python-crypto: Fix two CVEs

CVE-2013-7459 and CVE-2018-6594. Both patches taken from Fedora.

Also took the liberty to update the PKG_SOURCE_URL to a standard one.

Updated the home URL as well.

Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>

lang/python/python-crypto/Makefile

@@ -9,16 +9,17 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=python-crypto
 PKG_VERSION:=2.6.1
-PKG_RELEASE:=2
+PKG_RELEASE:=3
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=pycrypto-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
-PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://ftp.dlitz.net/pub/dlitz/crypto/pycrypto/
+PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/p/pycrypto
 PKG_HASH:=f2ce1e989b272cfcb677616763e0a2e7ec659effa67a88aa92b3a65528f60a3c
 
 PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(BUILD_VARIANT)-crypto-$(PKG_VERSION)
 
 PKG_LICENSE:=Public Domain
 PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=COPYRIGHT
+PKG_CPE_ID:=cpe:/a:dlitz:pycrypto
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=Jeffery To <jeffery.to@gmail.com>
 
 include $(INCLUDE_DIR)/package.mk
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ define Package/python-crypto/Default
   SECTION:=lang-python
   CATEGORY:=Languages
   SUBMENU:=Python
-  URL:=http://www.pycrypto.org/
+  URL:=https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/
 endef
 
 define Package/python-crypto

lang/python/python-crypto/patches/100-CVE-2013-74459.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+From 8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 22 Dec 2013 22:24:46 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Throw exception when IV is used with ECB or CTR
+
+The IV parameter is currently ignored when initializing
+a cipher in ECB or CTR mode.
+
+For CTR mode, it is confusing: it takes some time to see
+that a different parameter is needed (the counter).
+
+For ECB mode, it is outright dangerous.
+
+This patch forces an exception to be raised.
+---
+ lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ src/block_template.c                 | 11 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
+index 420b6ff..a5f8a88 100644
+--- a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
++++ b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py
+@@ -239,16 +239,30 @@ class RoundtripTest(unittest.TestCase):
+         return """%s .decrypt() output of .encrypt() should not be garbled""" % (self.module_name,)
+ 
+     def runTest(self):
+-        for mode in (self.module.MODE_ECB, self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB, self.module.MODE_OPENPGP):
++
++        ## ECB mode
++        mode = self.module.MODE_ECB
++        encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode)
++        ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
++        decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode)
++        decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
++        self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
++
++        ## OPENPGP mode
++        mode = self.module.MODE_OPENPGP
++        encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
++        eiv_ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
++        eiv = eiv_ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2]
++        ciphertext = eiv_ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:]
++        decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv)
++        decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
++        self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
++
++        ## All other non-AEAD modes (but CTR)
++        for mode in (self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB):
+             encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
+             ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext)
+-            
+-            if mode != self.module.MODE_OPENPGP:
+-                decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
+-            else:
+-                eiv = ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2]
+-                ciphertext = ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:]
+-                decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv)
++            decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv)
+             decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
+             self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext)
+ 
+diff --git a/src/block_template.c b/src/block_template.c
+index f940e0e..d555ceb 100644
+--- a/src/block_template.c
++++ b/src/block_template.c
+@@ -170,6 +170,17 @@ ALGnew(PyObject *self, PyObject *args, PyObject *kwdict)
+ 				"Key cannot be the null string");
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
++	if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_ECB)
++	{
++		PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, "ECB mode does not use IV");
++		return NULL;
++	}
++	if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_CTR)
++	{
++		PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
++			"CTR mode needs counter parameter, not IV");
++		return NULL;
++	}
+ 	if (IVlen != BLOCK_SIZE && mode != MODE_ECB && mode != MODE_CTR)
+ 	{
+ 		PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
+From 58de28a5d32bc10e15766e5a59f41b07397cc6cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Mitchell <richard.j.mitchell@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 16:58:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix speedtest run for ECB modes.
+
+---
+ pct-speedtest.py | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/pct-speedtest.py b/pct-speedtest.py
+index 4ce18be..c7b893a 100644
+--- a/pct-speedtest.py
++++ b/pct-speedtest.py
+@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ class Benchmark:
+         blocks = self.random_blocks(16384, 1000)
+         if mode is None:
+             cipher = module.new(key)
++        elif mode==module.MODE_ECB:
++            cipher = module.new(key, module.MODE_ECB)
+         else:
+             cipher = module.new(key, mode, iv)
+ 

lang/python/python-crypto/patches/101-CVE-2018-6594.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+--- lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py
++++ lib/Crypto/PublicKey/ElGamal.py
+@@ -153,33 +153,33 @@ def generate(bits, randfunc, progress_fu
+         if number.isPrime(obj.p, randfunc=randfunc):
+             break
+     # Generate generator g
+-    # See Algorithm 4.80 in Handbook of Applied Cryptography
+-    # Note that the order of the group is n=p-1=2q, where q is prime
+     if progress_func:
+         progress_func('g\n')
+     while 1:
++        # Choose a square residue; it will generate a cyclic group of order q.
++        obj.g = pow(number.getRandomRange(2, obj.p, randfunc), 2, obj.p)
++
+         # We must avoid g=2 because of Bleichenbacher's attack described
+         # in "Generating ElGamal signatures without knowning the secret key",
+         # 1996
+-        #
+-        obj.g = number.getRandomRange(3, obj.p, randfunc)
+-        safe = 1
+-        if pow(obj.g, 2, obj.p)==1:
+-            safe=0
+-        if safe and pow(obj.g, q, obj.p)==1:
+-            safe=0
++        if obj.g in (1, 2):
++            continue
++
+         # Discard g if it divides p-1 because of the attack described
+         # in Note 11.67 (iii) in HAC
+-        if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, obj.g)[1]==0:
+-            safe=0
++        if (obj.p - 1) % obj.g == 0:
++            continue
++
+         # g^{-1} must not divide p-1 because of Khadir's attack
+         # described in "Conditions of the generator for forging ElGamal
+         # signature", 2011
+         ginv = number.inverse(obj.g, obj.p)
+-        if safe and divmod(obj.p-1, ginv)[1]==0:
+-            safe=0
+-        if safe:
+-            break
++        if (obj.p - 1) % ginv == 0:
++            continue
++
++        # Found
++        break
++
+     # Generate private key x
+     if progress_func:
+         progress_func('x\n')