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haproxy: Update HAProxy to v1.8.5 

- Update haproxy download URL and hash
- Remove all already included patches

Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner <gladiac@gmail.com>
lilik-openwrt-22.03
Christian Lachner 7 years ago
parent
88fdeb5085
commit
3bcc1fb602
11 changed files with 3 additions and 580 deletions
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  1. +3
    -3
      net/haproxy/Makefile
  2. +0
    -61
      net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Dont-always-treat-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL-as-unrecovarable.patch
  3. +0
    -63
      net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Shutdown-the-connection-for-reading-on-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL.patch
  4. +0
    -69
      net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-http-Switch-the-HTTP-response-in-tunnel-mode-as-earlier-as-possible.patch
  5. +0
    -103
      net/haproxy/patches/0004-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-sample-ssl_bc_-fetch-keywords-are-broken.patch
  6. +0
    -71
      net/haproxy/patches/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-h2-always-consume-any-trailing-data-after-end-of-output-buffers.patch
  7. +0
    -33
      net/haproxy/patches/0006-BUG-MEDIUM-buffer-Fix-the-wrapping-case-in-bo_putblk.patch
  8. +0
    -33
      net/haproxy/patches/0007-BUG-MEDIUM-buffer-Fix-the-wrapping-case-in-bi_putblk.patch
  9. +0
    -46
      net/haproxy/patches/0008-BUG-MEDIUM-h2-also-arm-the-h2-timeout-when-sending.patch
  10. +0
    -55
      net/haproxy/patches/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-fix-a-100-cpu-usage-with-cpu-map-and-nbthread-nbproc.patch
  11. +0
    -43
      net/haproxy/patches/0010-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Remove-idle-applets-from-idle-list-when-HAProxy-is-stopping.patch

+ 3
- 3
net/haproxy/Makefile View File

@ -9,12 +9,12 @@
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=haproxy
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.4
PKG_RELEASE:=02
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.5
PKG_RELEASE:=01
PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/
PKG_HASH:=e305b0a4e7dec08072841eef6ac6dcd1b5586b1eff09c2d51e152a912e8884a6
PKG_HASH:=1c22083fa85332d5ab1c9aa8a7ec47a28d87ad9d802558808f9921d938ba20c9
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0


+ 0
- 61
net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Dont-always-treat-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL-as-unrecovarable.patch View File

@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
From 2fcd544272a5498ffa49544e9f06b51bc93e55d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 15:17:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Don't always treat SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL as
unrecovarable.
Bart Geesink reported some random errors appearing under the form of
termination flags SD in the logs for connections involving SSL traffic
to reach the servers.
Tomek Gacek and Mateusz Malek finally narrowed down the problem to commit
c2aae74 ("MEDIUM: ssl: Handle early data with OpenSSL 1.1.1"). It happens
that the special case of SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL isn't handled anymore since
this commit.
SSL_read() might return <= 0, and SSL_get_erro() return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL,
without meaning the connection is gone. Before flagging the connection
as in error, check the errno value.
This should be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit 7e2e505006feb8f3b4a7f9e0ac5e89b5a8c4895e)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index aecf3dd..f118724 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -5437,6 +5437,12 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
break;
} else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
goto read0;
+ /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure the error is
+ * unrecoverable before flagging the connection as
+ * in error.
+ */
+ if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN))
+ goto clear_ssl_error;
/* otherwise it's a real error */
goto out_error;
}
@@ -5451,11 +5457,12 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
conn_sock_read0(conn);
goto leave;
out_error:
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
+clear_ssl_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
- conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
goto leave;
}
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 63
net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Shutdown-the-connection-for-reading-on-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL.patch View File

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From f7fa1d461aa71bbc8a6c23fdcfc305f2e52ce5dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 14:25:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Shutdown the connection for reading on
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
When SSL_read returns SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno is unset or set to EAGAIN, the
connection must be shut down for reading. Else, the connection loops infinitly,
consuming all the CPU.
The bug was introduced in the commit 7e2e50500 ("BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Don't always
treat SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL as unrecovarable."). This patch must be backported in
1.8 too.
(cherry picked from commit 4ac77a98cda3d0f9b1d9de7bbbda2c91357f0767)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 14 ++++++++------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index f118724..a065bbb 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -5437,10 +5437,9 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
break;
} else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
goto read0;
- /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure the error is
- * unrecoverable before flagging the connection as
- * in error.
- */
+ /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure to clear the error
+ * stack before shutting down the connection for
+ * reading. */
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN))
goto clear_ssl_error;
/* otherwise it's a real error */
@@ -5453,16 +5452,19 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
conn_cond_update_sock_polling(conn);
return done;
+ clear_ssl_error:
+ /* Clear openssl global errors stack */
+ ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
+ ERR_clear_error();
read0:
conn_sock_read0(conn);
goto leave;
+
out_error:
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
-clear_ssl_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
-
goto leave;
}
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 69
net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-http-Switch-the-HTTP-response-in-tunnel-mode-as-earlier-as-possible.patch View File

@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
From 8a5949f2d74c3a3a6c6da25449992c312b183ef3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:54:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: http: Switch the HTTP response in tunnel mode as
earlier as possible
When the body length is undefined (no Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding
headers), The reponse remains in ending mode, waiting the request is done. So,
most of time this is not a problem because the resquest is done before the
response. But when a client sends data to a server that replies without waiting
all the data, it is really not desirable to wait the end of the request to
finish the response.
This bug was introduced when the tunneling of the request and the reponse was
refactored, in commit 4be980391 ("MINOR: http: Switch requests/responses in
TUNNEL mode only by checking txn flag").
This patch should be backported in 1.8 and 1.7.
(cherry picked from commit fd04fcf5edb0a24cd29ce8f4d4dc2aa3a0e2e82c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/proto_http.c | 15 +++++----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
index 64bd410..29880ea 100644
--- a/src/proto_http.c
+++ b/src/proto_http.c
@@ -4634,16 +4634,8 @@ int http_sync_res_state(struct stream *s)
* let's enforce it now that we're not expecting any new
* data to come. The caller knows the stream is complete
* once both states are CLOSED.
- *
- * However, there is an exception if the response length
- * is undefined. In this case, we switch in TUNNEL mode.
*/
- if (!(txn->rsp.flags & HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN)) {
- channel_auto_read(chn);
- txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
- chn->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
- }
- else if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
+ if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
channel_shutr_now(chn);
channel_shutw_now(chn);
}
@@ -6241,6 +6233,8 @@ http_msg_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct http_msg *msg)
/* The server still sending data that should be filtered */
if (!(chn->flags & CF_SHUTR) && HAS_DATA_FILTERS(s, chn))
goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
+ goto ending;
}
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ENDING;
@@ -6262,7 +6256,8 @@ http_msg_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct http_msg *msg)
/* default_ret */ 1,
/* on_error */ goto error,
/* on_wait */ goto waiting);
- msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ENDING)
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
return 1;
missing_data_or_waiting:
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 103
net/haproxy/patches/0004-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-sample-ssl_bc_-fetch-keywords-are-broken.patch View File

@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
From 7ccf7c9791f2b2329f3940d1347618af3a77bebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 15:59:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl/sample: ssl_bc_* fetch keywords are broken.
Since the split between connections and conn-stream objects, this
keywords are broken.
This patch must be backported in 1.8
(cherry picked from commit eb8def9f34c37537d56a69fcd211d4c4c8006bea)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 31 ++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 4d0d5db..d832d76 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -6580,8 +6580,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.u.sint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock);
@@ -6625,8 +6625,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_is_resumed(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const ch
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6651,9 +6651,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
int sint;
smp->flags = 0;
@@ -6676,8 +6675,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const c
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6747,8 +6746,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alpn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6773,9 +6772,8 @@ static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
SSL_SESSION *ssl_sess;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
@@ -6917,9 +6915,8 @@ static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
int finished_len;
struct chunk *finished_trash;
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 71
net/haproxy/patches/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-h2-always-consume-any-trailing-data-after-end-of-output-buffers.patch View File

@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
From 6fc36785addd45cc76a029a023296def53cff135 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 15:37:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: h2: always consume any trailing data after end
of output buffers
In case a stream tries to emit more data than advertised by the chunks
or content-length headers, the extra data remains in the channel's output
buffer until the channel's timeout expires. It can easily happen when
sending malformed error files making use of a wrong content-length or
having extra CRLFs after the empty chunk. It may also be possible to
forge such a bad response using Lua.
The H1 to H2 encoder must protect itself against this by marking the data
presented to it as consumed if it decides to discard them, so that the
sending stream doesn't wait for the timeout to trigger.
The visible effect of this problem is a huge memory usage and a high
concurrent connection count during benchmarks when using such bad data
(a typical place where this easily happens).
This fix must be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit 35a62705df65632e2717ae0d20a93e0cb3f8f163)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/mux_h2.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c
index caae041..4303a06 100644
--- a/src/mux_h2.c
+++ b/src/mux_h2.c
@@ -3020,6 +3020,9 @@ static int h2s_frt_make_resp_headers(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf)
* body or directly end in TRL2.
*/
if (es_now) {
+ // trim any possibly pending data (eg: inconsistent content-length)
+ bo_del(buf, buf->o);
+
h1m->state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
h2s->flags |= H2_SF_ES_SENT;
if (h2s->st == H2_SS_OPEN)
@@ -3269,8 +3272,12 @@ static int h2s_frt_make_resp_data(struct h2s *h2s, struct buffer *buf)
else
h2c_stream_close(h2c, h2s);
- if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_CHNK))
+ if (!(h1m->flags & H1_MF_CHNK)) {
+ // trim any possibly pending data (eg: inconsistent content-length)
+ bo_del(buf, buf->o);
+
h1m->state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
+ }
h2s->flags |= H2_SF_ES_SENT;
}
@@ -3319,6 +3326,10 @@ static int h2_snd_buf(struct conn_stream *cs, struct buffer *buf, int flags)
}
total += count;
bo_del(buf, count);
+
+ // trim any possibly pending data (eg: extra CR-LF, ...)
+ bo_del(buf, buf->o);
+
h2s->res.state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
break;
}
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 33
net/haproxy/patches/0006-BUG-MEDIUM-buffer-Fix-the-wrapping-case-in-bo_putblk.patch View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From fefb8592821ff0fa56f435c581d6e92e563e7ad7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 10:47:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: buffer: Fix the wrapping case in bo_putblk
When the block of data need to be split to support the wrapping, the start of
the second block of data was wrong. We must be sure to skip data copied during
the first memcpy.
This patch must be backported to 1.8, 1.7, 1.6 and 1.5.
(cherry picked from commit b2b279464c5c0f3dfadf02333e06eb0ae8ae8793)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
include/common/buffer.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/common/buffer.h b/include/common/buffer.h
index 976085e..ae9aafd 100644
--- a/include/common/buffer.h
+++ b/include/common/buffer.h
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static inline int bo_putblk(struct buffer *b, const char *blk, int len)
memcpy(b->p, blk, half);
b->p = b_ptr(b, half);
if (len > half) {
- memcpy(b->p, blk, len - half);
+ memcpy(b->p, blk + half, len - half);
b->p = b_ptr(b, half);
}
b->o += len;
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 33
net/haproxy/patches/0007-BUG-MEDIUM-buffer-Fix-the-wrapping-case-in-bi_putblk.patch View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 14f325000b91649b9d117c4d53d6b194ed3c7b11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 10:51:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: buffer: Fix the wrapping case in bi_putblk
When the block of data need to be split to support the wrapping, the start of
the second block of data was wrong. We must be sure to skup data copied during
the first memcpy.
This patch must be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit ca6ef506610e9d78f99b7ab2095ce0f8a47e18df)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
include/common/buffer.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/common/buffer.h b/include/common/buffer.h
index ae9aafd..0e63913 100644
--- a/include/common/buffer.h
+++ b/include/common/buffer.h
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static inline int bi_putblk(struct buffer *b, const char *blk, int len)
memcpy(bi_end(b), blk, half);
if (len > half)
- memcpy(b_ptr(b, b->i + half), blk, len - half);
+ memcpy(b_ptr(b, b->i + half), blk + half, len - half);
b->i += len;
return len;
}
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 46
net/haproxy/patches/0008-BUG-MEDIUM-h2-also-arm-the-h2-timeout-when-sending.patch View File

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From ccfb5d755f1708f890b197375d962d8c938e78bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 16:10:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: h2: also arm the h2 timeout when sending
Right now the h2 idle timeout is only set when there is no stream. If we
fail to send because the socket buffers are full (generally indicating
the client has left), we also need to arm it so that we can properly
expire such connections, otherwise some failed transfers might leave
H2 connections pending forever.
Thanks to Thierry Fournier for the diag and the traces.
This patch needs to be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit 84b118f3120b3c61156f0ada12ae6456bd1a0b5a)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/mux_h2.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c
index 4303a06..5446fd4 100644
--- a/src/mux_h2.c
+++ b/src/mux_h2.c
@@ -2329,7 +2329,7 @@ static int h2_wake(struct connection *conn)
}
if (h2c->task) {
- if (eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id)) {
+ if (eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id) || h2c->mbuf->o) {
h2c->task->expire = tick_add(now_ms, h2c->last_sid < 0 ? h2c->timeout : h2c->shut_timeout);
task_queue(h2c->task);
}
@@ -2501,7 +2501,7 @@ static void h2_detach(struct conn_stream *cs)
h2_release(h2c->conn);
}
else if (h2c->task) {
- if (eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id)) {
+ if (eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id) || h2c->mbuf->o) {
h2c->task->expire = tick_add(now_ms, h2c->last_sid < 0 ? h2c->timeout : h2c->shut_timeout);
task_queue(h2c->task);
}
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 55
net/haproxy/patches/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-fix-a-100-cpu-usage-with-cpu-map-and-nbthread-nbproc.patch View File

@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
From 5149cd3c7abad68ddb19a0a5b3b604786d5f1b95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?utf8?q?Cyril=20Bont=C3=A9?= <cyril.bonte@free.fr>
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 21:47:39 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: fix a 100% cpu usage with cpu-map and
nbthread/nbproc
Krishna Kumar reported a 100% cpu usage with a configuration using
cpu-map and a high number of threads,
Indeed, this minimal configuration to reproduce the issue :
global
nbthread 40
cpu-map auto:1/1-40 0-39
frontend test
bind :8000
This is due to a wrong type in a shift operator (int vs unsigned long int),
causing an endless loop while applying the cpu affinity on threads. The same
issue may also occur with nbproc under FreeBSD. This commit addresses both
cases.
This patch must be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit d400ab3a369523538c426cb70e059954c76b69c3)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/haproxy.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/haproxy.c b/src/haproxy.c
index 09f7b5e..7d6e019 100644
--- a/src/haproxy.c
+++ b/src/haproxy.c
@@ -2838,7 +2838,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
CPU_ZERO(&cpuset);
while ((i = ffsl(cpu_map)) > 0) {
CPU_SET(i - 1, &cpuset);
- cpu_map &= ~(1 << (i - 1));
+ cpu_map &= ~(1UL << (i - 1));
}
ret = cpuset_setaffinity(CPU_LEVEL_WHICH, CPU_WHICH_PID, -1, sizeof(cpuset), &cpuset);
}
@@ -3038,7 +3038,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
while ((j = ffsl(cpu_map)) > 0) {
CPU_SET(j - 1, &cpuset);
- cpu_map &= ~(1 << (j - 1));
+ cpu_map &= ~(1UL << (j - 1));
}
pthread_setaffinity_np(threads[i],
sizeof(cpuset), &cpuset);
--
1.7.10.4

+ 0
- 43
net/haproxy/patches/0010-BUG-MEDIUM-spoe-Remove-idle-applets-from-idle-list-when-HAProxy-is-stopping.patch View File

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From 7034083b5063d28276b986d645d18071aba5f4d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 13:33:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: spoe: Remove idle applets from idle list when
HAProxy is stopping
In the SPOE applet's handler, when an applet is switched from the state IDLE to
PROCESSING, it is removed for the list of idle applets. But when HAProxy is
stopping, this applet can be switched to DISCONNECT. In this case, we also need
to remove it from the list of idle applets. Else the applet is removed but still
present in the list. It could lead to a segmentation fault or an infinite loop,
depending the code path.
(cherry picked from commit 7d9f1ba246055046eed547fa35aa546683021dce)
[wt: adapted context for 1.8]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/flt_spoe.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/flt_spoe.c b/src/flt_spoe.c
index 8fb6e0b..e76a352 100644
--- a/src/flt_spoe.c
+++ b/src/flt_spoe.c
@@ -1866,6 +1866,7 @@ spoe_handle_appctx(struct appctx *appctx)
goto switchstate;
case SPOE_APPCTX_ST_IDLE:
+ agent->rt[tid].applets_idle--;
if (stopping &&
LIST_ISEMPTY(&agent->rt[tid].sending_queue) &&
LIST_ISEMPTY(&SPOE_APPCTX(appctx)->waiting_queue)) {
@@ -1874,7 +1875,6 @@ spoe_handle_appctx(struct appctx *appctx)
appctx->st0 = SPOE_APPCTX_ST_DISCONNECT;
goto switchstate;
}
- agent->rt[tid].applets_idle--;
appctx->st0 = SPOE_APPCTX_ST_PROCESSING;
/* fall through */
--
1.7.10.4

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