diff --git a/net/haproxy/Makefile b/net/haproxy/Makefile index bb92f6604..01a3eb969 100644 --- a/net/haproxy/Makefile +++ b/net/haproxy/Makefile @@ -10,12 +10,12 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=haproxy -PKG_VERSION:=2.0.8 -PKG_RELEASE:=2 +PKG_VERSION:=2.0.9 +PKG_RELEASE:=1 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/2.0/src -PKG_HASH:=c37e1e8515ad6f9781a0ac336ca88787f3bb52252fb2bdad9919ba16323c280a +PKG_HASH:=35692801abfd6dde4976cb42fe5cee8aaf61959e743003426073c3141494c589 PKG_MAINTAINER:=Thomas Heil , \ Christian Lachner diff --git a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh index f15aef24c..0fd06d941 100755 --- a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh +++ b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/bin/sh CLONEURL=https://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-2.0.git -BASE_TAG=v2.0.8 +BASE_TAG=v2.0.9 TMP_REPODIR=tmprepo PATCHESDIR=patches diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/000-MINOR-config-warn-on-presence-of-n-in-header-values-replacements.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/000-MINOR-config-warn-on-presence-of-n-in-header-values-replacements.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b354e8bfc..000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/000-MINOR-config-warn-on-presence-of-n-in-header-values-replacements.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -commit 41898a216e92c80c1354b67613834be1b3e97864 -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Fri Oct 25 14:16:14 2019 +0200 - - MINOR: config: warn on presence of "\n" in header values/replacements - - Yves Lafon reported an interesting case where an old rsprep rule used - to conditionally append a header field by inserting a \n in the exising - value was breaking H2 in HTX mode, with the browser rightfully reporting - a PROTOCOL_ERROR when facing the \n. In legacy mode, since the response - is first parsed again as an HTTP/1 message before being converted to H2 - the issue does not happen. We should definitely discourage from using - this old trick nowadays, http-request and http-response rules were made - exactly to end this. Let's detect this and emit a warning when present. - In 2.0 there is already a warning recalling that these rules are - deprecated and which explains what to do instead, so the user now gets - all the relevant information to convert them. - - There is no upstream commit ID for this patch because these rules were - indeed removed from 2.1. This patch could be backported to 1.9 as it - can also trigger the problem when HTX is enabled. - -diff --git a/src/cfgparse-listen.c b/src/cfgparse-listen.c -index 5454f3bb..9c3e107a 100644 ---- a/src/cfgparse-listen.c -+++ b/src/cfgparse-listen.c -@@ -294,6 +294,12 @@ static int create_cond_regex_rule(const char *file, int line, - goto err_free; - } - -+ if (repl && strchr(repl, '\n')) { -+ ha_warning("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : hack involving '\\n' character in replacement string will fail with HTTP/2.\n", -+ file, line, cmd); -+ ret_code |= ERR_WARN; -+ } -+ - if (dir == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ && warnif_misplaced_reqxxx(px, file, line, cmd)) - ret_code |= ERR_WARN; - -@@ -4039,6 +4045,12 @@ stats_error_parsing: - goto out; - } - -+ if (strchr(args[1], '\n')) { -+ ha_warning("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : hack involving '\\n' character in new header value will fail with HTTP/2.\n", -+ file, linenum, args[0]); -+ err_code |= ERR_WARN; -+ } -+ - wl = calloc(1, sizeof(*wl)); - wl->cond = cond; - wl->s = strdup(args[1]); -@@ -4157,6 +4169,12 @@ stats_error_parsing: - goto out; - } - -+ if (strchr(args[1], '\n')) { -+ ha_warning("parsing [%s:%d] : '%s' : hack involving '\\n' character in new header value will fail with HTTP/2.\n", -+ file, linenum, args[0]); -+ err_code |= ERR_WARN; -+ } -+ - wl = calloc(1, sizeof(*wl)); - wl->cond = cond; - wl->s = strdup(args[1]); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/006-OPENWRT-add-uclibc-support.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/000-OPENWRT-add-uclibc-support.patch similarity index 100% rename from net/haproxy/patches/006-OPENWRT-add-uclibc-support.patch rename to net/haproxy/patches/000-OPENWRT-add-uclibc-support.patch diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-mux-h2-do-not-emit-logs-on-backend-connections.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-mux-h2-do-not-emit-logs-on-backend-connections.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fe9221051..000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-mux-h2-do-not-emit-logs-on-backend-connections.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,133 +0,0 @@ -commit 21178a582238ee1c57d0aef73c97711741dd93ed -Author: Willy Tarreau -Date: Wed Oct 23 11:06:35 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: mux-h2: do not emit logs on backend connections - - The logs were added to the H2 mux so that we can report logs in case - of errors that prevent a stream from being created, but as a side effect - these logs are emitted twice for backend connections: once by the H2 mux - itself and another time by the upper layer stream. It can even happen - more with connection retries. - - This patch makes sure we do not emit logs for backend connections. - - It should be backported to 2.0 and 1.9. - - (cherry picked from commit 9364a5fda33a2f591d5e2640249a54af8955fb8b) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c -index 8841c0e0..afa68e80 100644 ---- a/src/mux_h2.c -+++ b/src/mux_h2.c -@@ -1661,7 +1661,8 @@ static int h2c_handle_settings(struct h2c *h2c) - h2c->st0 = H2_CS_FRAME_A; - return 1; - fail: -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - h2c_error(h2c, error); - return 0; - } -@@ -2318,7 +2319,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */ - if (h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR) { - h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2; -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - } - goto fail; - } -@@ -2327,7 +2329,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */ - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR); - h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2; -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - goto fail; - } - -@@ -2335,7 +2338,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */ - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR); - h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2; -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - goto fail; - } - -@@ -2363,7 +2367,7 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - - if ((int)hdr.len < 0 || (int)hdr.len > global.tune.bufsize) { - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR); -- if (!h2c->nb_streams) { -+ if (!h2c->nb_streams && !(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) { - /* only log if no other stream can report the error */ - sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - } -@@ -2381,7 +2385,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - */ - if (hdr.len < 1) { - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR); -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - goto fail; - } - hdr.len--; -@@ -2396,7 +2401,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - * frame payload or greater => error. - */ - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR); -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - goto fail; - } - -@@ -2420,7 +2426,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - ret = h2_frame_check(h2c->dft, 1, h2c->dsi, h2c->dfl, global.tune.bufsize); - if (ret != H2_ERR_NO_ERROR) { - h2c_error(h2c, ret); -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - goto fail; - } - } -@@ -2458,7 +2465,7 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - * this state MUST be treated as a connection error - */ - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR); -- if (!h2c->nb_streams) { -+ if (!h2c->nb_streams && !(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) { - /* only log if no other stream can report the error */ - sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - } -@@ -2608,7 +2615,8 @@ static void h2_process_demux(struct h2c *h2c) - * frames so this one is out of sequence. - */ - h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR); -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -+ if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK)) -+ sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); - goto fail; - - case H2_FT_HEADERS: -@@ -2714,10 +2722,8 @@ static int h2_process_mux(struct h2c *h2c) - if (unlikely(h2c->st0 == H2_CS_PREFACE && (h2c->flags & H2_CF_IS_BACK))) { - if (unlikely(h2c_bck_send_preface(h2c) <= 0)) { - /* RFC7540#3.5: a GOAWAY frame MAY be omitted */ -- if (h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR) { -+ if (h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR) - h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR2; -- sess_log(h2c->conn->owner); -- } - goto fail; - } - h2c->st0 = H2_CS_SETTINGS1; diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/007-OPENWRT-openssl-deprecated.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/001-OPENWRT-openssl-deprecated.patch similarity index 100% rename from net/haproxy/patches/007-OPENWRT-openssl-deprecated.patch rename to net/haproxy/patches/001-OPENWRT-openssl-deprecated.patch diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/002-MINOR-tcp-avoid-confusion-in-time-parsing-init.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/002-MINOR-tcp-avoid-confusion-in-time-parsing-init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5808c1736..000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/002-MINOR-tcp-avoid-confusion-in-time-parsing-init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -commit 74a1e4393f7a7b194abb4f428fd02c7c088f6c67 -Author: William Dauchy -Date: Wed Oct 23 19:31:36 2019 +0200 - - MINOR: tcp: avoid confusion in time parsing init - - We never enter val_fc_time_value when an associated fetcher such as `fc_rtt` is - called without argument. meaning `type == ARGT_STOP` will never be true and so - the default `data.sint = TIME_UNIT_MS` will never be set. remove this part to - avoid thinking default data.sint is set to ms while reading the code. - - Signed-off-by: William Dauchy - - [Cf: This patch may safely backported as far as 1.7. But no matter if not.] - - (cherry picked from commit b705b4d7d308d1132a772f3ae2d6113447022a60) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/proto_tcp.c b/src/proto_tcp.c -index c3578ea2..cfd58e60 100644 ---- a/src/proto_tcp.c -+++ b/src/proto_tcp.c -@@ -1569,10 +1569,6 @@ smp_fetch_dport(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void - */ - static int val_fc_time_value(struct arg *args, char **err) - { -- if (args[0].type == ARGT_STOP) { -- args[0].type = ARGT_SINT; -- args[0].data.sint = TIME_UNIT_MS; -- } - if (args[0].type == ARGT_STR) { - if (strcmp(args[0].data.str.area, "us") == 0) { - free(args[0].data.str.area); diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUG-MINOR-cli-dont-call-the-kw--io_release-if-kw--parse-failed.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUG-MINOR-cli-dont-call-the-kw--io_release-if-kw--parse-failed.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2763f08c9..000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUG-MINOR-cli-dont-call-the-kw--io_release-if-kw--parse-failed.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -commit d4f20fadd9c3145de0eb5f5434f57b9fffc61062 -Author: William Lallemand -Date: Fri Oct 25 21:10:14 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: cli: don't call the kw->io_release if kw->parse failed - - The io_release() callback of the cli_kw is supposed to be used to clean - what an io_handler() has made. It is called once the work in the IO - handler is finished, or when the connection was aborted by the client. - - This patch fixes a bug where the io_release callback was called even - when the parse() callback failed. Which means that the io_release() could - called even if the io_handler() was not called. - - Should be backported in every versions that have a cli_kw->release(). - (as far as 1.7) - - (cherry picked from commit 90b098c921e15f912dbde42658e34780f0ba446d) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/cli.c b/src/cli.c -index 9a9f80f9..c063fbf0 100644 ---- a/src/cli.c -+++ b/src/cli.c -@@ -570,10 +570,19 @@ static int cli_parse_request(struct appctx *appctx) - - appctx->io_handler = kw->io_handler; - appctx->io_release = kw->io_release; -- /* kw->parse could set its own io_handler or ip_release handler */ -- if ((!kw->parse || kw->parse(args, payload, appctx, kw->private) == 0) && appctx->io_handler) { -- appctx->st0 = CLI_ST_CALLBACK; -- } -+ -+ if (kw->parse && kw->parse(args, payload, appctx, kw->private) != 0) -+ goto fail; -+ -+ /* kw->parse could set its own io_handler or io_release handler */ -+ if (!appctx->io_handler) -+ goto fail; -+ -+ appctx->st0 = CLI_ST_CALLBACK; -+ return 1; -+fail: -+ appctx->io_handler = NULL; -+ appctx->io_release = NULL; - return 1; - } - diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MINOR-mux-h2-Dont-pretend-mux-buffers-arent-full-anymore-if-nothing-sent.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MINOR-mux-h2-Dont-pretend-mux-buffers-arent-full-anymore-if-nothing-sent.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 97aee88c8..000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/004-BUG-MINOR-mux-h2-Dont-pretend-mux-buffers-arent-full-anymore-if-nothing-sent.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -commit 074230876d05bdf3fe33893889b326da14ab8ae9 -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Thu Oct 24 10:31:01 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MINOR: mux-h2: Don't pretend mux buffers aren't full anymore if nothing sent - - In h2_send(), when something is sent, we remove the flags - (H2_CF_MUX_MFULL|H2_CF_DEM_MROOM) on the h2 connection. This way, we are able to - wake up all streams waiting to send data. Unfortunatly, these flags are - unconditionally removed, even when nothing was sent. So if the h2c is blocked - because the mux buffers are full and we are unable to send anything, all streams - in the send_list are woken up for nothing. Now, we only remove these flags if at - least a send succeeds. - - This patch must be backport to 2.0. - - (cherry picked from commit 69fe5cea213afd0c7465094e9dfead93143dcf3f) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c -index afa68e80..ac34a723 100644 ---- a/src/mux_h2.c -+++ b/src/mux_h2.c -@@ -2943,7 +2943,8 @@ static int h2_send(struct h2c *h2c) - offer_buffers(NULL, tasks_run_queue); - - /* wrote at least one byte, the buffer is not full anymore */ -- h2c->flags &= ~(H2_CF_MUX_MFULL | H2_CF_DEM_MROOM); -+ if (sent) -+ h2c->flags &= ~(H2_CF_MUX_MFULL | H2_CF_DEM_MROOM); - } - - if (conn->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH) { diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MAJOR-stream-int-Dont-receive-data-from-mux-until-SI_ST_EST-is-reached.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MAJOR-stream-int-Dont-receive-data-from-mux-until-SI_ST_EST-is-reached.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e4717e8fe..000000000 --- a/net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MAJOR-stream-int-Dont-receive-data-from-mux-until-SI_ST_EST-is-reached.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,112 +0,0 @@ -commit 27ebcefd41b3e44395c3fe71939ef98b03f98e7b -Author: Christopher Faulet -Date: Fri Oct 25 10:21:01 2019 +0200 - - BUG/MAJOR: stream-int: Don't receive data from mux until SI_ST_EST is reached - - This bug is pretty pernicious and have serious consequences : In 2.1, an - infinite loop in process_stream() because the backend stream-interface remains - in the ready state (SI_ST_RDY). In 2.0, a call in loop to process_stream() - because the stream-interface remains blocked in the connect state - (SI_ST_CON). In both cases, it happens after a connection retry attempt. In 1.9, - it seems to not happen. But it may be just by chance or just because it is - harder to get right conditions to trigger the bug. However, reading the code, - the bug seems to exist too. - - Here is how the bug happens in 2.1. When we try to establish a new connection to - a server, the corresponding stream-interface is first set to the connect state - (SI_ST_CON). When the underlying connection is known to be connected (the flag - CO_FL_CONNECTED set), the stream-interface is switched to the ready state - (SI_ST_RDY). It is a transient state between the connect state (SI_ST_CON) and - the established state (SI_ST_EST). It must be handled on the next call to - process_stream(), which is responsible to operate the transition. During all - this time, errors can occur. A connection error or a client abort. The transient - state SI_ST_RDY was introduced to let a chance to process_stream() to catch - these errors before considering the connection as fully established. - Unfortunatly, if a read0 is catched in states SI_ST_CON or SI_ST_RDY, it is - possible to have a shutdown without transition to SI_ST_DIS (in fact, here, - SI_ST_CON is swichted to SI_ST_RDY). This happens if the request was fully - received and analyzed. In this case, the flag SI_FL_NOHALF is set on the backend - stream-interface. If an error is also reported during the connect, the behavior - is undefined because an error is returned to the client and a connection retry - is performed. So on the next connection attempt to the server, if another error - is reported, a client abort is detected. But the shutdown for writes was already - done. So the transition to the state SI_ST_DIS is impossible. We stay in the - state SI_ST_RDY. Because it is a transient state, we loop in process_stream() to - perform the transition. - - It is hard to understand how the bug happens reading the code and even harder to - explain. But there is a trivial way to hit the bug by sending h2 requests to a - server only speaking h1. For instance, with the following config : - - listen tst - bind *:80 - server www 127.0.0.1:8000 proto h2 # in reality, it is a HTTP/1.1 server - - It is a configuration error, but it is an easy way to observe the bug. Note it - may happen with a valid configuration. - - So, after a careful analyzis, it appears that si_cs_recv() should never be - called for a not fully established stream-interface. This way the connection - retries will be performed before reporting an error to the client. Thus, if a - shutdown is performed because a read0 is handled, the stream-interface is - inconditionnaly set to the transient state SI_ST_DIS. - - This patch must be backported to 2.0 and 1.9. However on these versions, this - patch reveals a design flaw about connections and a bad way to perform the - connection retries. We are working on it. - - (cherry picked from commit 04400bc7875fcc362495b0f25e75ba6fc2f44850) - Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet - -diff --git a/src/stream_interface.c b/src/stream_interface.c -index ef0fea7f..211fe2d7 100644 ---- a/src/stream_interface.c -+++ b/src/stream_interface.c -@@ -1215,6 +1215,10 @@ int si_cs_recv(struct conn_stream *cs) - int read_poll = MAX_READ_POLL_LOOPS; - int flags = 0; - -+ /* If not established yet, do nothing. */ -+ if (si->state != SI_ST_EST) -+ return 0; -+ - /* If another call to si_cs_recv() failed, and we subscribed to - * recv events already, give up now. - */ -@@ -1293,8 +1297,6 @@ int si_cs_recv(struct conn_stream *cs) - ic->total += ret; - cur_read += ret; - ic->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL; -- if (si->state == SI_ST_CON) -- si->state = SI_ST_RDY; - } - - if (cs->flags & CS_FL_EOS) -@@ -1391,8 +1393,6 @@ int si_cs_recv(struct conn_stream *cs) - - ic->flags |= CF_READ_PARTIAL; - ic->total += ret; -- if (si->state == SI_ST_CON) -- si->state = SI_ST_RDY; - - if ((ic->flags & CF_READ_DONTWAIT) || --read_poll <= 0) { - /* we're stopped by the channel's policy */ -@@ -1544,16 +1544,7 @@ static void stream_int_read0(struct stream_interface *si) - - si_done_get(si); - -- /* Don't change the state to SI_ST_DIS yet if we're still -- * in SI_ST_CON, otherwise it means sess_establish() hasn't -- * been called yet, and so the analysers would not run. However -- * it's fine to switch to SI_ST_RDY as we have really validated -- * the connection. -- */ -- if (si->state == SI_ST_EST) -- si->state = SI_ST_DIS; -- else if (si->state == SI_ST_CON) -- si->state = SI_ST_RDY; -+ si->state = SI_ST_DIS; - si->exp = TICK_ETERNITY; - return; - }