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haproxy: Update HAProxy to v1.8.4 (+patches) 

- Update haproxy download URL and hash
- Update the haproxy homepage
- Add libatomic to the dependencies as 1.8 needs it
- Make USE_REGPARM an x86-only option as this fixes many warnings and does not do much on non-x86 platforms
- Add USE_GETADDRINFO=1 to use getaddrinfo() to resolve IPv6 host names
- Add USE_TFO=1 to enable TCP fast open
- Unbreak CFLAGS, LD and LDFLAGS by adding the missing backslash after $(ADDON)
- Unbreak IGNOREGIT=1 option (typo)
- Rework LDFLAGS and add libatomic
- Add MEDIUM+ patches (see https://www.haproxy.org/bugs/bugs-1.8.4.html)

Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner <gladiac@gmail.com>
lilik-openwrt-22.03
Christian Lachner 7 years ago
parent
4012a69514
commit
02deb12f70
6 changed files with 318 additions and 171 deletions
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  1. +22
    -13
      net/haproxy/Makefile
  2. +0
    -158
      net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-connection-remove-useless-flag-CO_FL_DATA.patch
  3. +61
    -0
      net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Dont-always-treat-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL-as-unrecovarable.patch
  4. +63
    -0
      net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Shutdown-the-connection-for-reading-on-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL.patch
  5. +69
    -0
      net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-http-Switch-the-HTTP-response-in-tunnel-mode-as-earlier-as-possible.patch
  6. +103
    -0
      net/haproxy/patches/0004-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-sample-ssl_bc_-fetch-keywords-are-broken.patch

+ 22
- 13
net/haproxy/Makefile View File

@ -9,12 +9,12 @@
include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=haproxy
PKG_VERSION:=1.7.9
PKG_RELEASE:=02
PKG_VERSION:=1.8.4
PKG_RELEASE:=01
PKG_SOURCE:=haproxy-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.7/src/
PKG_HASH:=1072337e54fa188dc6e0cfe3ba4c2200b07082e321cbfe5a0882d85d54db068e
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/src/
PKG_HASH:=e305b0a4e7dec08072841eef6ac6dcd1b5586b1eff09c2d51e152a912e8884a6
PKG_BUILD_DIR:=$(BUILD_DIR)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(BUILD_VARIANT)/$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION)
PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ define Package/haproxy/Default
SECTION:=net
CATEGORY:=Network
TITLE:=The Reliable, High Performance TCP/HTTP Load Balancer
URL:=http://haproxy.1wt.eu/
URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/
endef
define Download/lua534
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ define Package/haproxy/Default/description
endef
define Package/haproxy
DEPENDS+= +libpcre +libltdl +zlib +libpthread +libopenssl +libncursesw +libreadline +@OPENSSL_WITH_DEPRECATED +@OPENSSL_WITH_EC +@OPENSSL_WITH_EC2M +@OPENSSL_WITH_DTLS +@OPENSSL_WITH_COMPRESSION +@OPENSSL_WITH_NPN +@OPENSSL_WITH_PSK +@OPENSSL_WITH_SRP +@OPENSSL_ENGINE_DIGEST +@OPENSSL_ENGINE_CRYPTO
DEPENDS+= +libpcre +libltdl +zlib +libpthread +libopenssl +libncursesw +libreadline +libatomic +@OPENSSL_WITH_DEPRECATED +@OPENSSL_WITH_EC +@OPENSSL_WITH_EC2M +@OPENSSL_WITH_DTLS +@OPENSSL_WITH_COMPRESSION +@OPENSSL_WITH_NPN +@OPENSSL_WITH_PSK +@OPENSSL_WITH_SRP +@OPENSSL_ENGINE_DIGEST +@OPENSSL_ENGINE_CRYPTO
TITLE+= (with SSL support)
VARIANT:=ssl
@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ $(call Package/haproxy/Default/description)
endef
ENABLE_LUA:=y
ENABLE_REGPARM:=n
ifeq ($(CONFIG_mips),y)
ENABLE_LUA:=n
endif
@ -99,6 +101,10 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_mipsel),y)
ENABLE_LUA:=n
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_TARGET_x86),y)
ENABLE_REGPARM:=y
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_avr32),y)
LINUX_TARGET:=linux26
else
@ -117,6 +123,10 @@ ifeq ($(ENABLE_LUA),y)
ADDON+=LUA_LIB="$(STAGING_DIR)/lua-5.3.4/lib"
endif
ifeq ($(ENABLE_REGPARM),y)
ADDON+=USE_REGPARM=1
endif
ifeq ($(ENABLE_LUA),y)
define Build/Compile/lua
$(MAKE) TARGET=$(LINUX_TARGET) -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR)/lua \
@ -138,14 +148,13 @@ define Build/Compile
CC="$(TARGET_CC)" \
PCREDIR="$(STAGING_DIR)/usr/" \
SMALL_OPTS="-DBUFSIZE=16384 -DMAXREWRITE=1030 -DSYSTEM_MAXCONN=165530 " \
USE_LINUX_TPROXY=1 USE_LINUX_SPLICE=1 USE_REGPARM=1 \
USE_ZLIB=yes USE_PCRE=1 USE_PCRE_JIT=1\
USE_LINUX_TPROXY=1 USE_LINUX_SPLICE=1 USE_TFO=1 \
USE_ZLIB=yes USE_PCRE=1 USE_PCRE_JIT=1 USE_GETADDRINFO=1 \
VERSION="$(PKG_VERSION)-patch$(PKG_RELEASE)" \
$(ADDON)
CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS) -fno-align-jumps -fno-align-functions -fno-align-labels -fno-align-loops -pipe -fomit-frame-pointer -fhonour-copts" \
LD="$(TARGET_LD)" \
LDFLAGS="$(TARGET_LDFLAGS) -lcurses -lreadline" \
GNOREGIT=1
$(ADDON) \
LD="$(TARGET_CC)" \
LDFLAGS="$(TARGET_LDFLAGS) -latomic" \
IGNOREGIT=1
$(MAKE_VARS) $(MAKE) -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR) \
DESTDIR="$(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)" \


+ 0
- 158
net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-connection-remove-useless-flag-CO_FL_DATA.patch View File

@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
From 912e8f18ef274fdda0a522b2aa8255bddd00fb7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 07:35:35 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: connection: remove useless flag CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH
This flag is both confusing and wrong. It is supposed to report the
fact that the data layer has received a shutdown, but in fact this is
reported by CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH which is set by the transport layer after
this condition is detected. The only case where the flag above is set
is in the stream interface where CF_SHUTR is also set on the receiving
channel.
In addition, it was checked in the health checks code (while never set)
and was always test jointly with CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH everywhere, except in
conn_data_read0_pending() which incorrectly doesn't match the second
time it's called and is fortunately protected by an extra check on
(ic->flags & CF_SHUTR).
This patch gets rid of the flag completely. Now conn_data_read0_pending()
accurately reports the fact that the transport layer has detected the end
of the stream, regardless of the fact that this state was already consumed,
and the stream interface watches ic->flags&CF_SHUTR to know if the channel
was already closed by the upper layer (which it already used to do).
The now unused conn_data_read0() function was removed.
(cherry picked from commit 54e917cfa1e7b0539550ae32c48c76da2f169041)
[wt: this happens to fix a real bug which occasionally strikes when
using http-reuse in the rare case where a server shuts down after
providing its response but before the connection is put back into
the idle pool, and it gets immediately recycled for another request,
without first passing through the idle handler, and the already
reported shutdown is never reported to the second transaction,
causing a loop to last for as long as the server timeout]
---
contrib/debug/flags.c | 1 -
include/proto/connection.h | 8 +-------
include/types/connection.h | 2 +-
src/checks.c | 4 ++--
src/stream_interface.c | 11 +++++------
5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/contrib/debug/flags.c b/contrib/debug/flags.c
index bc71bde9..19327f34 100644
--- a/contrib/debug/flags.c
+++ b/contrib/debug/flags.c
@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ void show_conn_flags(unsigned int f)
SHOW_FLAG(f, CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH);
SHOW_FLAG(f, CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH);
SHOW_FLAG(f, CO_FL_DATA_WR_SH);
- SHOW_FLAG(f, CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH);
SHOW_FLAG(f, CO_FL_WAKE_DATA);
SHOW_FLAG(f, CO_FL_INIT_DATA);
SHOW_FLAG(f, CO_FL_ADDR_TO_SET);
diff --git a/include/proto/connection.h b/include/proto/connection.h
index fce60259..eb68322a 100644
--- a/include/proto/connection.h
+++ b/include/proto/connection.h
@@ -413,12 +413,6 @@ static inline void conn_sock_read0(struct connection *c)
fdtab[c->t.sock.fd].linger_risk = 0;
}
-static inline void conn_data_read0(struct connection *c)
-{
- c->flags |= CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH;
- __conn_data_stop_recv(c);
-}
-
static inline void conn_sock_shutw(struct connection *c)
{
c->flags |= CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH;
@@ -450,7 +444,7 @@ static inline void conn_data_shutw_hard(struct connection *c)
/* detect sock->data read0 transition */
static inline int conn_data_read0_pending(struct connection *c)
{
- return (c->flags & (CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH)) == CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH;
+ return (c->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH) != 0;
}
/* detect data->sock shutw transition */
diff --git a/include/types/connection.h b/include/types/connection.h
index 02eac932..90e8e073 100644
--- a/include/types/connection.h
+++ b/include/types/connection.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ enum {
CO_FL_WAKE_DATA = 0x00008000, /* wake-up data layer upon activity at the transport layer */
/* flags used to remember what shutdown have been performed/reported */
- CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH = 0x00010000, /* DATA layer was notified about shutr/read0 */
+ /* unused : 0x00010000 */
CO_FL_DATA_WR_SH = 0x00020000, /* DATA layer asked for shutw */
CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH = 0x00040000, /* SOCK layer was notified about shutr/read0 */
CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH = 0x00080000, /* SOCK layer asked for shutw */
diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
index ca3881a5..6c5e3cbc 100644
--- a/src/checks.c
+++ b/src/checks.c
@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ static void event_srv_chk_r(struct connection *conn)
done = 0;
conn->xprt->rcv_buf(conn, check->bi, check->bi->size);
- if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH)) {
+ if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH)) {
done = 1;
if ((conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) && !check->bi->i) {
/* Report network errors only if we got no other data. Otherwise
@@ -2892,7 +2892,7 @@ static void tcpcheck_main(struct connection *conn)
goto out_end_tcpcheck;
if (conn->xprt->rcv_buf(conn, check->bi, check->bi->size) <= 0) {
- if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH)) {
+ if (conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH)) {
done = 1;
if ((conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR) && !check->bi->i) {
/* Report network errors only if we got no other data. Otherwise
diff --git a/src/stream_interface.c b/src/stream_interface.c
index 836487bd..aba49c94 100644
--- a/src/stream_interface.c
+++ b/src/stream_interface.c
@@ -1060,14 +1060,14 @@ static void si_conn_recv_cb(struct connection *conn)
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
- /* stop here if we reached the end of data */
- if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
- goto out_shutdown_r;
-
/* maybe we were called immediately after an asynchronous shutr */
if (ic->flags & CF_SHUTR)
return;
+ /* stop here if we reached the end of data */
+ if (conn_data_read0_pending(conn))
+ goto out_shutdown_r;
+
cur_read = 0;
if ((ic->flags & (CF_STREAMER | CF_STREAMER_FAST)) && !ic->buf->o &&
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ static void si_conn_recv_cb(struct connection *conn)
* that if such an event is not handled above in splice, it will be handled here by
* recv().
*/
- while (!(conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_DATA_RD_SH | CO_FL_WAIT_ROOM | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE))) {
+ while (!(conn->flags & (CO_FL_ERROR | CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_WAIT_ROOM | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE)) && !(ic->flags & CF_SHUTR)) {
max = channel_recv_max(ic);
if (!max) {
@@ -1267,7 +1267,6 @@ static void si_conn_recv_cb(struct connection *conn)
if (ic->flags & CF_AUTO_CLOSE)
channel_shutw_now(ic);
stream_sock_read0(si);
- conn_data_read0(conn);
return;
}
--
2.13.5

+ 61
- 0
net/haproxy/patches/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Dont-always-treat-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL-as-unrecovarable.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
From 2fcd544272a5498ffa49544e9f06b51bc93e55d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Houchard <ohouchard@haproxy.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 15:17:23 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Don't always treat SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL as
unrecovarable.
Bart Geesink reported some random errors appearing under the form of
termination flags SD in the logs for connections involving SSL traffic
to reach the servers.
Tomek Gacek and Mateusz Malek finally narrowed down the problem to commit
c2aae74 ("MEDIUM: ssl: Handle early data with OpenSSL 1.1.1"). It happens
that the special case of SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL isn't handled anymore since
this commit.
SSL_read() might return <= 0, and SSL_get_erro() return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL,
without meaning the connection is gone. Before flagging the connection
as in error, check the errno value.
This should be backported to 1.8.
(cherry picked from commit 7e2e505006feb8f3b4a7f9e0ac5e89b5a8c4895e)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index aecf3dd..f118724 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -5437,6 +5437,12 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
break;
} else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
goto read0;
+ /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure the error is
+ * unrecoverable before flagging the connection as
+ * in error.
+ */
+ if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN))
+ goto clear_ssl_error;
/* otherwise it's a real error */
goto out_error;
}
@@ -5451,11 +5457,12 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
conn_sock_read0(conn);
goto leave;
out_error:
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
+clear_ssl_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
- conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
goto leave;
}
--
1.7.10.4

+ 63
- 0
net/haproxy/patches/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-Shutdown-the-connection-for-reading-on-SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
From f7fa1d461aa71bbc8a6c23fdcfc305f2e52ce5dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 14:25:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Shutdown the connection for reading on
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
When SSL_read returns SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno is unset or set to EAGAIN, the
connection must be shut down for reading. Else, the connection loops infinitly,
consuming all the CPU.
The bug was introduced in the commit 7e2e50500 ("BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: Don't always
treat SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL as unrecovarable."). This patch must be backported in
1.8 too.
(cherry picked from commit 4ac77a98cda3d0f9b1d9de7bbbda2c91357f0767)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 14 ++++++++------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index f118724..a065bbb 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -5437,10 +5437,9 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
break;
} else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN)
goto read0;
- /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure the error is
- * unrecoverable before flagging the connection as
- * in error.
- */
+ /* For SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL, make sure to clear the error
+ * stack before shutting down the connection for
+ * reading. */
if (ret == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL && (!errno || errno == EAGAIN))
goto clear_ssl_error;
/* otherwise it's a real error */
@@ -5453,16 +5452,19 @@ static int ssl_sock_to_buf(struct connection *conn, struct buffer *buf, int coun
conn_cond_update_sock_polling(conn);
return done;
+ clear_ssl_error:
+ /* Clear openssl global errors stack */
+ ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
+ ERR_clear_error();
read0:
conn_sock_read0(conn);
goto leave;
+
out_error:
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
-clear_ssl_error:
/* Clear openssl global errors stack */
ssl_sock_dump_errors(conn);
ERR_clear_error();
-
goto leave;
}
--
1.7.10.4

+ 69
- 0
net/haproxy/patches/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-http-Switch-the-HTTP-response-in-tunnel-mode-as-earlier-as-possible.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 8a5949f2d74c3a3a6c6da25449992c312b183ef3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Faulet <cfaulet@haproxy.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 15:54:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: http: Switch the HTTP response in tunnel mode as
earlier as possible
When the body length is undefined (no Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding
headers), The reponse remains in ending mode, waiting the request is done. So,
most of time this is not a problem because the resquest is done before the
response. But when a client sends data to a server that replies without waiting
all the data, it is really not desirable to wait the end of the request to
finish the response.
This bug was introduced when the tunneling of the request and the reponse was
refactored, in commit 4be980391 ("MINOR: http: Switch requests/responses in
TUNNEL mode only by checking txn flag").
This patch should be backported in 1.8 and 1.7.
(cherry picked from commit fd04fcf5edb0a24cd29ce8f4d4dc2aa3a0e2e82c)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/proto_http.c | 15 +++++----------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
index 64bd410..29880ea 100644
--- a/src/proto_http.c
+++ b/src/proto_http.c
@@ -4634,16 +4634,8 @@ int http_sync_res_state(struct stream *s)
* let's enforce it now that we're not expecting any new
* data to come. The caller knows the stream is complete
* once both states are CLOSED.
- *
- * However, there is an exception if the response length
- * is undefined. In this case, we switch in TUNNEL mode.
*/
- if (!(txn->rsp.flags & HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN)) {
- channel_auto_read(chn);
- txn->rsp.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
- chn->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
- }
- else if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
+ if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
channel_shutr_now(chn);
channel_shutw_now(chn);
}
@@ -6241,6 +6233,8 @@ http_msg_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct http_msg *msg)
/* The server still sending data that should be filtered */
if (!(chn->flags & CF_SHUTR) && HAS_DATA_FILTERS(s, chn))
goto missing_data_or_waiting;
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
+ goto ending;
}
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ENDING;
@@ -6262,7 +6256,8 @@ http_msg_forward_body(struct stream *s, struct http_msg *msg)
/* default_ret */ 1,
/* on_error */ goto error,
/* on_wait */ goto waiting);
- msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
+ if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ENDING)
+ msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
return 1;
missing_data_or_waiting:
--
1.7.10.4

+ 103
- 0
net/haproxy/patches/0004-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-sample-ssl_bc_-fetch-keywords-are-broken.patch View File

@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
From 7ccf7c9791f2b2329f3940d1347618af3a77bebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Emeric Brun <ebrun@haproxy.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 15:59:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl/sample: ssl_bc_* fetch keywords are broken.
Since the split between connections and conn-stream objects, this
keywords are broken.
This patch must be backported in 1.8
(cherry picked from commit eb8def9f34c37537d56a69fcd211d4c4c8006bea)
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
src/ssl_sock.c | 31 ++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
index 4d0d5db..d832d76 100644
--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
+++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
@@ -6580,8 +6580,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_x_key_alg(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.u.sint = (conn && conn->xprt == &ssl_sock);
@@ -6625,8 +6625,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_is_resumed(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const ch
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6651,9 +6651,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_cipher(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
int sint;
smp->flags = 0;
@@ -6676,8 +6675,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alg_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const c
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_use_keysize(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6747,8 +6746,8 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_fc_alpn(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw
static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_protocol(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
smp->flags = 0;
if (!conn || !conn->xprt_ctx || conn->xprt != &ssl_sock)
@@ -6773,9 +6772,8 @@ static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_session_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
SSL_SESSION *ssl_sess;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
@@ -6917,9 +6915,8 @@ static int
smp_fetch_ssl_fc_unique_id(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090800fL
- struct connection *conn = objt_conn((kw[4] != 'b') ? smp->sess->origin :
- smp->strm ? smp->strm->si[1].end : NULL);
-
+ struct connection *conn = (kw[4] != 'b') ? objt_conn(smp->sess->origin) :
+ smp->strm ? cs_conn(objt_cs(smp->strm->si[1].end)) : NULL;
int finished_len;
struct chunk *finished_trash;
--
1.7.10.4

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