From b2a9219f738344ddd164c9904cc9019db96d4658 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Couzens Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2020 03:30:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] ipmitool: fix CVE-2020-5208 All patches has been applied upstream. Signed-off-by: Alexander Couzens --- admin/ipmitool/Makefile | 3 +- ...-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch | 128 ++++++++++++++++ ...uffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch | 48 ++++++ ...er-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch | 48 ++++++ ...020-5208-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch | 37 +++++ ...er-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch | 88 +++++++++++ ...u-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch | 137 ++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 488 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 admin/ipmitool/patches/0006-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch create mode 100644 admin/ipmitool/patches/0007-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch create mode 100644 admin/ipmitool/patches/0008-CVE-2020-5208-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch create mode 100644 admin/ipmitool/patches/0009-CVE-2020-5208-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch create mode 100644 admin/ipmitool/patches/0010-CVE-2020-5208-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch create mode 100644 admin/ipmitool/patches/0011-CVE-2020-5208-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch diff --git a/admin/ipmitool/Makefile b/admin/ipmitool/Makefile index 9e234ea07..898e2e6ce 100644 --- a/admin/ipmitool/Makefile +++ b/admin/ipmitool/Makefile @@ -9,13 +9,14 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=ipmitool PKG_VERSION:=1.8.18 -PKG_RELEASE:=3 +PKG_RELEASE:=4 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.bz2 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=@SF/$(PKG_NAME) PKG_HASH:=0c1ba3b1555edefb7c32ae8cd6a3e04322056bc087918f07189eeedfc8b81e01 PKG_LICENSE:=BSD-3-clause PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYING +PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:ipmitool_project:ipmitool include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk diff --git a/admin/ipmitool/patches/0006-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0006-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..48fe5eeb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0006-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-vulnerabilities.patch @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From 960dbb956d9f9cb05b719087faed53c88dc80956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chrostoper Ertl +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:33:59 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 06/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities + +Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see +https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp + +The `read_fru_area_section` function only performs size validation of +requested read size, and falsely assumes that the IPMI message will not +respond with more than the requested amount of data; it uses the +unvalidated response size to copy into `frubuf`. If the response is +larger than the request, this can result in overflowing the buffer. + +The same issue affects the `read_fru_area` function. +--- + lib/ipmi_fru.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ipmi_fru.c b/lib/ipmi_fru.c +index cf00effc82a2..af99aa99444c 100644 +--- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c ++++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c +@@ -615,7 +615,10 @@ int + read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf) + { +- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish; ++ uint32_t off = offset; ++ uint32_t tmp; ++ uint32_t finish; ++ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer; + struct ipmi_rs * rsp; + struct ipmi_rq req; + uint8_t msg_data[4]; +@@ -628,10 +631,12 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + + finish = offset + length; + if (finish > fru->size) { ++ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size); + finish = fru->size; + lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, " + "Adjusting to %d", + offset + length, finish - offset); ++ length = finish - offset; + } + + memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); +@@ -667,6 +672,7 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + } + } + ++ size_left_in_buffer = length; + do { + tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off; + msg_data[0] = id; +@@ -707,9 +713,18 @@ read_fru_area(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + } + + tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0]; ++ if(rsp->data_len < 1 ++ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1 ++ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer) ++ { ++ printf(" Not enough buffer size"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + memcpy(frubuf, rsp->data + 1, tmp); + off += tmp; + frubuf += tmp; ++ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp; + /* sometimes the size returned in the Info command + * is too large. return 0 so higher level function + * still attempts to parse what was returned */ +@@ -742,7 +757,9 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, uint8_t *frubuf) + { + static uint32_t fru_data_rqst_size = 20; +- uint32_t off = offset, tmp, finish; ++ uint32_t off = offset; ++ uint32_t tmp, finish; ++ uint32_t size_left_in_buffer; + struct ipmi_rs * rsp; + struct ipmi_rq req; + uint8_t msg_data[4]; +@@ -755,10 +772,12 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + + finish = offset + length; + if (finish > fru->size) { ++ memset(frubuf + fru->size, 0, length - fru->size); + finish = fru->size; + lprintf(LOG_NOTICE, "Read FRU Area length %d too large, " + "Adjusting to %d", + offset + length, finish - offset); ++ length = finish - offset; + } + + memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req)); +@@ -773,6 +792,8 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + if (fru->access && fru_data_rqst_size > 16) + #endif + fru_data_rqst_size = 16; ++ ++ size_left_in_buffer = length; + do { + tmp = fru->access ? off >> 1 : off; + msg_data[0] = id; +@@ -804,8 +825,16 @@ read_fru_area_section(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct fru_info *fru, uint8_t id, + } + + tmp = fru->access ? rsp->data[0] << 1 : rsp->data[0]; ++ if(rsp->data_len < 1 ++ || tmp > rsp->data_len - 1 ++ || tmp > size_left_in_buffer) ++ { ++ printf(" Not enough buffer size"); ++ return -1; ++ } + memcpy((frubuf + off)-offset, rsp->data + 1, tmp); + off += tmp; ++ size_left_in_buffer -= tmp; + + /* sometimes the size returned in the Info command + * is too large. return 0 so higher level function +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/admin/ipmitool/patches/0007-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0007-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d694c9252 --- /dev/null +++ b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0007-CVE-2020-5208-fru-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_spd_print_fru.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 910e5782b7d9f222d4e34d3505d0d636ff757103 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chrostoper Ertl +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:44:18 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 07/11] fru: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_spd_print_fru + +Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see +https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp + +The `ipmi_spd_print_fru` function has a similar issue as the one fixed +by the previous commit in `read_fru_area_section`. An initial request is +made to get the `fru.size`, which is used as the size for the allocation +of `spd_data`. Inside a loop, further requests are performed to get the +copy sizes which are not checked before being used as the size for a +copy into the buffer. +--- + lib/dimm_spd.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/lib/dimm_spd.c b/lib/dimm_spd.c +index 41e30dbb4bda..68f3b4fa1eff 100644 +--- a/lib/dimm_spd.c ++++ b/lib/dimm_spd.c +@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t id) + struct ipmi_rq req; + struct fru_info fru; + uint8_t *spd_data, msg_data[4]; +- int len, offset; ++ uint32_t len, offset; + + msg_data[0] = id; + +@@ -1697,6 +1697,13 @@ ipmi_spd_print_fru(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t id) + } + + len = rsp->data[0]; ++ if(rsp->data_len < 1 ++ || len > rsp->data_len - 1 ++ || len > fru.size - offset) ++ { ++ printf(" Not enough buffer size"); ++ return -1; ++ } + memcpy(&spd_data[offset], rsp->data + 1, len); + offset += len; + } while (offset < fru.size); +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/admin/ipmitool/patches/0008-CVE-2020-5208-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0008-CVE-2020-5208-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6d8cc1549 --- /dev/null +++ b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0008-CVE-2020-5208-session-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-ipmi_get_session_info.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 4f7778ed232a92bde388f38917b94f458a82c78e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chrostoper Ertl +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:51:49 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 08/11] session: Fix buffer overflow in ipmi_get_session_info + +Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see +https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp + +The `ipmi_get_session_info` function does not properly check the +response `data_len`, which is used as a copy size, allowing stack buffer +overflow. +--- + lib/ipmi_session.c | 12 ++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ipmi_session.c b/lib/ipmi_session.c +index 141f0f4ec8dd..b9af1fd75d40 100644 +--- a/lib/ipmi_session.c ++++ b/lib/ipmi_session.c +@@ -309,8 +309,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf * intf, + } + else + { +- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len); +- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len); ++ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, ++ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); ++ print_session_info(&session_info, ++ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); + } + break; + +@@ -341,8 +343,10 @@ ipmi_get_session_info(struct ipmi_intf * intf, + break; + } + +- memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, rsp->data_len); +- print_session_info(&session_info, rsp->data_len); ++ memcpy(&session_info, rsp->data, ++ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); ++ print_session_info(&session_info, ++ __min(rsp->data_len, sizeof(session_info))); + + } while (i <= session_info.session_slot_count); + break; +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/admin/ipmitool/patches/0009-CVE-2020-5208-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0009-CVE-2020-5208-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dd29993b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0009-CVE-2020-5208-channel-Fix-buffer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 743dd4faa302f22950e4438cf684e1e398eb47eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chrostoper Ertl +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 16:56:38 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 09/11] channel: Fix buffer overflow +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see +https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp + +The `ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites` function does not properly check +the final response’s `data_len`, which can lead to stack buffer overflow +on the final copy. +--- + lib/ipmi_channel.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ipmi_channel.c b/lib/ipmi_channel.c +index fab2e5483d12..8cd7c59a4273 100644 +--- a/lib/ipmi_channel.c ++++ b/lib/ipmi_channel.c +@@ -413,7 +413,10 @@ ipmi_get_channel_cipher_suites(struct ipmi_intf *intf, const char *payload_type, + lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Unable to Get Channel Cipher Suites"); + return -1; + } +- if (rsp->ccode > 0) { ++ if (rsp->ccode ++ || rsp->data_len < 1 ++ || rsp->data_len > sizeof(uint8_t) + 0x10) ++ { + lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Get Channel Cipher Suites failed: %s", + val2str(rsp->ccode, completion_code_vals)); + return -1; +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/admin/ipmitool/patches/0010-CVE-2020-5208-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0010-CVE-2020-5208-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e7a797077 --- /dev/null +++ b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0010-CVE-2020-5208-lanp-Fix-buffer-overflows-in-get_lan_param_select.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From e048e9c65a52f0879d482531e70735c1d314d43a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chrostoper Ertl +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:06:39 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 10/11] lanp: Fix buffer overflows in get_lan_param_select +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Partial fix for CVE-2020-5208, see +https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp + +The `get_lan_param_select` function is missing a validation check on the +response’s `data_len`, which it then returns to caller functions, where +stack buffer overflow can occur. +--- + lib/ipmi_lanp.c | 14 +++++++------- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c +index 65d881bc5890..022c7f1605ed 100644 +--- a/lib/ipmi_lanp.c ++++ b/lib/ipmi_lanp.c +@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, + if (p == NULL) { + return (-1); + } +- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); ++ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); + /* set new ipaddr */ + memcpy(data+3, temp, 4); + printf("Setting LAN Alert %d IP Address to %d.%d.%d.%d\n", alert, +@@ -1824,7 +1824,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, + if (p == NULL) { + return (-1); + } +- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); ++ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); + /* set new macaddr */ + memcpy(data+7, temp, 6); + printf("Setting LAN Alert %d MAC Address to " +@@ -1838,7 +1838,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, + if (p == NULL) { + return (-1); + } +- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); ++ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); + + if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "def", 3) == 0 || + strncasecmp(argv[1], "default", 7) == 0) { +@@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, + if (p == NULL) { + return (-1); + } +- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); ++ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); + + if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "on", 2) == 0 || + strncasecmp(argv[1], "yes", 3) == 0) { +@@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, + if (p == NULL) { + return (-1); + } +- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); ++ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); + + if (strncasecmp(argv[1], "pet", 3) == 0) { + printf("Setting LAN Alert %d destination to PET Trap\n", alert); +@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, + if (p == NULL) { + return (-1); + } +- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); ++ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); + + if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[2]) != 0) { + lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid time: %s", argv[1]); +@@ -1933,7 +1933,7 @@ ipmi_lan_alert_set(struct ipmi_intf * intf, uint8_t chan, uint8_t alert, + if (p == NULL) { + return (-1); + } +- memcpy(data, p->data, p->data_len); ++ memcpy(data, p->data, __min(p->data_len, sizeof(data))); + + if (str2uchar(argv[1], &data[3]) != 0) { + lprintf(LOG_ERR, "Invalid retry: %s", argv[1]); +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/admin/ipmitool/patches/0011-CVE-2020-5208-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0011-CVE-2020-5208-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6cc5b7aad --- /dev/null +++ b/admin/ipmitool/patches/0011-CVE-2020-5208-fru-sdr-Fix-id_string-buffer-overflows.patch @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +From 98b47424cf548f58c4d295fa8235210406ea85ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chrostoper Ertl +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2019 17:13:45 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 11/11] fru, sdr: Fix id_string buffer overflows + +Final part of the fixes for CVE-2020-5208, see +https://github.com/ipmitool/ipmitool/security/advisories/GHSA-g659-9qxw-p7cp + +9 variants of stack buffer overflow when parsing `id_string` field of +SDR records returned from `CMD_GET_SDR` command. + +SDR record structs have an `id_code` field, and an `id_string` `char` +array. + +The length of `id_string` is calculated as `(id_code & 0x1f) + 1`, +which can be larger than expected 16 characters (if `id_code = 0xff`, +then length will be `(0xff & 0x1f) + 1 = 32`). + +In numerous places, this can cause stack buffer overflow when copying +into fixed buffer of size `17` bytes from this calculated length. +--- + lib/ipmi_fru.c | 2 +- + lib/ipmi_sdr.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ipmi_fru.c b/lib/ipmi_fru.c +index af99aa99444c..98bc9840955a 100644 +--- a/lib/ipmi_fru.c ++++ b/lib/ipmi_fru.c +@@ -3062,7 +3062,7 @@ ipmi_fru_print(struct ipmi_intf * intf, struct sdr_record_fru_locator * fru) + return 0; + + memset(desc, 0, sizeof(desc)); +- memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, fru->id_code & 0x01f); ++ memcpy(desc, fru->id_string, __min(fru->id_code & 0x01f, sizeof(desc))); + desc[fru->id_code & 0x01f] = 0; + printf("FRU Device Description : %s (ID %d)\n", desc, fru->device_id); + +diff --git a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c +index 2a9cbe3087af..62aac08a9002 100644 +--- a/lib/ipmi_sdr.c ++++ b/lib/ipmi_sdr.c +@@ -2084,7 +2084,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_eventonly(struct ipmi_intf *intf, + return -1; + + memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); +- snprintf(desc, (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", sensor->id_string); ++ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (sensor->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, sensor->id_string); + + if (verbose) { + printf("Sensor ID : %s (0x%x)\n", +@@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_mc_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf, + return -1; + + memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); +- snprintf(desc, (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", mc->id_string); ++ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (mc->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, mc->id_string); + + if (verbose == 0) { + if (csv_output) +@@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_generic_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf, + char desc[17]; + + memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); +- snprintf(desc, (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", dev->id_string); ++ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (dev->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, dev->id_string); + + if (!verbose) { + if (csv_output) +@@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_sensor_fru_locator(struct ipmi_intf *intf, + char desc[17]; + + memset(desc, 0, sizeof (desc)); +- snprintf(desc, (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, "%s", fru->id_string); ++ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (fru->id_code & 0x1f) + 1, fru->id_string); + + if (!verbose) { + if (csv_output) +@@ -2489,35 +2489,43 @@ ipmi_sdr_print_name_from_rawentry(struct ipmi_intf *intf, uint16_t id, + + int rc =0; + char desc[17]; ++ const char *id_string; ++ uint8_t id_code; + memset(desc, ' ', sizeof (desc)); + + switch ( type) { + case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_FULL_SENSOR: + record.full = (struct sdr_record_full_sensor *) raw; +- snprintf(desc, (record.full->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", +- (const char *)record.full->id_string); ++ id_code = record.full->id_code; ++ id_string = record.full->id_string; + break; ++ + case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_COMPACT_SENSOR: + record.compact = (struct sdr_record_compact_sensor *) raw ; +- snprintf(desc, (record.compact->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", +- (const char *)record.compact->id_string); ++ id_code = record.compact->id_code; ++ id_string = record.compact->id_string; + break; ++ + case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_EVENTONLY_SENSOR: + record.eventonly = (struct sdr_record_eventonly_sensor *) raw ; +- snprintf(desc, (record.eventonly->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", +- (const char *)record.eventonly->id_string); +- break; ++ id_code = record.eventonly->id_code; ++ id_string = record.eventonly->id_string; ++ break; ++ + case SDR_RECORD_TYPE_MC_DEVICE_LOCATOR: + record.mcloc = (struct sdr_record_mc_locator *) raw ; +- snprintf(desc, (record.mcloc->id_code & 0x1f) +1, "%s", +- (const char *)record.mcloc->id_string); ++ id_code = record.mcloc->id_code; ++ id_string = record.mcloc->id_string; + break; ++ + default: + rc = -1; +- break; +- } ++ } ++ if (!rc) { ++ snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "%.*s", (id_code & 0x1f) + 1, id_string); ++ } + +- lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc); ++ lprintf(LOG_INFO, "ID: 0x%04x , NAME: %-16s", id, desc); + return rc; + } + +-- +2.27.0 +