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libarchive: patch security issues

Fixes
CVE-2019-1000019
CVE-2019-1000020

Signed-off-by: Jan Pavlinec <jan.pavlinec@nic.cz>
lilik-openwrt-22.03
Jan Pavlinec 6 years ago
parent
commit
8f1f0ec9ab
No known key found for this signature in database GPG Key ID: 60244CCEFB39E584
3 changed files with 111 additions and 1 deletions
  1. +1
    -1
      libs/libarchive/Makefile
  2. +55
    -0
      libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
  3. +55
    -0
      libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch

+ 1
- 1
libs/libarchive/Makefile View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=libarchive PKG_NAME:=libarchive
PKG_VERSION:=3.3.3 PKG_VERSION:=3.3.3
PKG_RELEASE:=2
PKG_RELEASE:=3
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.libarchive.org/downloads PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.libarchive.org/downloads


+ 55
- 0
libs/libarchive/patches/104-CVE-2019-1000019.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From 65a23f5dbee4497064e9bb467f81138a62b0dae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 16:01:40 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
binary will also crash.
==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
#1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
#2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
#3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
#4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
#5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
#6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
#7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
#8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
#9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
#10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
#11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
#12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
may have been generated by qsym.
---
libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | 8 +-------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
index bccbf8966..b6d1505d3 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
@@ -2964,13 +2964,7 @@ get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size,
if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) {
/* Copy mode. */
- /*
- * Note: '1' here is a performance optimization.
- * Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of
- * available bytes; asking for more than that forces the
- * decompressor to combine reads by copying data.
- */
- *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
+ *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, minimum, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,

+ 55
- 0
libs/libarchive/patches/105-CVE-2019-1000020.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From 8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 17:10:49 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is missing
A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop
forever.
read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension
to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while
loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails
before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without
advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry
indefinitely.
Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an
extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this
seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate
it to a fatal error immediately anyway.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym.
---
libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
index 28acfefbb..bad8f1dfe 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
@@ -2102,6 +2102,7 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file,
const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
+ int entry_seen = 0;
iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
@@ -2257,8 +2258,16 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file,
}
p += p[2];
+ entry_seen = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (entry_seen)
+ return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+ else {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
+ "Tried to parse Rockridge extensions, but none found");
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
- return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
static int

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