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libarchive: update to version 3.4.0
Changes: remove backported patches add bsdtar libopenssl variant switch to github codeload polish tab/spaces Signed-off-by: Jan Pavlinec <jan.pavlinec@nic.cz>lilik-openwrt-22.03
Jan Pavlinec
5 years ago
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7 changed files with 35 additions and 315 deletions
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+35 -22libs/libarchive/Makefile
-
+0 -37libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch
-
+0 -43libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch
-
+0 -72libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
-
+0 -31libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
-
+0 -55libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
-
+0 -55libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
+ 35
- 22
libs/libarchive/Makefile
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+ 0
- 37
libs/libarchive/patches/100-CVE-2018-1000880.patch
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| @ -1,37 +0,0 @@ | |||||
| From 9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |||||
| From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> | |||||
| Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:33:42 +1100 | |||||
| Subject: [PATCH] warc: consume data once read | |||||
| The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume | |||||
| data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify | |||||
| an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over | |||||
| and over and over again until it hits the desired length. | |||||
| This means that a WARC resource with e.g. | |||||
| Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665 | |||||
| but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop. | |||||
| Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read. | |||||
| Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup. | |||||
| --- | |||||
| libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 5 +++++ | |||||
| 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) | |||||
| diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | |||||
| index e8753853f..e8fc8428b 100644 | |||||
| --- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | |||||
| +++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | |||||
| @@ -386,6 +386,11 @@ _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off) | |||||
| return (ARCHIVE_EOF); | |||||
| } | |||||
| + if (w->unconsumed) { | |||||
| + __archive_read_consume(a, w->unconsumed); | |||||
| + w->unconsumed = 0U; | |||||
| + } | |||||
| + | |||||
| rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd); | |||||
| if (nrd < 0) { | |||||
| *bsz = 0U; | |||||
+ 0
- 43
libs/libarchive/patches/101-CVE-2018-1000879.patch
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| @ -1,43 +0,0 @@ | |||||
| From 15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |||||
| From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> | |||||
| Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 14:29:42 +1100 | |||||
| Subject: [PATCH] Skip 0-length ACL fields | |||||
| Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar | |||||
| with a malformed ACL: | |||||
| Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. | |||||
| archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726 | |||||
| 1726 switch (*s) { | |||||
| (gdb) p n | |||||
| $1 = 1 | |||||
| (gdb) p field[n] | |||||
| $2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0} | |||||
| Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning | |||||
| the switch statement. | |||||
| I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1], | |||||
| and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup. | |||||
| [1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun | |||||
| --- | |||||
| libarchive/archive_acl.c | 5 +++++ | |||||
| 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) | |||||
| diff --git a/libarchive/archive_acl.c b/libarchive/archive_acl.c | |||||
| index 512beee1f..7beeee86e 100644 | |||||
| --- a/libarchive/archive_acl.c | |||||
| +++ b/libarchive/archive_acl.c | |||||
| @@ -1723,6 +1723,11 @@ archive_acl_from_text_l(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text, | |||||
| st = field[n].start + 1; | |||||
| len = field[n].end - field[n].start; | |||||
| + if (len == 0) { | |||||
| + ret = ARCHIVE_WARN; | |||||
| + continue; | |||||
| + } | |||||
| + | |||||
| switch (*s) { | |||||
| case 'u': | |||||
| if (len == 1 || (len == 4 | |||||
+ 0
- 72
libs/libarchive/patches/102-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
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| @ -1,72 +0,0 @@ | |||||
| From bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |||||
| From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> | |||||
| Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 00:55:22 +1100 | |||||
| Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match | |||||
| Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a | |||||
| single file archive reported that it was split across multiple | |||||
| volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling | |||||
| rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some | |||||
| situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would | |||||
| check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't | |||||
| match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new | |||||
| one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the | |||||
| buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and | |||||
| writes to the freed region can be observed. | |||||
| This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is | |||||
| too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume | |||||
| success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there | |||||
| good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we | |||||
| can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by | |||||
| checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up | |||||
| there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that | |||||
| assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go | |||||
| down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7 | |||||
| decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data. | |||||
| Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym. | |||||
| --- | |||||
| libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++ | |||||
| 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) | |||||
| diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | |||||
| index 6f419c270..a8cc5c94d 100644 | |||||
| --- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | |||||
| +++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | |||||
| @@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar | |||||
| struct data_block_offsets *dbo; | |||||
| unsigned int cursor; | |||||
| unsigned int nodes; | |||||
| + char filename_must_match; | |||||
| /* LZSS members */ | |||||
| struct huffman_code maincode; | |||||
| @@ -1560,6 +1561,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry, | |||||
| } | |||||
| return ret; | |||||
| } | |||||
| + else if (rar->filename_must_match) | |||||
| + { | |||||
| + archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, | |||||
| + "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive"); | |||||
| + return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); | |||||
| + } | |||||
| rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save, | |||||
| filename_size + 1); | |||||
| @@ -2933,12 +2940,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail) | |||||
| else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME && | |||||
| rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER) | |||||
| { | |||||
| + rar->filename_must_match = 1; | |||||
| ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); | |||||
| if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF)) | |||||
| { | |||||
| rar->has_endarc_header = 1; | |||||
| ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry); | |||||
| } | |||||
| + rar->filename_must_match = 0; | |||||
| if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK)) | |||||
| return NULL; | |||||
| return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail); | |||||
+ 0
- 31
libs/libarchive/patches/103-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
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| @ -1,31 +0,0 @@ | |||||
| From 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |||||
| From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> | |||||
| Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:29 +1100 | |||||
| Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified | |||||
| new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive. | |||||
| realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would | |||||
| be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function. | |||||
| Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym. | |||||
| --- | |||||
| libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++ | |||||
| 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) | |||||
| diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | |||||
| index 234522229..6f419c270 100644 | |||||
| --- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | |||||
| +++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | |||||
| @@ -2300,6 +2300,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a) | |||||
| new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE; | |||||
| else | |||||
| new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1; | |||||
| + if (new_size == 0) { | |||||
| + archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, | |||||
| + "Zero window size is invalid."); | |||||
| + return (ARCHIVE_FATAL); | |||||
| + } | |||||
| new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size); | |||||
| if (new_window == NULL) { | |||||
| archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, | |||||
+ 0
- 55
libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
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| @ -1,55 +0,0 @@ | |||||
| From 65a23f5dbee4497064e9bb467f81138a62b0dae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |||||
| From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> | |||||
| Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 16:01:40 +1100 | |||||
| Subject: [PATCH] 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives | |||||
| Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data() | |||||
| would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause | |||||
| the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory. | |||||
| A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash. | |||||
| An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented | |||||
| binary will also crash. | |||||
| ==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0) | |||||
| ==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. | |||||
| #0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c) | |||||
| #1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb) | |||||
| #2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156) | |||||
| #3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134) | |||||
| #4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690) | |||||
| #5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7) | |||||
| #6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63) | |||||
| #7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd) | |||||
| #8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f) | |||||
| #9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be) | |||||
| #10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb) | |||||
| #11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 | |||||
| #12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09) | |||||
| This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries | |||||
| may have been generated by qsym. | |||||
| --- | |||||
| libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | 8 +------- | |||||
| 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) | |||||
| diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | |||||
| index bccbf8966..b6d1505d3 100644 | |||||
| --- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | |||||
| +++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | |||||
| @@ -2964,13 +2964,7 @@ get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size, | |||||
| if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) { | |||||
| /* Copy mode. */ | |||||
| - /* | |||||
| - * Note: '1' here is a performance optimization. | |||||
| - * Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of | |||||
| - * available bytes; asking for more than that forces the | |||||
| - * decompressor to combine reads by copying data. | |||||
| - */ | |||||
| - *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail); | |||||
| + *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, minimum, &bytes_avail); | |||||
| if (bytes_avail <= 0) { | |||||
| archive_set_error(&a->archive, | |||||
| ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, | |||||
+ 0
- 55
libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
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| @ -1,55 +0,0 @@ | |||||
| From 8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |||||
| From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> | |||||
| Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 17:10:49 +1100 | |||||
| Subject: [PATCH] iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is missing | |||||
| A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop | |||||
| forever. | |||||
| read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension | |||||
| to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while | |||||
| loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails | |||||
| before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without | |||||
| advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry | |||||
| indefinitely. | |||||
| Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an | |||||
| extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this | |||||
| seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate | |||||
| it to a fatal error immediately anyway. | |||||
| Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym. | |||||
| --- | |||||
| libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 11 ++++++++++- | |||||
| 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) | |||||
| diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | |||||
| index 28acfefbb..bad8f1dfe 100644 | |||||
| --- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | |||||
| +++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | |||||
| @@ -2102,6 +2102,7 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file, | |||||
| const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end) | |||||
| { | |||||
| struct iso9660 *iso9660; | |||||
| + int entry_seen = 0; | |||||
| iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data); | |||||
| @@ -2257,8 +2258,16 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file, | |||||
| } | |||||
| p += p[2]; | |||||
| + entry_seen = 1; | |||||
| + } | |||||
| + | |||||
| + if (entry_seen) | |||||
| + return (ARCHIVE_OK); | |||||
| + else { | |||||
| + archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, | |||||
| + "Tried to parse Rockridge extensions, but none found"); | |||||
| + return (ARCHIVE_WARN); | |||||
| } | |||||
| - return (ARCHIVE_OK); | |||||
| } | |||||
| static int | |||||