diff --git a/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile b/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile index 551fd94fa..ae1694a6a 100644 --- a/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile +++ b/lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile @@ -9,16 +9,17 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=python-crypto PKG_VERSION:=2.6.1 -PKG_RELEASE:=2 +PKG_RELEASE:=3 PKG_SOURCE:=pycrypto-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz -PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://ftp.dlitz.net/pub/dlitz/crypto/pycrypto/ +PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/p/pycrypto PKG_HASH:=f2ce1e989b272cfcb677616763e0a2e7ec659effa67a88aa92b3a65528f60a3c PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(BUILD_VARIANT)-crypto-$(PKG_VERSION) PKG_LICENSE:=Public Domain PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYRIGHT +PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:dlitz:pycrypto PKG_MAINTAINER:=Jeffery To include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk @@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ define Package/python-crypto/Default SECTION:=lang-python CATEGORY:=Languages SUBMENU:=Python - URL:=http://www.pycrypto.org/ + URL:=https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/ endef define Package/python-crypto diff --git a/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..db1f740b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +From 8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Legrandin +Date: Sun, 22 Dec 2013 22:24:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Throw exception when IV is used with ECB or CTR + +The IV parameter is currently ignored when initializing +a cipher in ECB or CTR mode. + +For CTR mode, it is confusing: it takes some time to see +that a different parameter is needed (the counter). + +For ECB mode, it is outright dangerous. + +This patch forces an exception to be raised. +--- + lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + src/block_template.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py +index 420b6ff..a5f8a88 100644 +--- a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py ++++ b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py +@@ -239,16 +239,30 @@ class RoundtripTest(unittest.TestCase): + return """%s .decrypt() output of .encrypt() should not be garbled""" % (self.module_name,) + + def runTest(self): +- for mode in (self.module.MODE_ECB, self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB, self.module.MODE_OPENPGP): ++ ++ ## ECB mode ++ mode = self.module.MODE_ECB ++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode) ++ ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode) ++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) ++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) ++ ++ ## OPENPGP mode ++ mode = self.module.MODE_OPENPGP ++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) ++ eiv_ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) ++ eiv = eiv_ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2] ++ ciphertext = eiv_ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:] ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv) ++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) ++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) ++ ++ ## All other non-AEAD modes (but CTR) ++ for mode in (self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB): + encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) + ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) +- +- if mode != self.module.MODE_OPENPGP: +- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) +- else: +- eiv = ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2] +- ciphertext = ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:] +- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv) ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) + decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) + self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) + +diff --git a/src/block_template.c b/src/block_template.c +index f940e0e..d555ceb 100644 +--- a/src/block_template.c ++++ b/src/block_template.c +@@ -170,6 +170,17 @@ ALGnew(PyObject *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwdict) + "Key cannot be the null string"); + return NULL; + } ++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_ECB) ++ { ++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, "ECB mode does not use IV"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_CTR) ++ { ++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, ++ "CTR mode needs counter parameter, not IV"); ++ return NULL; ++ } + if (IVlen != BLOCK_SIZE && mode != MODE_ECB && mode != MODE_CTR) + { + PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, +From 58de28a5d32bc10e15766e5a59f41b07397cc6cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Richard Mitchell +Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:58:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix speedtest run for ECB modes. + +--- + pct-speedtest.py | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/pct-speedtest.py b/pct-speedtest.py +index 4ce18be..c7b893a 100644 +--- a/pct-speedtest.py ++++ b/pct-speedtest.py +@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ class Benchmark: + blocks = self.random_blocks(16384, 1000) + if mode is None: + cipher = module.new(key) ++ elif mode==module.MODE_ECB: ++ cipher = module.new(key, module.MODE_ECB) + else: + cipher = module.new(key, mode, iv) + diff --git a/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..22c3719d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +--- lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py ++++ lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py +@@ -153,33 +153,33 @@ def generate(bits, randfunc, progress_fu + if number.isPrime(obj.p, randfunc=randfunc): + break + # Generate generator g +- # See Algorithm 4.80 in Handbook of Applied Cryptography +- # Note that the order of the group is n=p-1=2q, where q is prime + if progress_func: + progress_func('g\n') + while 1: ++ # Choose a square residue; it will generate a cyclic group of order q. ++ obj.g = pow(number.getRandomRange(2, obj.p, randfunc), 2, obj.p) ++ + # We must avoid g=2 because of Bleichenbacher's attack described + # in "Generating ElGamal signatures without knowning the secret key", + # 1996 +- # +- obj.g = number.getRandomRange(3, obj.p, randfunc) +- safe = 1 +- if pow(obj.g, 2, obj.p)==1: +- safe=0 +- if safe and pow(obj.g, q, obj.p)==1: +- safe=0 ++ if obj.g in (1, 2): ++ continue ++ + # Discard g if it divides p-1 because of the attack described + # in Note 11.67 (iii) in HAC +- if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, obj.g)[1]==0: +- safe=0 ++ if (obj.p - 1) % obj.g == 0: ++ continue ++ + # g^{-1} must not divide p-1 because of Khadir's attack + # described in "Conditions of the generator for forging ElGamal + # signature", 2011 + ginv = number.inverse(obj.g, obj.p) +- if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, ginv)[1]==0: +- safe=0 +- if safe: +- break ++ if (obj.p - 1) % ginv == 0: ++ continue ++ ++ # Found ++ break ++ + # Generate private key x + if progress_func: + progress_func('x\n')