy/stream.h | |||
+++ b/include/haproxy/stream.h | |||
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ | |||
#include <haproxy/action-t.h> | |||
#include <haproxy/api.h> | |||
+#include <haproxy/connection.h> | |||
#include <haproxy/fd.h> | |||
#include <haproxy/freq_ctr.h> | |||
#include <haproxy/obj_type.h> | |||
@@ -341,6 +342,7 @@ static inline void stream_choose_redispa | |||
if (may_dequeue_tasks(objt_server(s->target), s->be)) | |||
process_srv_queue(objt_server(s->target), 0); | |||
+ sockaddr_free(&s->target_addr); | |||
s->flags &= ~(SF_DIRECT | SF_ASSIGNED | SF_ADDR_SET); | |||
si->state = SI_ST_REQ; | |||
} else { | |||
--- a/src/queue.c | |||
+++ b/src/queue.c | |||
@@ -561,6 +561,10 @@ int pendconn_dequeue(struct stream *strm | |||
strm->flags &= ~(SF_DIRECT | SF_ASSIGNED | SF_ADDR_SET); | |||
strm->flags |= p->strm_flags & (SF_DIRECT | SF_ASSIGNED | SF_ADDR_SET); | |||
+ /* the entry might have been redistributed to another server */ | |||
+ if (!(strm->flags & SF_ADDR_SET)) | |||
+ sockaddr_free(&strm->target_addr); | |||
+ | |||
if (p->target) { | |||
/* a server picked this pendconn, it must skip LB */ | |||
strm->target = &p->target->obj_type; |
@ -1,95 +0,0 @@ | |||
commit 78bc9d39b0b31d647b35131ae45b21a145112192 | |||
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
Date: Fri Nov 12 10:26:18 2021 +0100 | |||
BUG/MINOR: pools: don't mark ourselves as harmless in DEBUG_UAF mode | |||
When haproxy is built with DEBUG_UAF=1, some particularly slow | |||
allocation functions are used for each pool, and it was not uncommon | |||
to see the watchdog trigger during performance tests. For this reason | |||
the allocation functions were surrounded by a pair of thread_harmless | |||
calls to mention that the function was waiting in slow syscalls. The | |||
problem is that this also releases functions blocked in thread_isolate() | |||
which can then start their work. | |||
In order to protect against the accidental removal of a shared resource | |||
in this situation, in 2.5-dev4 with commit ba3ab7907 ("MEDIUM: servers: | |||
make the server deletion code run under full thread isolation") was added | |||
thread_isolate_full() for functions which want to be totally protected | |||
due to being manipulating some data. | |||
But this is not sufficient, because there are still places where we | |||
can allocate/free (thus sleep) under a lock, such as in long call | |||
chains involving the release of an idle connection. In this case, if | |||
one thread asks for isolation, one thread might hang in | |||
pool_alloc_area_uaf() with a lock held (for example the conns_lock | |||
when coming from conn_backend_get()->h1_takeover()->task_new()), with | |||
another thread blocked on a lock waiting for that one to release it, | |||
both keeping their bit clear in the thread_harmless mask, preventing | |||
the first thread from being released, thus causing a deadlock. | |||
In addition to this, it was already seen that the "show fd" CLI handler | |||
could wake up during a pool_free_area_uaf() with an incompletely | |||
released memory area while deleting a file descriptor, and be fooled | |||
showing bad pointers, or during a pool_alloc() on another thread that | |||
was in the process of registering a freshly allocated connection to a | |||
new file descriptor. | |||
One solution could consist in replacing all thread_isolate() calls by | |||
thread_isolate_full() but then that makes thread_isolate() useless | |||
and only shifts the problem by one slot. | |||
A better approach could possibly consist in having a way to mark that | |||
a thread is entering an extremely slow section. Such sections would | |||
be timed so that this is not abused, and the bit would be used to | |||
make the watchdog more patient. This would be acceptable as this would | |||
only affect debugging. | |||
The approach used here for now consists in removing the harmless bits | |||
around the UAF allocator, thus essentially undoing commit 85b2cae63 | |||
("MINOR: pools: make the thread harmless during the mmap/munmap | |||
syscalls"). | |||
This is marked as minor because nobody is expected to be running with | |||
DEBUG_UAF outside of development or serious debugging, so this issue | |||
cannot affect regular users. It must be backported to stable branches | |||
that have thread_harmless_now() around the mmap() call. | |||
(cherry picked from commit fdf53b4962229b6cfcc5bc11151356c3d92d7023) | |||
[wt: applied to include/pool-os.h] | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
--- a/include/haproxy/pool-os.h | |||
+++ b/include/haproxy/pool-os.h | |||
@@ -65,12 +65,8 @@ static inline void pool_free_area(void * | |||
static inline void *pool_alloc_area(size_t size) | |||
{ | |||
size_t pad = (4096 - size) & 0xFF0; | |||
- int isolated; | |||
void *ret; | |||
- isolated = thread_isolated(); | |||
- if (!isolated) | |||
- thread_harmless_now(); | |||
ret = mmap(NULL, (size + 4095) & -4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); | |||
if (ret != MAP_FAILED) { | |||
/* let's dereference the page before returning so that the real | |||
@@ -83,8 +79,6 @@ static inline void *pool_alloc_area(size | |||
} else { | |||
ret = NULL; | |||
} | |||
- if (!isolated) | |||
- thread_harmless_end(); | |||
return ret; | |||
} | |||
@@ -101,9 +95,7 @@ static inline void pool_free_area(void * | |||
if (pad >= sizeof(void *) && *(void **)(area - sizeof(void *)) != area) | |||
ABORT_NOW(); | |||
- thread_harmless_now(); | |||
munmap(area - pad, (size + 4095) & -4096); | |||
- thread_harmless_end(); | |||
} | |||
#endif /* DEBUG_UAF */ |
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ | |||
commit b9aac36d8d8d3bb05c785aa8f6630338d078f64a | |||
Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
Date: Sat Nov 20 19:17:38 2021 +0100 | |||
BUILD: cli: clear a maybe-unused warning on some older compilers | |||
The SHOW_TOT() and SHOW_AVG() macros used in cli_io_handler_show_activity() | |||
produce a warning on gcc 4.7 on MIPS with threads disabled because the | |||
compiler doesn't know that global.nbthread is necessarily non-null, hence | |||
that at least one iteration is performed. Let's just change the loop for | |||
a do {} while () that lets the compiler know it's always initialized. It | |||
also has the tiny benefit of making the code shorter. | |||
(cherry picked from commit 97b5d07a3e5a33552327bac2e4c9c6a0496f7b5e) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
--- a/src/cli.c | |||
+++ b/src/cli.c | |||
@@ -1368,8 +1368,10 @@ static int cli_io_handler_show_activity( | |||
unsigned int _v[MAX_THREADS]; \ | |||
unsigned int _tot; \ | |||
const unsigned int _nbt = global.nbthread; \ | |||
- for (_tot = t = 0; t < _nbt; t++) \ | |||
+ _tot = t = 0; \ | |||
+ do { \ | |||
_tot += _v[t] = (x); \ | |||
+ } while (++t < _nbt); \ | |||
if (_nbt == 1) { \ | |||
chunk_appendf(&trash, " %u\n", _tot); \ | |||
break; \ | |||
@@ -1386,8 +1388,10 @@ static int cli_io_handler_show_activity( | |||
unsigned int _v[MAX_THREADS]; \ | |||
unsigned int _tot; \ | |||
const unsigned int _nbt = global.nbthread; \ | |||
- for (_tot = t = 0; t < _nbt; t++) \ | |||
+ _tot = t = 0; \ | |||
+ do { \ | |||
_tot += _v[t] = (x); \ | |||
+ } while (++t < _nbt); \ | |||
if (_nbt == 1) { \ | |||
chunk_appendf(&trash, " %u\n", _tot); \ | |||
break; \ |
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ | |||
commit f9c40ed93330c9add953310b7ac04a0d4f43ec5c | |||
Author: Daniel Jakots <haproxy@chown.me> | |||
Date: Tue Dec 7 20:34:39 2021 -0500 | |||
BUILD: ssl: unbreak the build with newer libressl | |||
In LibreSSL 3.5.0, BIO is going to become opaque, so haproxy's | |||
compat macros will no longer work. The functions they substitute | |||
have been available since LibreSSL 2.7.0. | |||
(cherry picked from commit d1a2e2b0d1da0dff726738343fbaed044fb93470) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
(cherry picked from commit ca0b6e08dcc3686794d37e8bfcc4e4a4b2adb806) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
--- a/include/haproxy/openssl-compat.h | |||
+++ b/include/haproxy/openssl-compat.h | |||
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static inline void SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CT | |||
#define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx, chain) do { *(chain) = (ctx)->extra_certs; } while (0) | |||
#endif | |||
-#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L | |||
+#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL) | |||
#define BIO_get_data(b) (b)->ptr | |||
#define BIO_set_data(b, v) do { (b)->ptr = (v); } while (0) | |||
#define BIO_set_init(b, v) do { (b)->init = (v); } while (0) |
@ -1,24 +0,0 @@ | |||
commit fc13f79e8f8090018109e5c91e4e4e55a7105146 | |||
Author: Thierry Fournier <thierry.fournier@ozon.io> | |||
Date: Wed Dec 15 19:03:52 2021 +0100 | |||
DOC: fix misspelled keyword "resolve_retries" in resolvers | |||
"resolve_retries" was spelled "resolve_retires". | |||
(cherry picked from commit 55c40ea17778b1afa3cf8f0f0a2cc42717c9364a) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
(cherry picked from commit 8bb445d66b1bfddd77e3cf25973a642212d90880) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
--- a/doc/configuration.txt | |||
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt | |||
@@ -15145,7 +15145,7 @@ used by HAProxy. The following processin | |||
2. When the fallback on the query type was done (or not applicable), HAProxy | |||
retries the original DNS query, with the preferred query type. | |||
- 3. HAProxy retries previous steps <resolve_retires> times. If no valid | |||
+ 3. HAProxy retries previous steps <resolve_retries> times. If no valid | |||
response is received after that, it stops the DNS resolution and reports | |||
the error. | |||
@ -1,188 +0,0 @@ | |||
commit 6338b7d4a884639f98823e885325a50750f72e04 | |||
Author: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org> | |||
Date: Tue Dec 28 18:47:17 2021 +0100 | |||
BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: initialize correctly ssl w/ default-server | |||
This bug was introduced by d817dc73 ("MEDIUM: ssl: Load client | |||
certificates in a ckch for backend servers") in which the creation of | |||
the SSL_CTX for a server was moved to the configuration parser when | |||
using a "crt" keyword instead of being done in ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(). | |||
The patch 0498fa40 ("BUG/MINOR: ssl: Default-server configuration ignored by | |||
server") made it worse by setting the same SSL_CTX for every servers | |||
using a default-server. Resulting in any SSL option on a server applied | |||
to every server in its backend. | |||
This patch fixes the issue by reintroducing a string which store the | |||
path of certificate inside the server structure, and loading the | |||
certificate in ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx() again. | |||
This is a quick fix to backport, a cleaner way can be achieve by always | |||
creating the SSL_CTX in ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx() and splitting | |||
properly the ssl_sock_load_srv_cert() function. | |||
This patch fixes issue #1488. | |||
Must be backported as far as 2.4. | |||
(cherry picked from commit 2c776f1c30c85be11c9ba8ca8d9a7d62690d1a32) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
(cherry picked from commit 2f3c354b6cdc21ee185e263b5c7422c86ae58c98) | |||
[wt: ssl_sock_load_srv_cert() doesn't take the create_if_none arg in 2.4, | |||
thus adjust context and make sure ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx() matches | |||
what srv_parse_crt() used to do] | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
--- a/include/haproxy/server-t.h | |||
+++ b/include/haproxy/server-t.h | |||
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ struct server { | |||
char *verify_host; /* hostname of certificate must match this host */ | |||
char *ca_file; /* CAfile to use on verify */ | |||
char *crl_file; /* CRLfile to use on verify */ | |||
+ char *client_crt; /* client certificate to send */ | |||
struct sample_expr *sni; /* sample expression for SNI */ | |||
#ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED | |||
char *npn_str; /* NPN protocol string */ | |||
--- a/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc | |||
+++ b/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc | |||
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'versi | |||
feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'feature(OPENSSL)'" | |||
feature ignore_unknown_macro | |||
-server s1 -repeat 7 { | |||
+server s1 -repeat 10 { | |||
rxreq | |||
txresp | |||
} -start | |||
@@ -56,7 +56,10 @@ haproxy h1 -conf { | |||
backend third_be | |||
default-server ssl crt client1.pem ca-file ca-auth.crt verify none | |||
- server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem | |||
+ server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" | |||
+ server s2 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem | |||
+ server s3 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" | |||
+ server s4 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" | |||
backend fourth_be | |||
default-server ssl crt client1.pem verify none | |||
@@ -106,9 +109,25 @@ client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} { | |||
txreq | |||
rxresp | |||
expect resp.status == 200 | |||
+ expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok" | |||
+} -run | |||
+ | |||
+client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} { | |||
+ txreq -url "/third" | |||
+ txreq | |||
+ rxresp | |||
+ expect resp.status == 200 | |||
expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Expired" | |||
} -run | |||
+client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} -repeat 2 { | |||
+ txreq -url "/third" | |||
+ txreq | |||
+ rxresp | |||
+ expect resp.status == 200 | |||
+ expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok" | |||
+} -run | |||
+ | |||
client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} { | |||
txreq -url "/fourth" | |||
txreq | |||
--- a/src/cfgparse-ssl.c | |||
+++ b/src/cfgparse-ssl.c | |||
@@ -1450,25 +1450,17 @@ static int srv_parse_crl_file(char **arg | |||
/* parse the "crt" server keyword */ | |||
static int srv_parse_crt(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err) | |||
{ | |||
- int retval = -1; | |||
- char *path = NULL; | |||
- | |||
if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) { | |||
memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate file path", args[*cur_arg]); | |||
return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL; | |||
} | |||
if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global_ssl.crt_base) | |||
- memprintf(&path, "%s/%s", global_ssl.crt_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]); | |||
+ memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s/%s", global_ssl.crt_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]); | |||
else | |||
- memprintf(&path, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]); | |||
- | |||
- if (path) { | |||
- retval = ssl_sock_load_srv_cert(path, newsrv, err); | |||
- free(path); | |||
- } | |||
+ memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]); | |||
- return retval; | |||
+ return 0; | |||
} | |||
/* parse the "no-check-ssl" server keyword */ | |||
--- a/src/server.c | |||
+++ b/src/server.c | |||
@@ -2063,6 +2063,8 @@ static void srv_conn_src_cpy(struct serv | |||
static void srv_ssl_settings_cpy(struct server *srv, struct server *src) | |||
{ | |||
/* <src> is the current proxy's default server and SSL is enabled */ | |||
+ BUG_ON(src->ssl_ctx.ctx != NULL); /* the SSL_CTX must never be initialized in a default-server */ | |||
+ | |||
if (src == &srv->proxy->defsrv && src->use_ssl == 1) | |||
srv->flags |= SRV_F_DEFSRV_USE_SSL; | |||
@@ -2070,10 +2072,11 @@ static void srv_ssl_settings_cpy(struct | |||
srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.ca_file); | |||
if (src->ssl_ctx.crl_file != NULL) | |||
srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.crl_file); | |||
+ if (src->ssl_ctx.client_crt != NULL) | |||
+ srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.client_crt); | |||
srv->ssl_ctx.verify = src->ssl_ctx.verify; | |||
- srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = src->ssl_ctx.ctx; | |||
if (src->ssl_ctx.verify_host != NULL) | |||
srv->ssl_ctx.verify_host = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.verify_host); | |||
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c | |||
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c | |||
@@ -4669,7 +4669,7 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct serv | |||
{ | |||
struct proxy *curproxy = srv->proxy; | |||
int cfgerr = 0; | |||
- SSL_CTX *ctx = srv->ssl_ctx.ctx; | |||
+ SSL_CTX *ctx; | |||
/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */ | |||
if (!ssl_initialize_random()) { | |||
@@ -4693,6 +4693,26 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct serv | |||
if (srv->use_ssl == 1) | |||
srv->xprt = &ssl_sock; | |||
+ if (srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) { | |||
+ char *err = NULL; | |||
+ int err_code = 0; | |||
+ | |||
+ /* If there is a crt keyword there, the SSL_CTX will be created here. */ | |||
+ err_code = ssl_sock_load_srv_cert(srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, srv, &err); | |||
+ if (err_code != ERR_NONE) { | |||
+ if ((err_code & ERR_WARN) && !(err_code & ERR_ALERT)) | |||
+ ha_warning("%s", err); | |||
+ else | |||
+ ha_alert("%s", err); | |||
+ | |||
+ if (err_code & (ERR_FATAL|ERR_ABORT)) | |||
+ cfgerr++; | |||
+ } | |||
+ ha_free(&err); | |||
+ } | |||
+ | |||
+ ctx = srv->ssl_ctx.ctx; | |||
+ | |||
/* The context will be uninitialized if there wasn't any "cert" option | |||
* in the server line. */ | |||
if (!ctx) { |
@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ | |||
commit 7c565501e91f3759274dd7cd43ec9de7c4b9a162 | |||
Author: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org> | |||
Date: Wed Dec 29 18:16:27 2021 +0100 | |||
REGTESTS: ssl: fix ssl_default_server.vtc | |||
Patch 2c776f1 ("BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: initialize correctly ssl w/ | |||
default-server") added tests that are not relevant anymore and broke the | |||
reg-test. revert them. | |||
(cherry picked from commit 0387632ac0db520402550cf19a96d41f8c1661de) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
(cherry picked from commit 5229b2badbc370ef11ad5c6a7c9529bd24b2de66) | |||
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | |||
--- a/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc | |||
+++ b/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc | |||
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'versi | |||
feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'feature(OPENSSL)'" | |||
feature ignore_unknown_macro | |||
-server s1 -repeat 10 { | |||
+server s1 -repeat 7 { | |||
rxreq | |||
txresp | |||
} -start | |||
@@ -56,10 +56,7 @@ haproxy h1 -conf { | |||
backend third_be | |||
default-server ssl crt client1.pem ca-file ca-auth.crt verify none | |||
- server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" | |||
- server s2 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem | |||
- server s3 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" | |||
- server s4 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" | |||
+ server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem | |||
backend fourth_be | |||
default-server ssl crt client1.pem verify none | |||
@@ -109,25 +106,9 @@ client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} { | |||
txreq | |||
rxresp | |||
expect resp.status == 200 | |||
- expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok" | |||
-} -run | |||
- | |||
-client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} { | |||
- txreq -url "/third" | |||
- txreq | |||
- rxresp | |||
- expect resp.status == 200 | |||
expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Expired" | |||
} -run | |||
-client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} -repeat 2 { | |||
- txreq -url "/third" | |||
- txreq | |||
- rxresp | |||
- expect resp.status == 200 | |||
- expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok" | |||
-} -run | |||
- | |||
client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} { | |||
txreq -url "/fourth" | |||
txreq |