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rsync: fix CVE-2022-29154 

The rsync package is vulnerable to CVE-2022-29154[1], which is not yet in a
non-preview release. This commit applies the upstream commit to fix it and
several subsequent commits needed to fix bugs the initial fix introduced[2].

1. https://rsync.samba.org/ftp/rsync/NEWS#SECURITY_FIXES-3.2.5
2. https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/75558

Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
(cherry picked from commit 2611b86547)
lilik-openwrt-22.03
John Audia 2 years ago
committed by Josef Schlehofer
parent
63d46221bb
commit
8c85981f83
No known key found for this signature in database GPG Key ID: B950216FE4329F4C
4 changed files with 565 additions and 0 deletions
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  1. +385
    -0
      net/rsync/patches/010-fix-CVE-2022-29154.patch
  2. +106
    -0
      net/rsync/patches/011-more-improvements-to-file-list-checking.patch
  3. +50
    -0
      net/rsync/patches/012-a-few-more-minor-changes.patch
  4. +24
    -0
      net/rsync/patches/013-handle-a-trailing-slash.patch

+ 385
- 0
net/rsync/patches/010-fix-CVE-2022-29154.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
From b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 16:55:34 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Some extra file-list safety checks.
---
exclude.c | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
flist.c | 17 ++++++-
io.c | 4 ++
main.c | 7 ++-
receiver.c | 11 +++--
rsync.1.md | 44 ++++++++++++++++--
6 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/exclude.c
+++ b/exclude.c
@@ -27,16 +27,22 @@ extern int am_server;
extern int am_sender;
extern int eol_nulls;
extern int io_error;
+extern int xfer_dirs;
+extern int recurse;
extern int local_server;
extern int prune_empty_dirs;
extern int ignore_perishable;
+extern int old_style_args;
+extern int relative_paths;
extern int delete_mode;
extern int delete_excluded;
extern int cvs_exclude;
extern int sanitize_paths;
extern int protocol_version;
+extern int list_only;
extern int module_id;
+extern char *filesfrom_host;
extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
@@ -44,8 +50,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" };
filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" };
filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
+filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
+int trust_sender_filter = 0;
/* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
#define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16)
@@ -292,6 +300,125 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *l
}
}
+/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include
+ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */
+void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
+{
+ filter_rule *rule;
+ int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0;
+ int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */
+ const char *cp;
+ char *p;
+ if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
+ return;
+ if (relative_paths) {
+ cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
+ if (cp)
+ arg = cp+3;
+ } else {
+ if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
+ arg = cp + 1;
+ }
+ arg_len = strlen(arg);
+ if (arg_len) {
+ if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
+ /* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */
+ cp = arg;
+ while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) {
+ arg_len++;
+ cp++;
+ }
+ saw_wild = 1;
+ }
+ arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */
+ rule = new0(filter_rule);
+ if (!implied_filter_list.head)
+ implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule;
+ else {
+ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
+ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
+ }
+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1);
+ *p++ = '/';
+ cp = arg;
+ while (*cp) {
+ switch (*cp) {
+ case '\\':
+ backslash_cnt++;
+ if (saw_wild)
+ *p++ = '\\';
+ *p++ = *cp++;
+ break;
+ case '/':
+ if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
+ break;
+ if (relative_paths) {
+ filter_rule const *ent;
+ int found = 0;
+ *p = '\0';
+ for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
+ if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0)
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
+ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
+ R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
+ R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
+ R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
+ implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
+ }
+ }
+ slash_cnt++;
+ *p++ = *cp++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *p++ = *cp++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ *p = '\0';
+ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
+ arg = (const char *)rule->pattern;
+ }
+
+ if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
+ /* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */
+ rule = new0(filter_rule);
+ if (recurse)
+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2;
+ else
+ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD;
+ /* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */
+ if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) {
+ /* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */
+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1);
+ cp = arg;
+ while (*cp) {
+ if (*cp == '\\')
+ *p++ = '\\';
+ *p++ = *cp++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1);
+ if (arg_len) {
+ memcpy(p, arg, arg_len);
+ p += arg_len;
+ }
+ }
+ if (p[-1] != '/')
+ *p++ = '/';
+ *p++ = '*';
+ if (recurse)
+ *p++ = '*';
+ *p = '\0';
+ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
+ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
+ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
+ }
+}
+
/* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */
static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp)
{
@@ -718,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum lo
: name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory"
: "file";
rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n",
- w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
+ w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
t, name, ent->pattern,
ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type);
}
@@ -890,6 +1017,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const
}
switch (ch) {
case ':':
+ trust_sender_filter = 1;
rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE
| FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP;
/* FALL THROUGH */
--- a/flist.c
+++ b/flist.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist;
extern int sender_symlink_iconv;
extern int output_needs_newline;
extern int sender_keeps_checksum;
+extern int trust_sender_filter;
extern int unsort_ndx;
extern uid_t our_uid;
extern struct stats stats;
@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
-extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
+extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list;
#ifdef ICONV_OPTION
extern int filesfrom_convert;
@@ -986,6 +986,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_ent
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
+ if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
+ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
+ if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
+ && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+ if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+ }
+
if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) {
if (one_file_system) {
/* Room to save the dir's device for -x */
--- a/io.c
+++ b/io.c
@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
while (s != eob) {
if (*s++ == '\0') {
ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1;
+ add_implied_include(sob);
if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0)
exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */
write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */
@@ -450,9 +451,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos;
char *t = ff_xb.buf;
char *eob = f + len;
+ char *cur = t;
/* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */
while (f != eob) {
if (!(*t++ = *f++)) {
+ add_implied_include(cur);
+ cur = t;
while (f != eob && *f == '\0')
f++;
}
--- a/main.c
+++ b/main.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern int backup_dir_len;
extern int basis_dir_cnt;
extern int default_af_hint;
extern int stdout_format_has_i;
+extern int trust_sender_filter;
extern struct stats stats;
extern char *stdout_format;
extern char *logfile_format;
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1];
extern struct file_list *first_flist;
-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
+extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list;
uid_t our_uid;
gid_t our_gid;
@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *mac
#ifdef ICONV_CONST
setup_iconv();
#endif
+ trust_sender_filter = 1;
} else if (local_server) {
/* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force
* it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */
@@ -1500,6 +1502,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
char *dummy_host;
int dummy_port = rsync_port;
int i;
+ if (filesfrom_fd < 0)
+ add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]);
/* For remote source, any extra source args must have either
* the same hostname or an empty hostname. */
for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) {
@@ -1523,6 +1527,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
arg = ".";
remote_argv[i] = arg;
+ add_implied_include(arg);
}
}
--- a/receiver.c
+++ b/receiver.c
@@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
- if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')
- && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
- rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
- exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) {
+ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
+ if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) {
+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n",
+ fname);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+ }
}
#ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
--- a/rsync.1.md
+++ b/rsync.1.md
@@ -154,6 +154,33 @@ rsync daemon by leaving off the module n
See the following section for more details.
+## MULTI-HOST SECURITY
+
+Rsync takes steps to ensure that the file requests that are shared in a
+transfer are protected against various security issues. Most of the potential
+problems arise on the receiving side where rsync takes steps to ensure that the
+list of files being transferred remains within the bounds of what was
+requested.
+
+Toward this end, rsync 3.1.2 and later have aborted when a file list contains
+an absolute or relative path that tries to escape out of the top of the
+transfer. Also, beginning with version 3.2.5, rsync does two more safety
+checks of the file list to (1) ensure that no extra source arguments were added
+into the transfer other than those that the client requested and (2) ensure
+that the file list obeys the exclude rules that we sent to the sender.
+
+For those that don't yet have a 3.2.5 client rsync, it is safest to do a copy
+into a dedicated destination directory for the remote files rather than
+requesting the remote content get mixed in with other local content. For
+example, doing an rsync copy into your home directory is potentially unsafe on
+an older rsync if the remote rsync is being controlled by a bad actor:
+
+> rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~
+
+A safer command would be:
+
+> rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~/host1-files
+
## ADVANCED USAGE
The syntax for requesting multiple files from a remote host is done by
@@ -2323,6 +2350,12 @@ your home directory (remove the '=' for
behavior. The environment is always overridden by manually specified
positive or negative options (the negative is `--no-old-args`).
+ Note that this option also disables the extra safety check added in 3.2.5
+ that ensures that a remote sender isn't including extra top-level items in
+ the file-list that you didn't request. This side-effect is necessary
+ because we can't know for sure what names to expect when the remote shell
+ is interpreting the args.
+
This option conflicts with the [`--protect-args`](#opt) option.
0. `--protect-args`, `-s`
@@ -3754,8 +3787,13 @@ available rule prefixes:
0. `exclude, '-'` specifies an exclude pattern.
0. `include, '+'` specifies an include pattern.
-0. `merge, '.'` specifies a merge-file to read for more rules.
-0. `dir-merge, ':'` specifies a per-directory merge-file.
+0. `merge, '.'` specifies a merge-file on the client side to read for more
+rules.
+0. `dir-merge, ':'` specifies a per-directory merge-file. Using this kind of
+ filter rule requires that you trust the sending side's filter checking, and
+ thus it disables the receiver's verification of the file-list names against
+ the filter rules (since only the sender can know for sure if it obeyed all
+ the filter rules when some are per-dir merged from the sender's files).
0. `hide, 'H'` specifies a pattern for hiding files from the transfer.
0. `show, 'S'` files that match the pattern are not hidden.
0. `protect, 'P'` specifies a pattern for protecting files from deletion.

+ 106
- 0
net/rsync/patches/011-more-improvements-to-file-list-checking.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
From 7e5424b806e8eea053016268ad186276e9083b77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 07:00:51 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] More improvements to file-list checking
- Avoid implied rules on generator and (with extra certainty) on server
- Add -R implied-directory path elements as directory includes
- Log about extra file-list checking using a new --debug=FILTER3 level
---
exclude.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
main.c | 1 +
options.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/exclude.c
+++ b/exclude.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
extern int am_server;
extern int am_sender;
+extern int am_generator;
extern int eol_nulls;
extern int io_error;
extern int xfer_dirs;
@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg
int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */
const char *cp;
char *p;
- if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
+ if (am_server || old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
return;
if (relative_paths) {
cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
@@ -363,11 +364,16 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg
}
if (!found) {
filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
- R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
+ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_DIRECTORY
+ | (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
+ if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3)) {
+ rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s/)\n",
+ who_am_i(), rule->pattern);
+ }
}
}
slash_cnt++;
@@ -381,6 +387,8 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg
*p = '\0';
rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
arg = (const char *)rule->pattern;
+ if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3))
+ rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s)\n", who_am_i(), rule->pattern);
}
if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
@@ -416,6 +424,8 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg
rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
implied_filter_list.head = rule;
+ if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 3))
+ rprintf(FINFO, "[%s] add_implied_include(%s)\n", who_am_i(), rule->pattern);
}
}
@@ -833,11 +843,12 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum lo
filter_rule const *ent,
int name_flags, const char *type)
{
+ int log_level = am_sender || am_generator ? 1 : 3;
+
/* If a trailing slash is present to match only directories,
* then it is stripped out by add_rule(). So as a special
- * case we add it back in here. */
-
- if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, 1)) {
+ * case we add it back in the log output. */
+ if (DEBUG_GTE(FILTER, log_level)) {
static char *actions[2][2]
= { {"show", "hid"}, {"risk", "protect"} };
const char *w = who_am_i();
--- a/main.c
+++ b/main.c
@@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ static int do_recv(int f_in, int f_out,
}
am_generator = 1;
+ implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = NULL;
flist_receiving_enabled = True;
io_end_multiplex_in(MPLX_SWITCHING);
--- a/options.c
+++ b/options.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static struct output_struct debug_words[
DEBUG_WORD(DELTASUM, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug delta-transfer checksumming (levels 1-4)"),
DEBUG_WORD(DUP, W_REC, "Debug weeding of duplicate names"),
DEBUG_WORD(EXIT, W_CLI|W_SRV, "Debug exit events (levels 1-3)"),
- DEBUG_WORD(FILTER, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug filter actions (levels 1-2)"),
+ DEBUG_WORD(FILTER, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug filter actions (levels 1-3)"),
DEBUG_WORD(FLIST, W_SND|W_REC, "Debug file-list operations (levels 1-4)"),
DEBUG_WORD(FUZZY, W_REC, "Debug fuzzy scoring (levels 1-2)"),
DEBUG_WORD(GENR, W_REC, "Debug generator functions"),

+ 50
- 0
net/rsync/patches/012-a-few-more-minor-changes.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 3d7015afa223494e3318495c2f5de9cb49229da9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 07:29:44 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] A few more minor changes.
---
exclude.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/exclude.c
+++ b/exclude.c
@@ -313,13 +313,10 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg
if (am_server || old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
return;
if (relative_paths) {
- cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
- if (cp)
- arg = cp+3;
- } else {
- if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
- arg = cp + 1;
- }
+ if ((cp = strstr(arg, "/./")) != NULL)
+ arg = cp + 3;
+ } else if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
+ arg = cp + 1;
arg_len = strlen(arg);
if (arg_len) {
if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
@@ -359,13 +356,17 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg
int found = 0;
*p = '\0';
for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
- if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0)
+ if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0) {
found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
}
if (!found) {
filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
- R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_DIRECTORY
- | (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
+ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_DIRECTORY;
+ /* Check if our sub-path has wildcards or escaped backslashes */
+ if (saw_wild && strpbrk(rule->pattern, "*[?\\"))
+ R_rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_WILD;
R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;

+ 24
- 0
net/rsync/patches/013-handle-a-trailing-slash.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
From d659610afc8a3ee53fe68a8a4bbd7fc768fcd6e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2022 17:36:36 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Handle a trailing "/." at the end of a source arg.
---
exclude.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/exclude.c
+++ b/exclude.c
@@ -315,8 +315,11 @@ void add_implied_include(const char *arg
if (relative_paths) {
if ((cp = strstr(arg, "/./")) != NULL)
arg = cp + 3;
- } else if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
+ } else if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL) {
arg = cp + 1;
+ if (*arg == '.' && arg[1] == '\0')
+ arg++;
+ }
arg_len = strlen(arg);
if (arg_len) {
if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {

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